transition. Given the balance of forces at the time – and especially the collapse of the Soviet Union – the ruling party had accepted a Constitution that ‘emptied the legislature and executive of real political power’ and ‘immigrated (sic) the little power left [to them] to civil society and the Judiciary’.36
It is not true, however, that the Constitution was ‘forced’ on the ANC. On the contrary, at the time the interim text was adopted in 1993, Joe Slovo, chairman of the SACP and one of the ANC’s key negotiators, described it as ‘a famous victory’. The overall transition package represented ‘a score of 16 out of 16 for the strategic objectives of the ANC alliance’, he said. In the crucial closing stages of the talks, the ANC had shifted the balance of forces so far in its favour as to bring about ‘a complete demoralisation in the ranks of our opposition’. Slovo also stressed that the ANC had not agreed to anything that would compromise the further stages of the revolution, adding: ‘Looking at the result as a whole, I can say without hesitation that we got pretty much what we wanted.’37
It is also not true that the final Constitution (which was negotiated by a constituent assembly dominated by the ANC) robs the state of essential powers, as Ramathlodi further claims. On the contrary, the text gives the government all the powers normally accorded democratic states, along with the capacity to implement affirmative action and other policies aimed at providing effective redress for apartheid wrongs. But it also protects the rights and freedoms of citizens against pervasive state control and requires respect for the rule of law. In addition, it reflects the broad consensus at the time of the transition that the new South Africa must be a constitutional democracy in which legislative and executive action would be subject to judicial review – and could thus be struck down for inconsistency with guaranteed rights and other constitutional principles.
Behind this consensus, moreover, lay the knowledge of how parliamentary sovereignty had been abused by the National Party to harm the black majority and the wider society – and a determination that this must never be allowed to happen again. The ANC’s attempt to rewrite history in this regard is disingenuous. It also points to the ruling party’s willingness to white-ant or even disregard the country’s founding document.
Goals and strategies of the national democratic revolution
Since 1994, the ANC has adopted four key Strategy and Tactics documents setting out the current tasks of the national democratic revolution and weighing up the balance of forces that either assist or obstruct their implementation. The Mafikeng Strategy and Tactics document, adopted in 1997, described the principal goals of the national democratic revolution for the next five years. The Stellenbosch national conference in 2002 reaffirmed the Mafikeng document as the relevant guide to the next five years but also adopted a Preface to it, which states, among other things:
A critical element of the programme for national emancipation should be the elimination of apartheid property relations. This requires: the deracialisation of ownership and control of wealth, including land and equity; affirmative action in the provision of skills and access to positions of management; … and systematic and intelligent ways of working in partnership with private capital in a relationship … defined by both unity and struggle, co-operative engagement and contestation on fundamental issues. It requires the elimination of the legacy of apartheid super-exploitation and inequality, and the redistribution of wealth and income to benefit society as a whole, especially the poor.38
The Preface noted that this programme would involve ‘a continuing struggle’ that would intensify over time. ‘Because property relations are at the core of all social systems, the tensions that decisive application of this objective will generate will require dexterity in tact and firmness in principle.’39
The Polokwane Strategy and Tactics document, adopted in December 2007, describes the ANC as ‘a disciplined force of the Left, organised to conduct consistent struggle’. Emphasising the need to ‘change colonial production relations and the social conditions of the poor’, it reaffirms that ‘the main content of the NDR is the liberation of Africans in particular and blacks in general from political and socio-economic bondage’. This requires ‘a systematic programme to correct the historical injustice’, while the need for such affirmative action will ‘decline in the same measure as all centres of power and influence became broadly representative of the country’s demographics’. The document adds that ‘a national democratic society … requires the de-racialisation of ownership and control of wealth’ as regards land, management, and the professions.40
The Strategy and Tactics document adopted by the ANC at Mangaung (Bloemfontein) in December 2012 endorses the Polokwane document and adds to it a Preface reaffirming the need to ‘eradicate the legacy of apartheid colonialism’. The Preface also urges further ‘interventions … to speed up change’ as part of ‘a second phase’ in the country’s transition. It once again calls for the ‘eradication of apartheid production relations’, reaffirms ‘the centrality of the Freedom Charter as our lodestar’, and speaks of the need to confront ‘the dominance of the capitalist system’.41
The ANC’s Strategy and Tactics documents are public statements that often express worthy aims: to heighten state efficiency, increase economic growth, maintain macro-economic discipline, improve living standards, counter the HIV/Aids pandemic, enhance education, and reduce inequality. However, although the documents recognise the importance of growth, their main emphasis is on redistribution. The more recent Polokwane and Mangaung documents also stress that the balance of forces has shifted substantially in favour of a more rapid implementation of the national democratic revolution. The Mangaung document, in particular, calls for a ‘second phase’ in the transition, which requires more radical policies and ‘decisive action to effect thorough-going economic transformation’.42
The Mangaung Strategy and Tactics document also stresses the need to pursue affirmative action until such time as ‘all centres of power and influence … become broadly representative of the country’s demographics’. Since the goal of demographic representivity is inherently unattainable, this means that affirmative action will persist for the foreseeable future. Moreover, given the fact that Africans, ‘coloured’ people and Indians cumulatively comprise some 91% of the South African population, the targets for BEE and land reform that have thus far been set (a 25% shareholding for blacks in listed companies, for instance, and the transfer of 30% of agricultural land to black people) are likely to be revised upwards over time.43
However, radical redistribution of the kind envisaged overlooks the age profile of the African majority, the skills shortage among black people, and the limited capital available to Africans to pay for major stakes in companies and other assets. Hence, full implementation of the national democratic revolution could easily undermine South Africa’s economy and constrain the rapid rates of growth essential to future prosperity. The scale of redistribution it requires is also contrary to the spirit of South Africa’s negotiated transition and in conflict with key provisions of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.44
‘What is also striking about these demands is their extremity,’ writes political analyst James Myburgh. ‘When white minority rule ended in 1994, there was widespread agreement among all sectors of the population that black advancement was essential, as were major improvements in the living conditions of the African majority. There was also a chronic skills shortage in the country which the white population was not large enough to meet. The number of blacks with tertiary qualifications was growing, while white racial attitudes towards blacks had changed dramatically. If policies aimed at faster economic growth had been vigorously pursued by the new government, there would have been ample capacity to absorb a rising black middle class into both the private and public sectors without the need to displace whites.’45 However, this evolutionary approach has consistently been trumped by the ideological requirements of the national democratic revolution and has never been attempted.
2. Affirmative Action in Education
When
