1917. Key to the “Russian” Revolution. Николай Стариков

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1917. Key to the “Russian” Revolution - Николай Стариков

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Army, by contrast, planned its strategic defense. "Our position was really challenging and almost desperate. We couldn't think of any offence, and we had to keep our reserves ready for defense. Any of the Entente members would hardly be put out of action. Our defeat seemed inevitable…" Erich Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs.[38]

      The German Army was pessimistic as they were reported not only by the German ministers but by their Austro-Hungarian colleagues, too. And the latter were full of some goner's "optimism."

      "It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an end. To enter into lengthy details in this connection would be to take up your Majesty's time needlessly. I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human materials, and, above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owning to undernourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of the sufferings from the war.

      Though I hope we succeed in holding out during the next few months and carry out a successful defense, I am nevertheless quite convinced that another winter campaign would be absolutely out of question; in other words, that in the later summer or in the autumn an end must be put to the war at all costs. Without a doubt, it will be most important to begin peace negotiations."[39]

      This is how Count von Czernin, the internal minister in Austria, grimly described the situation in the report for his Emperor. After the Russian Army had significantly increased its combat might, the German Army wouldn't withstand the onslaught from the east and west for long. Germany would be definitely followed by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, whose armies stayed up only with the German support. The German submarines were the only hope for Germany – if they didn't help to win the war, they would at least help them to stay up. "Without our submarine warfare, the Quadruple Alliance would have been inevitably defeated in 1917,"[40] Ludendorff indicated. Therefore, no one relied on the overland army anymore.

      The military catastrophe of Germany and all of its satellites was inevitably coming in 1917. "If in 1917 Russia had remained an "organized state," all the Danube countries would be just Russian provinces today," said Count Istvan Bethlen, the Hungarian chancellor. "Not only Prague but Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, and Sofia would follow the will of the Russian rulers. The Russian military flags would wave in the breeze in Constantinople on the Bosphorus and in Kotor on the Adriatic Coast. Yet, due to the revolution, Russia lost this war and many of its lands…"[41]

      The victory was very close, which meant Russia was going to win. However, our joint victory with all of its signs clear wasn't what the "allies" wanted, as in that case they would have to share the trophies. They would have to give Russia the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and to let Russia out from the blocked Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Thus, Russia might have left the crucible of the dreadful war not ruined but reinforced. And it would have been impossible not to give it the straits if it had won. On December 1, 1916, Nicholas II addressed the army and the navy and explained that he was going to fight for the recovery of our primordial boundaries and for the ownership of Constantinople. Thus, he announced the agreements made, and after Russia had victoriously ended the war, they couldn't have been failed. If Russia hadn't been on the list of the winning nations, though, there wouldn't be any need for sharing!

      Our partners from the Entente didn't need the world slaughter to end in the coming year, it was too early. The "allies" didn't need a victory. They wanted to have Russia and Germany, these large states, destroyed, and their economies absolutely ruined. It would be great to have chaos and civil wars to weaken them finally. Early in 1917, the Russians and the Germans weren't yet ready to kill their fellows. It was necessary to make their sufferings even worse for the scenario to work. The "allies" took every effort to prevent the war from ending this year and to prolong it for a year and a half. Millions of soldiers were going to fall on battlefields in accordance with the plan of our "allies," who didn't just need a victory. What they needed were total destruction and the revolution. Russia should have been the first to burst into flames – to get rid of the tsarist regime and detonate the rest of the monarchial Europe. That's why the war took over a year longer, and Germany fell only in November 1918, not in summer 1917. How can a war be "prolonged" when one of the opponents is ready to lose? Only through weakening the other opponent. The February Revolution despite its obvious progressiveness quickly destroyed the Russian Army, which revived the spirits of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria. The war went on. That's why "the bourgeois democratic revolution" should have happened in Russia exactly in 1917.

      There are other rather compelling facts explaining why the revolution was needed in February, not in August or July. As the Russian General Headquarters planned to land in the Bosphorus in March or April 1917, February was the deadline for a revolution in Russia. After this push in March the revolution would be impossible, and thus, it was due by February. If the Russian Army had entered Constantinople, it would have come into Russia's possession without any prior agreements. So, February was the deadline for the revolution.

      Summarized, no matter how weird it sounds, it was an improvement of the military situation, not its worsening, that lead to the February overthrow! It was exactly when the revolution should have happened. Light had already appeared at the end of the tunnel – for Russian patriots. It was the last call for the orchestrators of the global slaughter and the authors to the scenario of our overthrow. They had to hurry, as after the war there wouldn't be a chance to destroy Russia. Before they had blinked, the war would have been over, and there wouldn't have even been a reason for revolution. If you are still in doubt, recall what happened next. As if on an order, monarchy fell, putting an end to all the plans of getting Constantinople and the straits. The Provisional Government discussed it a lot but could do nothing, as they had no army, no navy, and soldiers and sailors weren't eager to fight.

      All the above-mentioned were the exterior reasons why the Russian Revolution had to happen before spring 1917. Yet, there was another strictly interior reason why the Russian Emperor had to be quickly overthrown. Historians that tell us about these events lose sight of an important fact. In November 1917, the powers of the Fourth State Duma were to expire. In the end of June 1916, Nicholas II received a report on the meeting held at Boris Shturmer's, the Russian prime minister. "Forming a hardworking and patriotic majority in the State Duma is especially important under the grave situation caused by the war,"[42] which was the government's strategy for the future election, absolutely correctly formed by the attendants of the meeting. The previous election gave Russia many anti-state thinking deputies that used the Duma tribune to accuse the state and its leaders. In war-time, the Duma members took the liberty of saying things that even the British and French parliamentarians wouldn't dare to enounce. It came to a point when Minister of War Sukhomlinov was brought to justice for treason, and his case was initiated by the Duma environment. In this regard, Sir Eduard Gray told the Russian ambassador, "Your government should be really bold to bring the minister of war to justice during the war."

      And all these brayers could have easily stayed without the tribune, fame, and prospects. The country leaders intended to hold the elections like a military operation, to make it quick, successful and to completely disorient "the Duma opponent." There was a plan to spread rumors about the extension of terms being a settled matter along with a mass issue of political pamphlets unmasking not only the opposition leaders but even the whole parties. The government had fancy amounts of money ready for the pre-election campaign, it was about 5 million rubles, 2 million of which were to be taken from the Tsar's treasury, and the rest were to be given by the banks. This money was to be used to issue the brochures "Truth about the KDs," "The Yellow Party," which were to reveal the truth about the anti-Russian activities of the Duma liberal factions.[43] If the Russian Government had done it all after a successful landing at the Bosphorus, the carriers of most Russian "democrats" would have come to an end.

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<p>38</p>

Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of the War 1914–1918. Minsk: Kharvest, 2005. P. 379.

<p>39</p>

Czernin O. In the World War. M.; Pg.: Giz, 1923. P. 161.

<p>40</p>

Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of the War 1914–1918. Minsk: Kharvest, 2005. P. 384.

<p>41</p>

Multatuli P. God Bless My Decision… M.: Forum, 2007. P. 242.

<p>42</p>

Diaries and documents from the personal archives of Nicholas II. Minsk: Kharvest, 2003. P. 320.

<p>43</p>

Diaries and documents from the personal archives of Nicholas II. Minsk: Kharvest, 2003. P. 323–324.