a day in combat against ours. Virtually all of their armored forces date from the Desert Storm era, and we witnessed how well those performed in the hands of Saddam’s military.
In November 2015, I visited our Army in Europe to speak firsthand with the leaders of all NATO armies. In sum, all of the European generals I spoke to considered Putin “containable” if the United States placed a few armored brigades within the eastern NATO states: the Baltics and Poland. The cost of such a move to the United States would be minimal. Moving existing matériel to Europe would not require a single new weapons program or any increase in existing manpower. From what I witnessed, I strongly believe that such a force, properly positioned, would create a deterrent sufficiently intimidating to keep Mr. Putin on his side of the line for a very long time.
To anticipate whom we must fear the most, we must return to Colonel Yahara. Take a moment and look across a map of the expanse of Islamic nations in turmoil. Begin your visual transit with the North African states that touch the Atlantic, shift southward into central Africa and across the troubled and chaotic states that border the Mediterranean. Skip to the Levant, then to the true heartland of the Middle East: Pakistan and Iraq. What you see is utter chaos, perhaps the most destructive array of geopolitical mendacity and horror seen since the Assyrian holocaust in the eighth century BC.
Scholars call this turgid sweep the “Arc of Instability.” After the collapse of Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, and the expansion of the threat from radical Islamism, perhaps a more relevant term might be the “Arc of Failure.” This growing horror is persistent, most likely generational . . . and it affects our homeland. Radical Islamist threats are growing. But also, more troubling, they are becoming more skilled at both terrorism and war.
Look carefully at media images of ground fighting across the Middle East, and you will notice that the bad guys are also fighting differently.2 In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the West confronted terrorists acting like, well, terrorists. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Al Qaeda relied on ambushes, roadside bombings, sniper fire, and the occasional “fire and run” mortar or rocket attack to inflict casualties on U.S. forces. When terrorists were stupid enough to come out of the shadows, they fought as individuals in a mob of other individuals. Just the rip of a Kalashnikov or a single launch of a rocket-propelled grenade was enough to show their manhood. If they stood to reload they risked annihilation at the hands of their disciplined, well trained, and heavily armed U.S. opponents.
Today it is different. We now see Islamic fighters becoming skilled Soldiers. The thrust of ISIS down the Euphrates illustrates a style of warfare that melds the old and the new. U.S. Soldiers fighting in Iraq used to say, “Thank God they can’t shoot.” Well, now they can. They maneuver in reasonably disciplined fighting formations, often mounted on board pickups and captured Iraqi Humvees. They employ mortars and rockets in deadly barrages. To be sure, parts of the old terrorist playbook remain: they butcher and execute in front of the global media to make the Iraqis, Syrians, and Libyans understand, in unambiguous terms, the terrible consequences of continued resistance. Like their forbearers, they still display the terrorist’s eager willingness for death and the media savvy of the “propaganda of the deed.”
We see these newly formed pseudo-armies emerging across the Levant as well. The Darwinian process of wartime immersion has forced them to either be dead or a lot better. Some observers of their transformation admit that Hezbollah now are among the best-trained and skilled light infantry on the planet . . . and thanks to their Iranian patron, they have stockpiled more than 100,000 rockets ready to be fired against Israeli civilians.
And now there is Hamas. Gone are the fleeting “pickup teams” from Operation Cast Lead in 2008. We see Hamas fighting in small, strictly organized, tightly bound teams under the authority of connected, well informed commanders. In their war against Israeli intrusion in 2014, Hamas units stood and fought from building hideouts and tunnel entrances. Instead of charging the Israelis, Hamas waited for the Israelis to pass before ambushing them from the rear, occasionally dressed in Israeli uniforms. Like Hezbollah, they are getting good with second-generation weapons, such as wire-guided antitank missiles. The Israelis started the Gaza campaign trying to fight house to house. Soon, tank and infantry fire was replaced by hundred-ton barrages of precision two-thousand-pound bombs—and Hamas still did not quit.
These groups are now well-armed, well-trained, well-equipped, well-led, disciplined, and often flush with cash to buy or bribe their way out of difficulties. While the story of the disintegration of the Iraqi army is multicausal, the fact that it was never trained to face such a competent opponent was certainly a factor.
Michael Morrell, former deputy head of the Central Intelligence Agency calls the anti-jihad conflict in the Middle East the “Great War of our Time.” This frightening new age that Morrell describes will dominate warfare for a generation or more, because of several factors. First, of course, is the influence and global influx of foreign fighters into ISIS. As witnessed by the assault on the ISIS-held cities of Tikrit and Ramadi, Iranian advisers throughout the Middle East are getting better at their craft. Radicalized fighters from the Chechen and Bosnian conflicts have joined the ISIS team as mentors. The terrorists of the last decade used to generate one-shot suicide bombers of little strategic consequence. Now they have learned to craft fighting units, and they teach weapons and tactics very well. Second, ISIS and Hezbollah have made the bloody Syrian war into a first-rate training ground. They are exploiting that terrible war to select leaders, practice tactics, train to maneuver on the urban battlefield, and build political and military institutions with depth, mass, and resiliency. Perversely, having these two Islamist organizations in conflict makes each better, not weaker.
All of these new armies talk to each other, even occasionally across ethno-sectarian divides. Social media and strategic intercessions in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq have created a body of well-informed and battle-hardened leaders and Soldiers who actually share lessons learned. While these new armies are becoming more professional, they still retain the terrorist’s specialty in disciplined killing. Terrorist killing used to be mostly random. But now killings are carefully orchestrated, media-driven executions of surrendering Soldiers, political leaders, and former leaders of the opposition. Strategic killing gives them the psychological high ground often well before the clash of arms begins.
What we have seen in Gaza, Syria, Iran, Pakistan, Libya, and Iraq is not only sobering but a cautionary tale for those Beltway gurus who are already calling for a pivot to Asia and a war against the Chinese. The truth is that America’s battle against radicalism is now a world, not just a regional, war. It is unfinished and going poorly. Of course, U.S. Soldiers and Marines are still the global gold standard in tactical competence. But their comparative advantage has diminished considerably over the past fourteen years of war against an adaptive, dedicated enemy willing to learn and to die. Inevitably, terrorists groups will amalgamate and turn into armies. Given time, ISIS will become a sovereign state, pairing their fanatical dedication with newly acquired tactical skills. Sadly, we are giving them time and room to get much better. Eventually, any attempt to renew intervention into the ISIS heartland will generate casualties on a different scale—as the Israelis and the Iraqis have learned painfully.
Then there is the eight-hundred-pound gorilla hiding in the Middle Eastern closet: nuclear weapons. No one with half a brain would deny that the Iranians will build a bomb. The ayatollahs have learned from their Iraqi neighbor and their North Korean ally that the only certain deterrent against intrusion by the United States is a nuke. They have learned from watching India and Pakistan that world approbation against new nuclear powers fades eventually. To a state that fears the United States and has the technology, not joining the nuclear club would be the height of foolishness. When Iran gets the bomb, the paranoia and extreme social insensitivity of its theological elites would certainly tempt them to use it, most likely against Israel.
The social insensitivity of Middle Eastern tyrants is off the charts. Their religiously driven ideologies and brutal worldview removes them from the community of civilized leaders. Their ability to close their world to social sensitivities
