to deliver all the commissions before the new Jefferson administration took over the White House. Seventeen justices of the peace, including William Marbury, did not receive their commissions before the new president was in office. Marbury sued Jefferson’s secretary of state, James Madison, asking the Court to issue a writ of mandamus forcing Madison to deliver Marbury his commission.
What did the Court actually rule in Marbury v. Madison?
John Marshall, now chief justice of the Supreme Court, noted that Marbury was entitled to his commission, as he had been appointed by the president, confirmed by the Senate and otherwise qualified for the position. The Court also determined that Secretary of State James Madison wrongfully withheld Marbury’s commission from him.
However, Marshall also ruled that Marbury’s suit must fail because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized the Court to issue a writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional. Marshall reasoned that Section 13 conflicted with Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which provided that the Supreme Court did not have original jurisdiction of Marbury’s case, only appellate jurisdiction. In other words, Marshall reasoned that Section 13 was unconstitutional because it attempted to confer original jurisdiction to litigants like William Marbury, but the Constitution provided that the Court only had appellate jurisdiction, meaning the suit had to be filed in the lower courts. Marshall explained that “the jurisdiction had to be appellate, not original.”
CourtSpeak: Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
“SEC. 13. And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction. And shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party. And the trial of issues in fact in the Supreme Court, in all actions at law against citizens of the United States, shall be by jury. The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
Whatever happened to William Marbury?
Marbury never became a justice of the peace, though he did become a prominent and successful banker in Washington, D.C.
The Marshall Court upheld a federal bankruptcy law in what decision?
The Marshall Court ruled in United States v. Fisher (1805) that Congress had the authority to pass the Bankruptcy Act of 1801, which gave the federal government first priority to obtain monies from debtors in insolvency cases vis-à-vis other creditors. Chief Justice Marshall explained that the measure was justified by the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution.
What are the historical coincidences associated with this case?
Chief Justice Marshall actually was one of the primary sponsors of the bankruptcy law when he was a U.S. representative from Virginia. The other coincidence was that one of the other chief sponsors of the legislation, U.S. congressman Robert Goodloe Harper of South Carolina, represented Fisher, the person challenging the constitutionality of the law.
CourtSpeak: United States v. Fisher Bankruptcy Case (1805)
Chief Justice John Marshall (unanimous ruling): “The government is to pay the debt of the union, and must be authorized to use the means which appear to itself most eligible to effect that object. It has consequently a right to make remittances by bills or otherwise, and to take those precautions which will render the transaction safe. This claim of priority on the part of the United States will, it has been said, interfere with the right of the state sovereignties respecting the dignity of debts, and will defeat the measures they have a right to adopt to secure themselves against delinquencies on the part of their own revenue officers.
“But this is an objection to the constitution itself. The mischief suggested, so far as it can really happen, is the necessary consequence of the supremacy of the laws of the United States on all subjects to which the legislative power of congress extends.”
The Marshall Court struck down a state law for the first time in what decision?
The Marshall Court, by a vote of 4–1, invalidated a state law for the first time in Fletcher v. Peck (1810) in a case that involved questionable land deals. In 1795, the state of Georgia sold more than 30 million acres of land in the Yazoo area (located in present-day Alabama and Mississippi) to several Northern land companies. These companies in turn sold the land to third parties at much higher prices. It was revealed that many Georgia legislators received bribes for their votes in approving the land sales. In the next round of elections, these legislators were voted out of office and the new legislature passed a law in 1796 that annulled the original sale contracts.
This cancellation presented a problem for innocent third-parties who purchased the land without knowledge of the shady origins of how the land was first acquired. In what some think was a contrived lawsuit—many believe plaintiff and defendant planned the lawsuit together—Robert Fletcher of New Hampshire sued John Peck of Massachusetts in 1803 to “quiet,” or establish, his title to ensure that he had a valid claim to the land.
The Court ruled that the Georgia law invalidating the Yazoo land sales was unconstitutional because it violated the Constitution’s Contract Clause, preventing states from impairing the obligations of contracts. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the new law could negatively impact innocent, third-party purchasers, such as Fletcher. “If the original transaction was infected with fraud, these purchasers did not participate in it, and had no notice of it,” he wrote. “They were innocent.” Marshall ruled that Fletcher had “vested rights” in the land that he had innocently purchased.
CourtSpeak: Fletcher v. Peck Land Deal Case (1810)
Chief Justice John Marshall (majority): “When, then, a law is in its nature a contract, when absolute rights have vested under that contract, a repeal of the law cannot devest those rights; and the act of annulling them, if legitimate, is rendered so by a power applicable to the case of every individual in the community….
“Since, then, in fact, a grant is a contract executed, the obligation of which still continues, and since the Constitution uses the general term ‘contract’ without distinguishing between those which are executory and those which are executed, it must be construed to comprehend the latter as well as the former. A law annulling conveyances between individuals, and declaring that the grantors should stand seised of their former estates, notwithstanding those grants, would be as repugnant to the Constitution as a law discharging the vendors of property from the obligation of executing their contracts by conveyances. It would be strange if a contract to convey was secured by the Constitution, while an absolute conveyance remained unprotected.”
What famous
