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The War Against The Nazi U-Boats 1942 – 1944
The Antisubmarine Command
L. Douglas Keeney
Copyright © 2012 FastPencil, Inc.
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2012-08-10
Foreword
The clouds of World War II were casting long and increasingly dark shadows across the face of America. By 1942, with the exception of neutral countries such as Spain, Switzerland and Sweden, the continent of Europe had been overrun by the Germans with just Britain and Russia holding them back from compete domination. On the other side of the world, Imperial Japan had a pincer-like grip on the remainder of the nations with occupation forces stretching from the Aleutians to New Guinea leaving just a narrow sea lane to Australia, which was also in jeopardy. If Japan were to prevail in the East and Germany in the West, North America would be an isolated continent surrounded by hostile nations on both sides.
Thus began the end. The Battle for the Atlantic pitted the Nazi wolf packs against the destroyer escorts of both navies, plus the RAF and, starting in 1942, the United States Army Air Force. But the tool that really did it was the B-24 Liberator. “The VLR [very long range] B-24 Liberator aircraft of RAF 120th Squadron was the weapon system which tipped the battle in favor of the Allies,” wrote Chipman. “What made the aircraft such an effective weapon against the U-boat was their high speed relative to a surface vessel, a speed which permitted them to search a much greater area than a ship.
“In October 1942, the US Army Air Forces entered the Atlantic war by creating several land-based antisubmarine squadrons. Officially known as the US Army Air Forces’ Antisubmarine Command, these units were designed to help the US Navy hunt for enemy submarines, which, at the time, were patrolling along the Atlantic coast and in the Caribbean.
“In November 1942, 21 American B-24s landed in South England and began flying out of St. Eval, Cornwall. Between December and March, they flew several patrols across the Bay of Biscay searching for and attacking various German submarines. On occasion they encountered German Junkers Ju-88 aircraft and had to fight their way back to England.”
This remarkable restoration brings back to life the original 300-page report written by in 1945 by Arthur B. Ferguson, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Historical Division of the United States Army Air Forces. Ferguson’s fine history reminds us yet again of another crucial mission flown by the World War II airmen. For aviation and history buffs, and all those who enjoy an engaging story exceptionally well told, this is a wonderful addition to your library and the newest installment to our series of books under the banner of the Untold Stories of World War II..
The Background
In the days immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the armed forces of the United States had to face the threat of a similar catastrophe on their eastern defenses. The Germans fully appreciated the advantages of swift offensive action in the Atlantic. They knew that American participation in the war would depend on the free and rapid movement of supply. Consequently, with the entry of the United States into active warfare, the Battle of the Atlantic became a key point in German strategy. And the Germans possessed in their submarine fleet, already used with devastating effect in the eastern Atlantic, the means of prosecuting this “trade war” to the utmost. It is not yet clear why the U-boats took nearly a month to become operative in American waters, but it appears that a detachment of the German submarine fleet was sent to the western Atlantic as soon as practicable after the formal entry of the United States into the war.
On 31 December a Coast Guard cutter reported a periscope in Portland Channel, and on 7 January an Army plane sighted a submarine off the coast of New Jersey. On that same day the Navy reported the presence of a fleet of U-boats in the waters south of Newfoundland. The SS Cyclope was sunk off Nova Scotia on 11 January; three days later the tanker Horness went down southeast of Montauk Point, Long Island. These sinking’s merely head the tragically long list of similar losses which served almost more than the disaster of Pearl Harbor to bring home to the American public the grim realities of total war. Here was not only a drain on supply lines of our war effort, perilously thin at best, but an attack virtually on our Atlantic seaboard. In the remaining 17 days of January, 13 more ships sank in the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
The situation rapidly became desperate. During the 76 days following the sinking of the Horness, 53 ships amounting to over 300,000 gross tons had gone down. With March sinking’s at an annual rate of over 2,000,000 tons, the morale of merchant crews showed signs of rapid deterioration, and insurance companies had ceased writing marine insurance. Worst of all was the fact that, prior to May 1942, the enemy submarines operated with relative impunity in American coastal waters.
The question thus arose: what sort of antisubmarine defense could be brought to bear against this threat to the entire U.S. strategy in the Atlantic? According to general defense plans, which will be discussed in some detail a little later, the Navy had assumed responsibility for operations beyond the coast line, leaving to Army aircraft only a supporting, emergency role in coastal defense. Steps had been taken to provide the means of cooperation between the services, resulting in the completion of a joint control and information center at New York 4 days after war was declared. Nevertheless, the shock of Pearl Harbor found the Navy quite unable to carry on the offshore patrol necessary to the fulfillment of its mission. The Commander of the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier (later, Eastern Sea Frontier), on whom fell naturally the initial responsibility for countering the submarine menace, had at his disposal on 7 December 1941 approximately 30 surface vessels, including 4 PY boats, 4 SC boats, one 165-foot Coast Guard cutter, six 125-foot Coast Guard cutters, 2 PG boats, and 3 Eagle boats to patrol the 1200-mille coast line from Maine to Key West. Of this force he wrote to COMINCH on 22 December: “There is not a single vessel available that an enemy submarine could not out-distance when operating on the surface. In most cases the guns of these vessels would be out-ranged by those of the submarine.” Nor was it possible to augment the surface forces rapidly enough to make antisubmarine patrol, even convoy, practicable. The only destroyers available were those which happened to be in the ESF on fleet duties. In actual practice an average of only two destroyers per day was available for use. Repeated requests made to COMINCH for reinforcements apparently could not be met. For example, on 30 March 1942 the Commander, ESF sent a message in which he requested additional destroyers because four submarines had been sighted off Cape Hatteras and two more were believed to be operating there, while all except one of the four destroyers in the area were searching for survivors of a lost ship or were refueling or were under repair. COMINCH replied on 31 March briefly: “Your knowledge of other demands for DD’s as imperative as your own is not given sufficient credit in your message 302318.”
If the surface forces were wholly inadequate, the naval air arm was little stronger. In December, the naval planes at the disposal of the Commander, ESF totaled 103. Of these, however, the majority were trainers or utility ships; only one was listed as a bomber, although 9 were classified as patrol or torpedo bombers. A month later the picture appeared little if at all brighter. Of the 63 aircraft available for duty between Salem and Elizabeth City (including four lighter-than-air ships at Lakehurst),
