first mechanised infantry unit in 1973, and, as Roland de Vries remembers, “[t]he training for evolving mobile warfare concepts and the appropriate development of South Africa’s mechanised infantry systems commenced in all seriousness at Bloemfontein in 1976.”[56]
The attack on Chetequera would be preceded by a small operation that was more important than it seems at first glance. This was a foray by Juliet into Angola to try to rescue Sapper Johan van der Mescht, who had been captured by a group of PLAN insurgents only a few days previously. Battle Group Juliet happened to be in Ovamboland to evaluate the new mechanised doctrine and the Ratel under operational conditions, and this presented an excellent opportunity. Under Commandant Joep Joubert, the unit crossed the border posthaste in the vicinity of Eenhana, where the woods were about the densest along the whole border. About 10 km inside Angola, the first SWAPO base was hit. Ep van Lill later remembered:
As we hit this first base, we were shocked because it was very well camouflaged. When the Ratels got into the trenches, we could not get through or out, as the Ratel at that stage did not have multiwheel drive. The brush badly damaged the air pressure pipes underneath the vehicles. I had to hitch up to six vehicles to each other to pull one out. I looked like a speed cop on the target. Lucky for us, the enemy fled, but it was a very hasty evacuation because the fires still burned and the porridge was still on the fire.[57]
After this, the column attacked a second base, but again SWAPO had already fled. As it was getting dark, the South African column withdrew under cover of artillery fire.[58] In the event, Van der Mescht was not rescued, and remained a prisoner until released in May 1982.[59]
This rather short operation was the very first SADF foray into Angola using mechanised forces. In light of the army’s lack of experience with mechanised movements in operational conditions, this was of great importance. According to Major Hans Kriek, Juliet’s second in command at the time, doctrine called for the avoidance of land mines at all costs. “Therefore we had to bundu-bash all the way, and that brought about much damage. At times, it was near chaos; in fact, it would have been chaos if it wasn’t for the cool leadership of Commandant Joep Joubert.”[60]
Van Lill concurs: “Our vehicles were, however, in a bad condition. Everything which could be broken off by the bush, was broken off, and the soft-skinned vehicles were all dents and without windows. Everything was taken to Grootfontein, and there an intense effort was made to repair the vehicles and make them bush-resistant.”[61]
For the attack on Chetequera, Battle Group Juliet was put under the command of Commandant Frank Bestbier, Joubert’s successor at 1 SAI, an experienced infantry officer who had seen action during Savannah. He would be accompanied by an observer from the Chief of the Army, Commandant (later Major General) Johann “Dippies” Dippenaar, an officer whom we shall meet again later in this book.[62] The unit had 31 Ratels, 23 Eland armoured cars, 9 Buffel armoured personnel carriers and 18 soft-skinned vehicles in the rear echelon. These were divided into three detachments: Combat Team 1, under the command of Major Ep van Lill (one Eland troop and a beefed-up Ratel company); Combat Team 2, under Major PW de Jager (three Eland troops and three support sections in Buffels); and Combat Team 3, under Lieutenant (later Commandant) Mike Muller (one Eland troop, one mechanised infantry platoon and three support sections, plus combat engineers). The formation also had an 81-mm mortar group.
Aerial photographs of Chetequera showed a base with about 200 to 300 men, well dug in with extensive trenches and bunkers, heavy machine guns, mortars and antitank weapons. The photos also showed that the point of gravity of the defences lay in the south. This was logical; any attack would, after all, most probably come from the direction of South West Africa. Therefore, Bestbier decided not to indulge the SWAPO commander, but to attack from the north, where the South Africans were clearly not expected.
The preparation was meticulous. A similar terrain was chosen in Ovamboland, and the SWAPO base was rebuilt there. The attack was repeatedly exercised until everybody knew exactly what to do. Bestbier’s operational instruction contained, among other things, strict orders that prisoners had to be taken and that nobody should be killed in cold blood. Shooting prisoners or members of the local population was emphatically out. Fighting with FAPLA or the Cubans had to be avoided.
The idea was that Van Lill’s Combat Team 1 would comprise the main punch of the attack. They would attack from the north and push right through to the south. De Jager’s Combat Team 2 would cover Van Lill’s attack on the western or right flank, its Eland 90s being used more or less in a mobile-artillery role. Muller’s Combat Team 3 would be stationed to the northeast to counter any enemy intervention from that direction. The mechanised infantry would fight mainly from within their Ratels. The attack would start at midday, after a bombardment by the same Canberras and Buccaneers that had brought death to Cassinga that morning. After Chetequera’s destruction, the combat group would attack a smaller base at Mahama on the way back.
Things started to go wrong slightly during the march to Chetequera. The combat group moved during the night, but one delay after the other meant that the assembly area for the attack was reached about 90 minutes late. However, the air support was also late, due to the events at Cassinga. At 13h30, the bombers – two Buccaneers, followed by four Canberras – finally went in.
The air attack caused a lot of shock, but relatively little damage, as the bushes cushioned the Canberras’ anti-personnel bombs, which did not explode. At this stage, Bestbier discovered that he could not talk to the aircraft to make sure they had completed their task, and another delay ensued. This did not matter much, though, because the enemy fighters were still very much “punch-drunk” when the ground attack went in, according to Van Lill.
Ten minutes after the aircraft were done, the ground troops were unleashed. Van Lill’s troops found that their sight was extremely limited due to crops growing in the fields, and they had to form their attack wedge formation on the go. They stormed into the base, but ran into trouble almost immediately. The terrain was very thickly wooded, so that Van Lill had to struggle hard to keep control over his own combat group. The Eland troop, which had to cover his attack from the northwest, found itself 800 m to the south, while the main axis of the advance was about 15° to the east of what it should have been. He could not see more than four of his vehicles at any time, but he succeeded in keeping the momentum going. Some Ratels fell into trenches or got stuck in the huge ant heaps and had to be towed out under heavy machine gun and rifle fire.
A medic, one Forster, remembers: “We flew into the base with the Browning machine gun shooting left, right and centre. Us at the back [of the vehicle] of course were so excited that we shot at any movement the enemy made. A few shots flew over our heads, but it was in vain. We did not allow those unaimed shots to disturb us.”[63]
Within 10 minutes, the Ratels drove right through the base in a southerly direction, shooting everything up and trampling a number of SWAPO fighters. At a recoilless 75-mm gun position, an estimated 26 PLAN fighters were killed despite their determined attempts to bring the weapon into action. It was in vain. “The enemy’s resistance astonished everyone,” Bestbier wrote in his report.[64] The 81-mm mortar group was supposed to give indirect support, but was too late in position to do so. Luckily for the South Africans, they had developed a technique – strictly speaking, illegal – of deploying 60-mm mortars on sandbags on the Ratels’ backs, so the absence of 81-mm mortar support did not make that much difference. The terrain was so rough that when Van Lill reached his objective south of the base 11 minutes later, he discovered that only 5 of his 14 Ratels remained entirely serviceable; the tyres on all the others were flat. (At this stage, the Ratel was not yet fitted with flat-run tyres, which would have enabled them to continue.)
Meanwhile, Combat Team 2 (De Jager) moved too far west before changing direction to the south, and consequently missed the northwestern corner of the base. They drew heavy fire, and two South Africans were killed, possibly by friendly fire.[65] Their covering fire – meant to support Van Lill’s advance – was also less effective than it was
