up institutions, they break down old barriers to achieve their goals. Because they shake things up, they often receive immediate high praise for making changes. But their refusal to follow institutional rules and adhere to accepted norms leads, invariably, to the hollowing out of already weak systems, the erosion of checks and balances, and their substitution by political theatre and personality cults. This creates even greater space for abuse. It often starts with the corruption of the electoral system, and the harassment and persecution of the opposition. Over time, as it becomes more difficult to maintain momentum, authoritarianism inevitably creeps in.
Democracy and development are not a trade-off of one against the other. ‘In the long-run,’ Cheeseman says, ‘efforts to promote development and fight corruption will not be successful unless they strengthen the institutions of the state.’46 Ad hoc efforts to stop corruption may attract attention and look effective, but by being highly personalised, they only serve to compound the problem. The aim of governance is, after all, to allow for less personal discretion, not more. And it’s not a question of whether individual leaders steal that defines the political economy, even though their example can be morally important. It’s about whether their actions serve to strengthen or undermine institutions and their checks and balances. As Cheeseman says, what populists tend to do is rarely sustaining for either democracy or development.
There is one other aspect worth highlighting for those regimes unreceptive to their citizens’ needs and demands, those happy with muddling along, serving the interests primarily of elites. The Arab Spring and, subsequently, Brexit and the rise of Donald Trump teach of the removal of previous barriers to politics, especially of money and access to traditional media. Tweeting 10 million followers, after all, costs nothing. Blogging and the internet are also powerful tools, free from traditional media-house filters. This is a trend that African electorates are exposed to through ever increasing mobile-connectivity rates. The possibility of greater political upheaval may also reflect the stake younger generations perceive they have in this status quo.47 Of course, the use of technology is not one way – on the contrary, sophisticated media messaging by the Russian government and the manipulation of internet access by certain African governments illustrate that the authorities also understand, and know how to harness, the power of digital technology.
The population growth forecast for sub-Saharan African countries presents an enormous challenge, and stresses the need for urgency. To manage it, countries need to rapidly create jobs, while controlling the social tensions that such growth will produce. A democratic system of government with strong institutions has historically proven to be the most effective style of government for dealing with these challenges, and it is what African people want. Ultimately, truly strong leaders are comfortable with the challenge, competition and accountability that democracy brings. They do not need to suppress opposition with force or election fiddling: they win with better, more effective policies, underpinned with a track record of delivery.
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