1917. Key to the “Russian” Revolution. Николай Стариков

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1917. Key to the “Russian” Revolution - Николай Стариков

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dates of the revolution: well-chosen as much as unexpected…

      "Behind-the-scenes revolution preparation remained behind the scenes," Milyukov wrote in his memoirs. And then the workers with no one behind them, simply the workers on their own took into the streets of the Russian capital. In the end, nobody was prepared for such a scenario: neither the plotters from the Duma conceiving the palace coup, nor the generals who assisted them. Social Revolutionaries (SRs) and Bolsheviks, enjoying cozy Swiss coffee shops and beer houses, had no clue about the revolution. Vladimir Lenin didn't count on it spending his time in Zurich, Lev Trotsky could not believe the lines in New-York newspapers, Joseph Stalin had no idea his exile would end in a few days. Russian Emperor calmly boarded his train to the General Headquarters in Mogilev, and his spouse saw him off with an easy mind.

      Everything was supposed to look as if the situation was unfolding on its own, and the waves of people's indignation caused the overthrow of the odious monarchy. Therefore, there had to be not a regular riot but some massive turmoil that could pass for a people's revolution. The displeased part of the Russian elite was ready to act but was short of a cause. Trotsky gave an excellent description of their mood in his memoirs, "The stage for the last act had long been prepared but, as usual, nobody expected that the time for action had already come."

      The cause for people's discontent was chosen perfectly – bread. Provisions in Russia were in abundance – in 1916 the surplus of bread minus internal consumption and supplies from allies made up around 197 mln poods (Translator's note: Russian pood is a unit of mass equal to about 16 kg).[49] Yet, in February it was the first time when interruptions in supply began. The scenario of 1905 was repeating: demonstrations, troops, and victims. The only difference was that in 1917 the capital stationed not the selective guards' regiments but reserve units. At the same time, a new draft of recruits born in 1898 had been completed. The barracks were filled with 18 and 19-year-olds, who had been drafted in earlier to replenish the heavy casualties at the front. In case of clashes with "people's" demonstrations, it could be easily predicted that these troops would not be effective in subduing the coup.

      The first alarm of the Russian tragedy rang on February 18: just the same as on the eve of the Bloody Sunday the strike outburst at the Putilovksy Factory The enterprise was not an ordinary one, it was the defensive plant that manufactured products on which life and death of our soldiers depended. In the democratic France, colonial forces would seal off the defensive plant on a strike at wartime, while all the troublemakers would be arrested, tried and shot. In the "Prison of Nations," as the imperial Russia is presented to us, not a single police officer moved towards the plant.

      The authorities did so many weird things that February, and all of it started with this forbearance for the strikers. The coup was not subdued in the inception. Even nature seemed to act against Russia. It was extremely cold in Central Russia, as cold as minus 43°C. Over 1,200 steam trains were out of order, which resulted in provision supplies' interruptions. Problems with food started in the capital on February 18, so the authorities had to announce introduction of bread coupons in the city. Apart from that, groundless rumors about upcoming hunger were insistently spread in Petrograd. Obviously, citizens started purchasing more bread, which resulted in even bigger food shortage. There was no brown bread in the stores while white bread, which was more expensive, was still available. Large queues formed in front of the stores, and people railed against the government. The only thing left was to explain "correctly" the annoyed citizens who was responsible for the difficulties. It was this very drawback so typical for monarchies: when stores have no bread, it is the autocracy responsible.

      After consulting with the "allied" delegations that had arrived for the conference, Nicholas II peacefully departed for the General Headquarters in Mogilev. He left his capital on February 22, 1917. The Tsar is often blamed for leaving Petrograd at the most critical moment. Yet, there were solid grounds for leaving the capital: he was at the head of the army and had to be at the General Headquarters. There were no particular reasons for concern. In spite of the fact that on the day that the State Duma was opened for sessions, workers' demonstrations were planned, all the riots were prevented thanks to the accurate actions of the secret police service, certain people were arrested. The last arrests in the history of the Russian secret police service[50]

      The planned marches did not take place. Only about 20,000 people went on strike. At two factories workers marched off with revolutionary songs crying, "Down with the war," but were scattered by the police. On Nevsky Prospect, male and female students converged in crowds but were also cleared away. The capital seemed to return to its peaceful state, and Nicholas II could return to manage the battle operations without any anxiety. However, leaving Petrograd and sensing uneasy situation in the capital, the Tsar ordered to send the reliable troops forth from the front to Tsarskoye Selo. Just in case. Could he have predicted the betrayal by the top military commanders?!

      Protopopov, the minister of internal affairs, wrote, "In mid-February, the Tsar informed me with a distaste that he had ordered General Gurko to send the lancer regiment and Cossacks forth to Petrograd but Gurko did not send those. Instead, he assigned other regiments including navy (who were considered pro-revolutionary)."[51] The researcher of the February events Ivan Solonevich writes, "Among other things it certainly can be explained by foolishness, however, this explanation faces the fact that everything has limits in our world, even human foolishness. It was a treason, a well-thought and well-planned one."[52]

      Apart from the non-performed military preparations, before departure the Tsar received Prince Golitsyn and signed a decree on the Duma dismissal, leaving it at his disposal. If required, Golitsyn was authorized to date the decree and notify the Duma members on their dismissal. After that, the monarch's train left for the General Headquarters in Mogilev.

      The next day after the monarch's departure, as if by command, serious riots spontaneously started in the city. "February 23 was International Women's Day. The plan was to celebrate it in social and democratic circles in the usual order: meetings, speeches, news sheets," Lev Trotsky wrote later in his "History of the Russian Revolution." "The day before nobody had the slightest idea that Women's Day would be the first day of the revolution. There was not a single organization invoking strikes on that day."[53]

      Nobody called out to start the strikes but they started. Randomly, on their own, out of nowhere. However, the fact that tension started right after Nicholas's departure, makes us ponder on the "spontaneity" of people's anger. The Empress, who remained in Tsarskoye Selo, sent a letter to her husband the next day, "Yesterday there were disturbances on Vasilievsky Island and on Nevsky Prospect, because the poor tried to storm bakeries. They broke the Philippov's shop into shatters, and the Cossacks were forwarded against that. I received this information поп-officially (the italics are mine. – N. S.)'.'[54]

      This is extremely important. Information blackout of the royal family is an obligatory condition for the coup to succeed. The blackout was in the final stage – the city was already overwhelmed by the revolution, but the Empress discovered it not from the people whose job it was to inform her. The same about the people close to Nicholas II – they did not report anything to him, and from his wife's letter he could only understand that nothing critical was going on. The Tsar did not know that the destiny of the dynasty was being resolved at that moment in Petrograd, the issue of life or death for his country and his family. Yet, to understand what was in store for him he should have only read the records of the Duma sessions.

      Later on, the members of the Provisional Government would shift the blame for assassinated Romanovs' family onto Bolsheviks. There is just as much truth in those accusations as bluff. On February 14, 1917, the plan was to prevent demonstrations and uprising, when Kerensky said in his speech to the Parliament, "Today the historic task for the Russian people is

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<p>49</p>

Kitanina T. War, Bread, Revolution (Provisions Issues in Russia. 1914 – October 1917). L.: Nauka, 1985

<p>50</p>

The last ones were not these particular arrested "fighters for liberty" but the involvement of the Police was the last before the liquidation of the law enforcement authorities. Actually, arrests of the revolutionaries continued until February 27, when anarchy completely swallowed the city (Spiridovich A. The Great War and February Revolution (1914–1917). Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 525, 533).

<p>51</p>

Multatuli P. God Bless My Decision… M: Forum, 2007. P. 285

<p>52</p>

Solonevich I. Great February Forgery; http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_s/solonev08.html

<p>53</p>

Trotsky L. The History of the Russian Revolution. V. 1; http://www.magister.msk.ru/library/trotsky/trotl007.htm

<p>54</p>

Spiridovich A. The Great War and February Revolution (1914–1917). Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 507.