Western troops in Afghanistan. Canada’s chief of the defence staff, Rick Hillier, has hardly helped matters by publicly characterizing our opponents as “detestable murderers and scumbags.” One wonders how Muslims around the world feel when they hear language like this being used on Canada’s behalf.
Sixth, General Hillier’s language points to another problem. The current mission in Afghanistan could, over time, lead to the development of a Canadian Forces that is focussed almost entirely—in its training, ethos and equipment—on aggressive missions conducted in concert with the United States. The long-term consequences of this would be significant, especially for Canadian foreign policy, since it would diminish our ability to conduct other kinds of missions, especially those not involving the United States.
And let us be clear: our current policy orientation is leading inexorably to a much longer engagement. In August 2005, Canadian major general Andrew Leslie said that helping Afghanistan break out of “a cycle of warlords and tribalism” was a “20-year venture.” In March 2006, Rick Hillier said: “From NATO’s perspective, they look at this as a 10-year mission, right? Minimum. There’s going to be a huge demand for Canada to contribute over the longer period of time.”
Seventh, it is possible that Canada’s involvement in the counterinsurgency mission is contributing to a decline in this country’s commitment to strong rules of international humanitarian law. In the previous chapter, I explained how this is happening, by our soldiers’ reliance on landmines laid by other armies and by our transfer of prisoners—directly or via the Afghans—to U.S. custody, where they may well be tortured
Eighth, such bellicose missions challenge the way Canadians think of themselves. We like to imagine that we are “global citizens” uniquely placed to promote a more peaceful, just, inclusive and law-abiding world, but how can participating in search-and-destroy operations in concert with the United States foster this self-identity? Surely stopping genocide would be more consistent with how Canadians have, traditionally, preferred their country to behave?
Stephen Harper sought to cut off these sorts of considerations when, in May 2006, he abruptly called a vote in the House of Commons to extend Canada’s participation in the counter-insurgency mission by two more years, from February 2007 to February 2009. The vote also had an obvious political purpose, in that it divided the Opposition Liberal caucus. Twenty-nine members of Parliament from that party voted for the extension, sixty-two voted against and another eleven were conspicuously absent. In the end, the motion passed by the narrow vote of 149–145, with all twenty-nine NDP and most of the Bloc Québécois members voting against. With a smile on his face, the prime minister made a point of shaking hands with Bill Graham, the interim Liberal leader, as well as with Liberal MP Michael Ignatieff, at the time vying to lead the party. The two men, by speaking in support and voting for the extension of the mission, had provided the Conservatives with political cover on the Afghanistan issue for months if not years to come. The new Liberal leader Stéphane Dion, who voted against the extension, now faces the difficult task of repairing a public split within his own party on one of the most important issues facing Canada.
The vote took place just hours after Captain Nichola Goddard had become the first female Canadian soldier ever to die in combat; she was killed by a rocket-propelled grenade during an offensive operation near Kandahar. Yet the flag on the Peace Tower above the House of Commons was not lowered in her honour. As part of its effort to draw attention away from the mounting casualties in Afghanistan, the Harper government had ordered an end to that practice just a few weeks earlier. It also imitated the Bush administration by banning the media from the airport “ramp ceremonies” at which soldiers’ bodies are welcomed home. The moves caused a storm of protest, including from some of the dead soldiers’ families. One angry father showed an amateur videotape of returning caskets at his son’s funeral, which he had pointedly invited the media to attend.
Canada is in a hole in southern Afghanistan, and it is time to stop digging. Our troops should be withdrawn from the current mission as soon as is reasonably possible. They belong elsewhere, redeployed to other parts of Afghanistan or to places such as Lebanon and Darfur, where they could make a more positive contribution. There is no question that our soldiers want to succeed, and we are proud of them for trying. But it is up to us—and the politicians we elect—to choose missions where success is possible and to change direction when our choices go seriously wrong.
LEBANON: HARPER’S UNMEASURED SUPP ORT FOR ISRAEL
In April 2004, I spent a month teaching as a visiting professor at the University of Tel Aviv. It was my first trip to Israel since the start of the “second intifada,” and the country was on high alert. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had recently assassinated two Hamas leaders, Sheik Ahmed Ismail Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, and everyone was waiting for the retaliatory suicide attacks. Armed security guards searched everyone entering hotels, shops, restaurants, even the university campus. And it was not only Israelis whose lives were being disrupted: every evening, helicopter gunships thundered down the Mediterranean coast towards Gaza, returning early the following morning.
My Israeli students were among the best I have taught. It helped that the subject matter of the course—the laws of war—was of direct relevance to them. It helped too that they had all served in the military, since Israel has a universal draft. Several were still serving, as the IDF had sent a few of their young lawyers to take my course. Not surprisingly, the students and I disagreed on a number of points, though always in a friendly and respectful manner. One of the most attractive things about Israel is the open and spirited nature of its public debates, even on matters of national security.
The ability to disagree without being disagreeable showed itself again when, on my last full day in Israel, one of the students took me to lunch with his commanding officer, the senior lawyer advising the IDF. A colonel with a Harvard doctorate, she was not one for small talk. After just a few minutes, she cut to the chase:
“There have been a number of missile attacks along our northern border. We’re going to respond with air strikes against some Hezbollah installations in southern Lebanon next week. What do you think?”
I was taken aback. Governments do not usually consult foreign academics about their military plans. But I knew that my host was well aware that two bodies of law were in play: the first of them governs the recourse to military force; the second, known as international humanitarian law, limits the way soldiers may behave once a conflict has begun. I began with the former.
“For starters,” I said, “any act of self-defence has to be necessary and proportionate. So, in order to stay within international law, you should target only those Hezbollah installations that have been used in the missile attacks.”
My host shook her head: “That won’t prevent future attacks. We’re also acting pre-emptively.”
“Well, in that case you’re still subject to the criteria from the Caroline case,” I replied, referring to an incident involving the destruction, by British and Canadian forces, of an American steamboat on the Niagara River in 1837. “The necessity of self-defence must be, quote, ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.’ And I’m not sure that your air strikes fit these criteria, since you’re not planning on launching them until next week. Where’s the imminent threat?”
“It’s an ongoing threat,” the Israeli lawyer explained. “We have to ensure that Hezbollah’s capabilities remain at a manageable level.”
“Isn’t that the job of the Lebanese government?” I queried. “What you’re proposing is, after all, an armed intervention within the territory of a sovereign nation-state.”
“The Lebanese government can’t control Hezbollah,” she scoffed. “If it could, we
