points out that while Christianity urges the rich to help the poor, it does not go as far as saying that the poor have a right on the wealth of the rich (pp. 70-74). It may also be noted that the Islamic assertion that the poor have a right in the wealth of the rich directly contradicts the libertarians’ claim that the poor do not have a moral right in the wealth of the rich.
4. Rawls (1999) defines a society beyond justice as one “in which all can achieve their complete good, or in which there are no conflicting demands, and the wants of all fit together without coercion into a harmonious plan of activity” (p. 249).
5. Thus, for instance, it has been argued that since the profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) principle is the only one most recommended by the Sharī’ah, it alone must be the most efficient and equitable. But this is circular reasoning: it makes the desired efficiency and equity outcomes contingent on the adoption of the PLS principle, which is prejudged as the only one available which is Islamically just! However, as should not be entirely unexpected, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons why an ‘unrestricted’ PLS-only system is likely to be both inefficient and inequitable [Naqvi (2000)].
6. The problem noted in the text is a historical one. Rahman, F. (1980) notes: “…Islamic ethics proper, systematically based upon a genuine understanding of the purposes of the Qur’ān, did not develop until later in Muslim history…The leaders of the Sharī’a made practically no distinction between ethics and law…” (emphasis added; p. 239).
7. Chapra (2000) wisely remarks: “The increasing volume of literature on maqāṣid al-Sharī’ah is also a reflection of the realization that the taking of these into account is at least as important as the letter of the text” (p. 107). Also timely is his warning that “if the ‘ulamā’….react aggressively and harshly to even moderate forms of rational thinking, which are necessary for enabling fiqh to meet the challenges faced by the Muslim ummah, then adverse reaction might occur” (p. 105).
8. The power of reasoning in creating new Islamic knowledge has been duly recognised by modern Muslim religious scholars. Thus, Mustafa Zarqa has laid down: “whatever is against reason has no place in Islam” [cited in Chapra (2000); p. 102]. Kuran (1992) is right in complaining that some Muslim economists ignore the fact that, “like the doctrines they indict so harshly, Islamic economics rests on human reasoning and interpretation” (p. 70).
Economic behaviour since Adam Smith has been assumed to be characterised by the ubiquity of self-interest, selfishness and greed. The “butcher”, the “baker” and the “brewer” are seen as motivated only by their self-interest (“self-love”) in the mutually beneficial exchange that follows the production of the goods which consumers demand. Any benevolence they may entertain towards their consumer is not a relevant element in consummating such exchanges to the benefit of both parties.1 An influential modern (mis)interpretation of the Smithian creed is to go a step further and proclaim self-interest to be an empirical reality: “self-interest dominates the majority of men” [Stigler (1975); p. 237].2 A direct implication of this dominance of self-interest or self-love is a cheerless economics that refuses to include ethical values and moral concerns in the list of explanatory variables of human motivation and behaviour. Yet another is to equate self-interest with rationality: it is entirely rational to be self-interested even in the sense of being self-denying – i.e., “I will never do what I believe will be worse for me” [Parfit (1984)]. Indeed, so overwhelming has been this dominance of the self-interest creed that rationality and rational behaviour have come to be regarded as synonyms for self-interest maximisation; and, any motivation other than profit-maximisation is condemned as irrational!
II. Competing Moral Perspectives
An exaggerated trust in universal cupidity as the ‘invisible’ deliverer has been strengthened both on ‘positivist’ and normative grounds. In the former category, the economic universe is kept efficient by profit-seekers with ambition, vanity and hubris; and any concern for the social good contemptuously shunned as redundant, inefficient and counterproductive. These beliefs have been formalised with tantalising elegance by the (two) fundamental theorems of welfare economics; which show that a state of the economy in competitive market equilibrium (i.e., that which is Pareto optimal) is “unimprovable” by public-policy, or through moral manoeuvring. In the latter category, which is the domain of non-market decision-making and where ‘market failures’ are explicitly admitted, considerable theoretical effort has been expended on matters relating to allocative efficiency (to points on the Pareto-efficiency frontier and those off it). In this area of public enquiry, christened as positive public-choice theory, the central assumptions are that “man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximiser” [Mueller (1979); p. 1]. Not only that; even a significant part of what is known as normative public-choice theory, supposed to tackle distributional issues, remains exclusively focused on proving the centrality of the Pareto-optimality principle, guided by self-interest behaviour and amoral rationality (see Chapter 1, note 1).
Fortunately, the progeny of Adam Smith has not been completely lacking in imagination. To make the world an interesting place to live, it is increasingly realised (though not always understood) that the vast desert of self-interestedness needs to be flooded with humanity. Thus, Harsanyi (1991) pointedly remarks: “there was a time when many economists wanted to ensure the objectivity of economic analysis by excluding value judgments, and even the study of value judgments from economics…Luckily, they have not succeeded; and we now know that economics would have been that much poorer if they had” (p. 704).3 The fact is that, beyond the domain of unalloyed selfinterest, “valuation and obligations” intermingle with “ascertainable facts” to produce morally acceptable solutions of the vital problems of economic growth, a just distribution of income and wealth, and human development. This is because “a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of social good” is required to be able to ask the type of questions just mentioned and seek probable answers to them [Rawls (1999); p. xii]. Thus, to fix the direction of a social transformation that commands popular support the basic structure of society must be so changed that the rights and duties of the people and the distribution of social and economic advantages among them are fair and just.
The fact is that the role of values in human affairs is too extensive to be ignored; and no science of any kind can be divorced from ethical considerations because doing that would limit the scope of human rationality [Boulding (1966)]. An obsession with self-interest is, therefore, artificial and arbitrary. Adam Smith, who is mistakenly credited with having fathered only the self-interest principle, had the foresight to emphasise the great importance of altruism in economic activity, which comprises a lot more than simple acts of exchange. The production and distribution of goods that enter the exchange arena are not necessarily governed by the same motivations. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790), he notes that while “prudence” (read, self-interest)
