youth groups, civil society organizations, and church groups65 —of recruitment strategies based on ethnoregional ties. Describing the state of the play in South Kivu in 2000, Ruhimbika notes that “there are five major Mai-Mai axes which reflect local ethnic configurations”: the Fizi axis (Dunia), the Uvira axis (Bidalira), the Kizuka high plateau area (Mulemera), the Ruzizi axis (controlled by Hutu militias), and the Lubumba axis (also controlled by Bidalira).66 Although the ethno-regional dimension is a common characteristic of most Mai-Mai factions, their members, as Ruhimbika's description suggests, come from different horizons: some, like “the old general Louis Bidalira,” are veterans of the 1964 Simba rebellion in eastern Congo; others are Hutu refugees from Burundi, as in the Ruzizi valley; and others are recycled interahamwe or their offspring. Viewed from a broader perspective, however, the Mai-Mai can best be seen as the political manifestation of the social exclusion affecting a growing number of marginalized youth. As Vlassenroot and Van Acker perceptively note, “the formation of the Mai-Mai must be understood as a social process which creates its own rationality, it is dictated by their rejection of the institutional order, and shaped by an environment which offers ample opportunities for creating and exploiting illicit trade networks and invites warlord types of activities.”67
In their early phase of development, the Mai-Mai were not so much motivated by greed as by the need to protect their communities against the threats posed by newcomers; first the Hutu refugees in 1994 and then, the Tutsi after the AFDL insurrection. Beginning in early 1997, after the assassination of a leading Mai-Mai personality, the main thrust of their activities was directed against the Rwandan occupying forces and their local allies. By the late 1990s, however, access to mineral wealth loomed increasingly large on their agenda. In a pattern that has repeated itself again and again, the quest for gold and diamonds has gone hand in hand with the procurement of weapons. The picture drawn by Vlassenroot and Van Acker in 2001 is still relevant today: “Since the militia leaders control the bulk of economic activities in the mineral-rich areas, the Mai-Mai, along with the interahamwe and FDD, have created their own war economy and are riding a wave of prosperity, which in turn brought about a decline in security in the mining districts.”68 The shift from “protection” to “greed” has been accompanied by a proliferation of armed factions, including Mai-Mai, in what looks increasingly like a free-for-all competition for loot.
An extreme but not untypical case is that of Ituri: since 2003, no fewer than eight armed factions have been involved in the scramble for gold and diamonds. Closer scrutiny suggests that greed was not the only motive behind this situation of intense competitiveness. In the words of one non-governmental organization (NGO) report, “the conflict which was over land at the beginning, has taken on multiple dimensions. Ethnicity is not a sufficient point of reference to understand what is going on in Ituri. Perpetrators of violence are at once and the same time ethnically based politico-military groups (UPC, PUSIC, FNI and FRPI), heterogeneous armed groups (FAPC and FPDC) and states (Uganda, Rwanda and RDC). The facts also demonstrate that the motives for confrontation are not always dictated by ethnic hatred, but by other considerations having to do with efforts at political positioning, the quest for material gain, the struggle for local, national or sub-regional leadership.”69
The story of how the original RCD broke into warring factions reveals much the same plurality of motives, albeit with ethnic and sub-ethnic cleavages looming increasingly large as a source of division. Personal and political grudges were certainly instrumental in causing Wamba-dia-Wamba's decision to form his own party in Kisangani (RCDK), but the choice of Kisangani was not made at random. The prospects of easy access to the area's rich mineral deposits were just as crucial for the dissident leader as they were, a few months later, in triggering the violent confrontation between Rwanda and Uganda, at which point he had few other options than to move to Bunia, the capital of Ituri. This is where the seeds of his undoing were sown. Quite aside from the greed factor, in the context of a growing ethnic polarization between Hema and Lendu, his decision to side with the Lendu immediately sealed a Nande-Hema alliance against him, bringing together Mbusa Nyamesi (Nande) and Tibasima (Hema) as the key players, identified with the RDC-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML). With Uganda firmly behind the Hema, Wamba eventually bowed to Museveni's pressure to leave Bunia, thus paving the way for the next round, between Nande and Hema. Eventually the Hema-Gegere group decided to break away from the RCD-ML in hopes of getting the exclusive benefit of the Kilo-Moto gold mines and under the leadership of Thomas Lubanga, formed the Union des Populations Congolaises (UPC). In time, however, intra-Hema rivalries would prompt the culturally distinct southern Hema to set up their own group, the Parti pour l'Unité et la Sauvegarde de l'Intégrité du Congo (PUSIC), led by chief Kahwa, whereas the northern Gegere-Hema remained under Lubanga's wing. Meanwhile, unable to hold his ground against the Hema's UPC, Nyamwesi retired to his solidly Nande fiefdom of Beni-Butambo, while Ituri sank inexorably into an ever more bloody factional strife. Ethnicity, greed, and political ambitions were all involved, though not always in equal proportion, in the unraveling of the original RCD.
And so were external actors, most notably Uganda and Rwanda. A detailed discussion of their involvement in Ituri politics would take us too far afield. Suffice it to note that both share a large part of responsibility in the factional strife that engulfed a large section of the province. First, by supporting the Hema against the Lendu, then switching sides while Rwanda threw its weight around the Hema, Uganda has played a major role in intensifying the conflict. And the same applies to Rwanda, even though Kigali made every effort to create the illusion that assistance to UPC was the initiative of the RCD-Goma. In truth, the UPC entered into an alliance with the RCD-Goma in January 2003, which provided for political and military assistance, but as early as June 2002, Rwanda was already delivering large quantities of arms and ammunition to the UPC. In trying to grasp the dynamic of violence in eastern Congo, one is reminded of Tilly's pithy formula, “someone who produces both the danger and, at a price, the shield against it, is a racketeer.”70 Nurtured by foreign patrons, and relayed by local warlords, the racketeering shows no sign of coming to an end any time soon.
The Rwandan Menace
In terms of size and potential wealth, there is no greater contrast than between minute, overpopulated, resource-poor Rwanda and its “scandalously” well-endowed, giant neighbor to the west; the anomaly lies in the overwhelming military superiority of Rwanda's RDF, one of the most experienced, disciplined, and efficient armed forces in the region.
The threats posed by Rwanda to its Congolese neighbor were cruelly revealed during the 1997 and 1998 wars, and by the repeated forays of the RDF into the DRC from 1998 to 2002, as far south into the interior as north Katanga and Kasai and Beni-Butembo in the north. Following the 2002 Pretoria accords, the bulk of Rwanda's army formally withdrew from the DRC; nonetheless, writes Reyntjens, “[it] later maintained a covert presence both directly and indirectly through its proxy, the RCD-Goma.”71 Just how serious is the challenge of its proxy was made clear during the May 2004 offensive on Bukavu, the border attacks on Kanyabonga in December 2004 and in Rutshuru in January 2006.
Ironically, Rwanda was the first to feel threatened by the presence of armed Hutu refugees in eastern Congo; its security concerns made it mandatory to “neutralize” the camps from which originated the raids against its national territory. Expansion quickly followed preemption and with the power vacuum created by the fall of the Mobutist state, the need to fill it with trustworthy allies backed by effective military force became all the more urgent. This is where a radical shift occurred in Rwanda's policy goals. Security meant, in essence, continuing access to mineral resources, not only to reward local allies but to strengthen its military establishment. No longer is Rwanda's security imperiled by Hutu rebels but, if anything, by rebels within its own military establishment. This is not to underestimate the nuisance potential of the radical, Hutu-led Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), consisting mainly of remnants of the interahamwe and ex-FAR. Although these constitute a clear and present danger to the civilian populations of North and South Kivu and parts of Maniema, Rwanda's allegation that they pose a mortal threat to its security is vastly exaggerated; nonetheless, the FDLR offer a convenient pretext
