We accuse others of madness, of folly, and are the veriest dizzards ourselves. For it is a great sign and property of a fool (which Eccl. x. 3, points at) out of pride and self-conceit to insult, vilify, condemn, censure, and call other men fools (Non videmus manticae quod a tergo est) to tax that in others of which we are most faulty; teach that which we follow not ourselves: For an inconstant man to write of constancy, a profane liver prescribe rules of sanctity and piety, a dizzard himself make a treatise of wisdom, or with Sallust to rail downright at spoilers of countries, and yet in [407]office to be a most grievous poller himself. This argues weakness, and is an evident sign of such parties' indiscretion. [408]Peccat uter nostrum cruce dignius? "Who is the fool now?" Or else peradventure in some places we are all mad for company, and so 'tis not seen, Satietas erroris et dementiae, pariter absurditatem et admirationem tollit. 'Tis with us, as it was of old (in [409]Tully's censure at least) with C. Pimbria in Rome, a bold, hair-brain, mad fellow, and so esteemed of all, such only excepted, that were as mad as himself: now in such a case there is [410]no notice taken of it.
"Nimirum insanus paucis videatur; eo quod
Maxima pars hominum morbo jactatur eodem."
"When all are mad, where all are like opprest
Who can discern one mad man from the rest?"
But put case they do perceive it, and some one be manifestly convicted of madness, [411]he now takes notice of his folly, be it in action, gesture, speech, a vain humour he hath in building, bragging, jangling, spending, gaming, courting, scribbling, prating, for which he is ridiculous to others, [412]on which he dotes, he doth acknowledge as much: yet with all the rhetoric thou hast, thou canst not so recall him, but to the contrary notwithstanding, he will persevere in his dotage. 'Tis amabilis insania, et mentis gratissimus error, so pleasing, so delicious, that he [413] cannot leave it. He knows his error, but will not seek to decline it, tell him what the event will be, beggary, sorrow, sickness, disgrace, shame, loss, madness, yet [414]"an angry man will prefer vengeance, a lascivious his whore, a thief his booty, a glutton his belly, before his welfare." Tell an epicure, a covetous man, an ambitious man of his irregular course, wean him from it a little, pol me occidistis amici, he cries anon, you have undone him, and as [415]a "dog to his vomit," he returns to it again; no persuasion will take place, no counsel, say what thou canst,
"Clames licet et mare coelo
———Confundas, surdo narras,"[416]
demonstrate as Ulysses did to [417]Elpenor and Gryllus, and the rest of his companions "those swinish men," he is irrefragable in his humour, he will be a hog still; bray him in a mortar, he will be the same. If he be in an heresy, or some perverse opinion, settled as some of our ignorant Papists are, convince his understanding, show him the several follies and absurd fopperies of that sect, force him to say, veris vincor, make it as clear as the sun, [418]he will err still, peevish and obstinate as he is; and as he said [419]si in hoc erro, libenter erro, nec hunc errorem auferri mihi volo; I will do as I have done, as my predecessors have done, [420]and as my friends now do: I will dote for company. Say now, are these men [421]mad or no, [422]Heus age responde? are they ridiculous? cedo quemvis arbitrum, are they sanae mentis, sober, wise, and discreet? have they common sense?———[423]uter est insanior horum? I am of Democritus' opinion for my part, I hold them worthy to be laughed at; a company of brain-sick dizzards, as mad as [424]Orestes and Athamas, that they may go "ride the ass," and all sail along to the Anticyrae, in the "ship of fools" for company together. I need not much labour to prove this which I say otherwise than thus, make any solemn protestation, or swear, I think you will believe me without an oath; say at a word, are they fools? I refer it to you, though you be likewise fools and madmen yourselves, and I as mad to ask the question; for what said our comical Mercury?
[425] "Justum ab injustis petere insipientia est."
"I'll stand to your censure yet, what think you?"
But forasmuch as I undertook at first, that kingdoms, provinces, families, were melancholy as well as private men, I will examine them in particular, and that which I have hitherto dilated at random, in more general terms, I will particularly insist in, prove with more special and evident arguments, testimonies, illustrations, and that in brief. [426]Nunc accipe quare desipiant omnes aeque ac tu. My first argument is borrowed from Solomon, an arrow drawn out of his sententious quiver, Pro. iii. 7, "Be not wise in thine own eyes." And xxvi. 12, "Seest thou a man wise in his own conceit? more hope is of a fool than of him." Isaiah pronounceth a woe against such men, cap. v. 21, "that are wise in their own eyes, and prudent in their own sight." For hence we may gather, that it is a great offence, and men are much deceived that think too well of themselves, an especial argument to convince them of folly. Many men (saith [427]Seneca) "had been without question wise, had they not had an opinion that they had attained to perfection of knowledge already, even before they had gone half way," too forward, too ripe, praeproperi, too quick and ready, [428]cito prudentes, cito pii, cito mariti, cito patres, cito sacerdotes, cito omnis officii capaces et curiosi, they had too good a conceit of themselves, and that marred all; of their worth, valour, skill, art, learning, judgment, eloquence, their good parts; all their geese are swans, and that manifestly proves them to be no better than fools. In former times they had but seven wise men, now you can scarce find so many fools. Thales sent the golden tripos, which the fishermen found, and the oracle commanded to be [429] "given to the wisest, to Bias, Bias to Solon," &c. If such a thing were now found, we should all fight for it, as the three goddesses did for the golden apple, we are so wise: we have women politicians, children metaphysicians; every silly fellow can square a circle, make perpetual motions, find the philosopher's stone, interpret Apocalypses, make new Theories, a new system of the world, new Logic, new Philosophy, &c. Nostra utique regio, saith [430]Petronius, "our country is so full of deified spirits, divine souls, that you may sooner find a God than a man amongst us," we think so well of ourselves, and that is an ample testimony of much folly.
My second argument is grounded upon the like place of Scripture, which though before mentioned in effect, yet for some reasons is to be repeated (and by Plato's good leave, I may do it, [431][Greek: dis to kalon raethen ouden blaptei]) "Fools" (saith David) "by reason of their transgressions." &c. Psal. cvii. 17. Hence Musculus infers all transgressors must needs be fools. So we read Rom. ii., "Tribulation and anguish on the soul of every man that doeth evil;" but all do evil. And Isaiah, lxv. 14, "My servant shall sing for joy, and [432]ye shall cry for sorrow of heart, and vexation of mind." 'Tis ratified by the common consent of all philosophers. "Dishonesty" (saith Cardan) "is nothing else but folly and madness." [433] Probus quis nobiscum vivit? Show me an honest man, Nemo malus qui non stultus, 'tis Fabius' aphorism to the same end. If none honest, none wise, then all fools. And well may they be so accounted: for who will account him otherwise, Qui iter adornat in occidentem, quum properaret in orientem? that goes backward all his life, westward, when he is bound to the east? or hold him a wise man (saith [434]Musculus) "that prefers momentary pleasures to eternity, that spends his master's goods in his absence, forthwith to be condemned for it?" Nequicquam sapit qui sibi non sapit, who will say that a sick man is wise, that eats and drinks to overthrow the temperature of his body? Can you account him wise or discreet that would willingly have his health, and yet will do nothing that should procure or continue it? [435]Theodoret, out of Plotinus the Platonist, "holds it a ridiculous thing for a man to live after his own laws, to do that which is offensive to God, and yet to hope that he should save him: and when he voluntarily neglects his own safety, and contemns the means, to think to be delivered by another:" who will say these men are wise?
A third argument may be derived from the precedent, [436]all men are carried away with passion, discontent, lust, pleasures, &c., they generally hate those virtues they should love, and love such vices they should hate. Therefore more than melancholy, quite mad, brute beasts, and void of reason, so Chrysostom contends; "or rather dead and buried alive," as [437] Philo Judeus concludes it for a certainty, "of all such that are carried away with passions, or labour of
