there were many points at which things could go very wrong. Moreover, because each phase was so dependent on the others, any hitch could create a chain reaction and end in a humiliating defeat for the entire mission. Not only would this be catastrophic on a tactical and operational level, but it would also be a major setback to the entire South African war effort.
On the other hand, calculated risk-taking is intrinsically part of war. No operation is ever without risk. The trick is to foresee where things can go wrong, to be flexible and think on your feet, to react quickly enough to unexpected developments, and to build in – in terms of planning, training and equipment – a kind of cushion to absorb unexpected problems when (not if!) they occur. The SADF’s “cushion” against the Cuban threat was an antitank platoon and one of the Buccaneer bombers, while a DC-4, fitted with sophisticated ELINT (electronic intelligence) equipment, would act as an airborne early warning system against any MiG interference. Four Mirage IIICZs from 2 Squadron (the famed “Flying Cheetahs”) were also added almost at the last minute to counter the threat from the MiGs.
In hindsight, this was woefully inadequate. As we shall see, there were simply not enough ground-attack aircraft on the scene to counter the Cuban threat. The Mirage IIIs were interceptors, not really bombers, and their limited range meant that they could not stay above the battlefield for longer than a few minutes. The four Mirages, which also had to stand in as back-up ground attackers, were also insufficient to counter a determined MiG intervention from Lubango or Menongue. Fortunately, such an intervention never happened, but that changes nothing about the fact that the SADF had too little air capacity at Cassinga.[21]
The ground plan was tactically sound, making maximum use of shock effect and surprise. There would, in effect, be a double surprise. The Calonga River, which flows north–south to the west of the town, formed a natural barrier, and so the SWAPO defences were strongest to the north, east and south. They were not expecting a thrust from the west, and yet this is exactly what Breytenbach and his planners decided to do. Furthermore, being so far from the border, the SWAPO fighters felt safe in Cassinga, and never expected a parachute assault.[22] When everything is taken into account, the boldness of the operation was an important factor in its eventual success.
Political considerations played an important role in the timing of the operation. South Africa had just accepted UN Security Council Resolution 435, and with it the prospect of Namibian independence and elections under UN supervision. However, the Vorster government still felt the need to project a strong image and to deal SWAPO a heavy blow in order to diminish the rebel movement’s capacity to win an election. After all, SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma had only recently proclaimed that his movement was fighting for total power and that elections were unimportant to them (see Chapter 10).
The date of Operation Reindeer was shifted repeatedly, until, finally, word came through that the operation was set for 4 May. The paratroopers, who had been training hard in total isolation in the Orange Free State province, were informed of their mission. They then boarded the C-130 and C-160 aircraft and were flown to Grootfontein Air Force Base on 3 May in preparation for the big day – the largest air assault in South African military history.
In order to mislead the enemy, a large combined mechanised infantry and parachute exercise, known as Exercise Kwiksilwer, was laid on at Schmidtsdrif at the same time as the operation. However, the paratroopers and the Ratel troops involved in Operation Reindeer never showed up.
Cassinga: the battle
The Prussian general Helmuth von Moltke (1800–1891) reputedly said that no battle plan ever survives first contact with the enemy. The Battle of Cassinga was no exception. In fact, things began to go wrong even before the first transport aircraft left Bloemspruit Air Force Base for Grootfontein. The aerial-photo interpreters had misjudged the height at which the photos of Cassinga had been taken, and consequently used the wrong scale and got the distances on the ground wrong. Based on this, incorrect information was given to the transport pilots about exactly when to start the paratroop drop. Also, the photographs were about six months old and had been taken in the dry season, when the Calonga River was little more than a trickle. On the day of the attack, the river was full.
At 07h50 the Canberras dropped a total of 1 200 antipersonnel bombs; they were followed shortly afterwards by the Buccaneers, which dropped 32 high-explosive bombs (450 kg each). This air strike was timed to coincide with the camp’s morning mustering parade, and the attack caused enormous carnage on the parade ground. The Buccaneers’ ordnance was of Second World War vintage, and exploded with great sound and fury, but signified not very much. It brought down a few buildings and left great craters in which PLAN fighters could take cover and make life difficult for the attackers. The smoke caused by the first attacks obscured the Buccaneer pilots’ view, and some of their bombs fell in the bush south of the camp without any effect. Also, the most important part of the base – the heavily defended headquarters complex – was not hit at all, since it had not been identified by the aerial-photo interpreters.
While the Mirages swooped over Cassinga, their 30-mm cannon chattering, the paratroopers commenced their drop, which went awry from the start. Because of the photo interpreters’ mistake, the soldiers were dropped too late and had to struggle with a stronger-than-expected northeasterly wind. Instead of landing between the village and the river to its west, a sizeable part of Alpha and Bravo companies landed spread out across the western side of river and to the southwest. About a third to a half of them first had to struggle across the swollen river.
The tactical plan was in a shambles. On the other side, Charlie Company was also dropped late and to the southeast of the target, instead of due east. The two platoons to be dropped to the north landed in the village, right on top of the defenders, while only Delta Company, to the south, came down more or less in their intended landing zone. Breytenbach’s forces were therefore in the wrong positions. This also left many gaps through which some SWAPO fighters – including PLAN commander-in-chief Dimo Hamaambo (nom de guerre “Jesus”) – promptly escaped. Hamaambo was nowhere to be found for the rest of the day, and his fighters had to battle alone and leaderless.
Any combat parachute drop is followed by a period of confusion – hopefully very short – in which the commander has to establish control over the battle. At Cassinga, Breytenbach had an almost impossible struggle to succeed, but the highly aggressive paratroopers immediately attacked the enemy fighters wherever they found them. Having established the whereabouts of his troops, Breytenbach proved what an excellent tactician he was. He decided to change the axis of attack – planned to be from west to east – to south to north. A suitable site to cross the river was found, and with Alpha and Bravo companies forming up to the south and southeast of Cassinga, the attack could finally begin, albeit 60 to 90 minutes behind schedule.
This delay had serious consequences. Firstly, it meant that the PLAN fighters had time to recover from the shock and confusion of the air attack. Secondly, the whole tactical plan, daring as it was, depended upon speed. The troops had to be inserted quickly, do the job posthaste and then be extracted. It was cutting things very fine indeed. The delay also would give the Cuban battle group at Techamutete additional time to react.
What is more, unknown to the South Africans, a mechanised combat group of FAPLA tanks, guns and infantry under Cuban officers was also rushing in from the north. Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) member Joseph Kobo, who was with them, related how they saw everything happening in the distance, but arrived at the battlefield just too late to intervene. Only years later, when he was discussing the matter with Kobo, it dawned on Breytenbach that his force had narrowly escaped being attacked not only from the south, but from the north too.[23] This scenario had not been foreseen during the planning phase.
Meanwhile, from the north, the independent platoon advanced against relatively light opposition, driving the defenders before them, until they encountered their compatriots coming from the opposite direction. Simultaneously, with Alpha Company on the left and Bravo on
