Third World to First, is testament to how highly he regarded the opinion of his colleagues and how often there were differences of outlook within government on key issues.3 Differences of opinion were tolerated, the competition of ideas producing an improved outcome.
Additionally, Singapore made sure that the best and brightest were attracted, that they were paid properly, and they were given full support by leadership to do their job. As Lee observed, ‘[W]e stand a better chance of not failing if we abide by the basic principles that have helped us progress: social cohesion through the sharing of the benefits of progress, equal opportunities for all and meritocracy, with the best man or woman for the job, especially in leaders in government.’4
In contrast to the xenophobia and identity politics suffered in certain African countries embracing ethnic diversity and attracting global talent is another key factor in Singapore’s success. The country had a population of a little over 1 million when it gained independence. Out of Singapore’s current population of 5.3 million, around 1.5 million are expatriates, permanent residents or migrant workers. The injection of immigrants has been part of a strategy to maintain GDP targets, and this syncs with Singapore’s need for continuous innovation and efficiency.
All this has been underpinned by Singapore’s determination to globalise rather than nationalise. African goeverments routinely make it difficult to move goods in and out of their countries and are inherently suspicious of the motives of foreign investors. In contrast, Singapore has capitalised on its strategic geographic location by matching it with policies and the focus of institutions. There is a zero tariff on imported goods, low tax rates, a range of free-trade agreements, and vigorous trade and export promotion, with nearly 40 000 international corporations on the island, including 7 000 multinationals. Singapore has avoided trying to buck the markets or the needs and sensitivities of multinational companies and international finance. In fact, it has always acted to strengthen regulatory institutions to negate any perception of developing country risk.
The argument in favour of more authoritarian rule would have it that a combination of low literacy levels, the distraction and financial cost of regular domestic election cycles and the lack of strong, capable alternative leaders makes Western-style democracy ineffective in Africa. Proponents of this argument state a preference for a tough figure, presumably like Lee, ‘who can just get things done’ over the long term – a form of benevolent dictatorship.
Until now the problem with such a model is that many African states have already experienced such one-party or one-man leadership, and it has worked less like Lee’s Singapore than a caricature of a tin-pot and often extremely brutal dictatorship. In Africa, but also farther afield, dictatorships tend not to be benevolent. Just as they use repression to keep their citizens in check, they also often end violently. The problem has been that the African authoritarians have not adopted the laser focus on economic growth, the emphasis on talent and the global perspective that were critical aspects of the Singapore miracle.
We, therefore, believe that long-term economic success depends on African countries becoming more democratic. That is the only way that will force governments to create institutions that benefit the majority. Depending on the goodwill and wisdom of a small elite has failed for decades in dozens of countries. Without the imperative to be re-elected, there is no obvious system that will force African leaders to encourage the private sector and create jobs in the face of Africa’s extraordinary population growth.
African democratic progress
During the Cold War, much of Africa was locked into systems of single-party or authoritarian rule, which by their very nature suppressed competition of ideas and systems.
Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, only two countries had what could be considered institutionalised democratic systems: Botswana and Mauritius.5 Then, as superpower competition fell away, along with the military and economic aid that had sustained many African dictators, between 1990 and 2005 the number of countries that held regular, competitive multi-party elections increased dramatically to over 40. Ivory Coast had a multi-party poll in 1990; Benin and Zambia followed in 1991; Kenya in 1992; and Tanzania in 1995. Ghana and Nigeria reverted to civilian rule with multi-party elections in 1996 and 1999, respectively. Since 1991 there have been 36 peaceful transfers of power from incumbents at the ballot box in sub-Saharan Africa.6
During this time there was a nearly fourfold increase – to 11 – in the number of African countries judged as ‘free’ by US think tank Freedom House.7 Arguably, the bigger shift was marked by countries labelled ‘not free’, which represented 70 per cent of the continent in 1990 but only 33 per cent by 2005. Most of the countries that moved out of this category migrated to the ‘partly free’ category, which grew from 24 per cent to 44 per cent in 2005.
The major surprise in the decade from 2005 to 2014, however, is seen in the limited progress – and arguably regression – when it comes to political reform. The number of countries rated as ‘free’ in 2014 is one fewer than in 2005 and there have been some significant disappointments, especially Mali. Perhaps even more notable is that, after a decade when the ‘partly free’ category outnumbered those in the ‘not free’ category, the number of countries that are considered ‘not free’ now clearly outnumbers those that are considered ‘partly free’ (21 to 18).
Of course, African regime transitions tend to be fluid. Of those where progress has stalled, including those reversions mentioned above, 80 per cent get back on the democratic path typically within three years, some countries more than once. These regimes involve often complex changing coalitions, with institutional as well as ethnic partnerships, sometimes including the military. Of the 91 presidents and prime ministers to have held office on the continent in civilian regimes since 1989, nearly half (45 per cent) either served in the armed forces or were once guerrillas.8
The threats to democracy in Africa vary from relationships with outsiders who are more interested in short-term profits, including revenue derived from minerals and oil, than in helping develop the institutions of governance, to deep-rooted problems of weak institutions, faltering nationalism and enduring poverty, which can result in votes being bought for a meal or a T-shirt.9 Democratic institutions (i.e. parliaments, courts and public prosecutors) have often been nascent and weak, simply because it is very hard to create such resilient structures. Financial probity and transparency invariably improve, too, with such institutions, as is suggested by the growth rate differential indicated in the next section, though the relationship between governance and democracy is not linear. Electoral threats manifest in various ways. The 2002 African Union (AU) Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa highlights some of the challenges in calling for elections to be organised by ‘impartial, all-inclusive, competent, and accountable national electoral bodies’. It also calls on member states to prevent fraud, rigging and other illegal practices.10
Compounding these challenges has been an apparent change in the engagement of the international community in its role in promoting democracy. Since the early 2000s, the focus appears to have shifted to preventing the spread of radicalisation and terrorism across the continent. The response of the US to the 2016 elections in Uganda was to temper its criticism because of the need to maintain Ugandan troops in the AU Mission in Somalia. Acknowledging the difficulties faced by the Ugandan opposition in the face of evidence of government rigging, harassment and lack of transparency in the East African nation’s February 2016 election, Zambia’s 2016 presidential candidate Hakainde Hichilema remarked, ‘We can only help ourselves.’11 Or, as Raila Odinga, the Kenyan opposition leader and former prime minister, put it in 2016, ‘There is an assault on democracy on the continent. Elections are now held as rituals designed to perpetuate the rule of the incumbent, a predetermined constitutional requirement.’ Odinga says this is down to ‘the emergence of China as a dominant economic player. The US was once the defender of democracy on the continent, but now it is reluctant to play this role. Perhaps,’ he suggest, ‘it is operating in its strategic self-interest, out of fear of being dislodged by China.’12
Partially
