an amorous intrigue in A.D. 449.44 She may have been in love with him, but love was subsidiary to the motive of ambition. She designed him to be her instrument in a plot to overthrow her detested brother. The intrigue was discovered,45 and her paramour was put to death. She was herself driven from the Palace, and betrothed compulsorily to a certain Flavius Bassus Herculanus, a rich senator of excellent character, whose sobriety assured the Emperor that a dangerous wife would be unable to draw him into revolutionary schemes.46
The idea of this union was hateful to Honoria and she bitterly resented the compulsion. She must often have heard — she had perhaps been old enough to have some recollection herself — of the breach between her mother and her uncle after her father’s death. In that crisis of her life Placidia had turned for help to a barbarian power. Her daughter now decided to do likewise. She despatched by the hands of a trustworthy eunuch, Hyacinthus, her ring and a sum of money to Attila, asking him to come to her assistance and prevent the hateful marriage. Attila was the most powerful monarch in Europe and she boldly chose him to be her champion.
The proposal of the Augusta Honoria was welcome to Attila, and was to determine his policy for the next three years. The message probably reached him in the spring of A.D. 450. She had sent her ring to show that the message was genuine, but he interpreted, or chose to interpret, it as a proposal of marriage. He claimed her as his bride, and demanded that half the territory over which Valentinian ruled should be surrendered to her.47 At the same time he made preparations to invade the western provinces. He addressed his demand to the senior Emperor, Theodosius, and Theodosius immediately wrote to Valentinian advising him to hand over Honoria to the Hun. Valentinian was furious. Hyacinthus was tortured, to reveal all the details of his mistress’s treason, and then beheaded. Placidia had much to do to prevail upon her son to spare his sister’s life. When Attila heard how she had been treated, he sent an embassy to Ravenna to protest; the lady, he said, had done no wrong, she was affianced to him, and he would come to enforce her right to a share in the Empire. Attila longed to extend his sway to the shores of the Atlantic, and he would now be able to pretend that Gaul was the portion of Honoria.
Meanwhile Theodosius had died and we saw how Marcian refused to pay the annual tribute to the Huns. This determined attitude may have helped to decide Attila to turn his arms against the weak realm of Valentinian instead of renewing his attacks upon exhausted Illyrian lands which he had so often wasted. There was another consideration which urged him to a Gallic campaign. The King of the Vandals had sent many gifts to the King of the Huns and used all his craft to stir him up against the Visigoths. Gaiseric feared the vengeance of Theoderic for the shameful treatment of his daughter,48 and longed to destroy or weaken the Visigothic nation. We are told by a contemporary writer, who was well informed concerning the diplomatic intrigues at the Hun court, that Attila invaded Gaul “to oblige Gaiseric.”49 But that was only one of his motives. Attila was too wary to unveil his intentions. It was his object to guard against the possibility of the co-operation of the Goths and Romans and he pretended to be friendly to both. He wrote to Tolosa that his expedition was aimed against the enemies of the Goths, and to Ravenna that he proposed to smite the foes of Rome.50
Early in A.D. 45151 he set forth with a large army composed not only of his own Huns, but of the forces of all his German subjects. Prominent among these were the Gepids, from the mountains of Dacia, under their king Ardaric, and the Ostrogoths under their three chieftains, Walamir, Theodemir, and Widimir;52 the Rugians from the regions of the Upper Theiss; the Scirians from Galicia; the Heruls from the shores of the Euxine; the Thuringians;53 Alans, and others. When they reached the Rhine they were joined by the division of the Burgundians who dwelled to the east of that river and by a portion of the Ripuarian Franks. The army poured into the Belgic provinces, took Metz (April 7),54 captured many other cities, and laid waste the land. It is not clear whether Aetius had really been lulled into security by the letter of Attila disclaiming any intention of attacking Roman territory. Certainly his preparations seem to have been hurried and made at the last moment. The troops which he was able to muster were inadequate to meet the huge army of the invader. The federate Salian Franks, some of the Ripuarians, the federate Burgundians of Savoy, and the Celts of Armorica obeyed his summons.55 But the chance of safety and victory depended on securing the co-operation of the Visigoths, who had decided to remain neutral. Avitus, whom we have already met as a persona grata at the court of Tolosa, was chosen by Aetius to undertake the mission of persuading Theoderic. He was successful; but it has been questioned whether his success was due so much to his diplomatic arts as to the fact that Attila was already turning his face towards the Loire.56 There was a settlement of Alans57 in the neighbourhood of Valence, and their king had secretly agreed to help Attila to the possession of that city. The objective then of Attila was Orleans, and the first strategic aim of the hastily cemented arrangement between the Romans and Goths was to prevent him from reaching it. The accounts of what happened are contradictory.58 The truth seems to be that the forces of the allies — the mixed army of Aetius, and the Visigothic host under Theoderic, who was accompanied by his son Thorismud — reached the city before the Huns arrived, and Attila saw that he would only court disaster if he attempted to assault their strongly fortified camp. No course was open but retreat. Aetius had won a bloodless strategic victory (summer A.D. 451).59
The Huns took the road to Troyes (Tricasses), and not very far from this town, in a district known as the Mauriac place,60 they halted, and prepared to oppose the confederate army which was marching close upon their heels.61 The battle, which began in the afternoon and lasted into the night, was drawn; there was immense slaughter,62 and king Theoderic was among the slain. Next day, the Romans found that Attila was strongly entrenched behind his wagons, and it was said that he had prepared a funeral pyre in which he might perish rather than fall into the hands of his foes. Thorismud, burning to avenge his father’s death, was eager to storm the entrenchment. But this did not recommend itself to the policy of Aetius. It was not part of his design to destroy the Hunnic power, of which throughout his career he had made constant use in the interests of the Empire; nor did he desire to increase the prestige of his Visigothic allies. He persuaded Thorismud to return with all haste to Tolosa, lest his brothers should avail themselves of his absence to contest his succession to the kingship. He also persuaded the Franks to return immediately to their own land. Disembarrassed of these auxiliaries, he was able to pursue his own policy and permit Attila to escape with the remnant of his host.
The battle of Maurica was a battle of nations, but its significance has been enormously exaggerated in conventional history. It cannot in any reasonable sense be designated as one of the critical battles of the world. The Gallic campaign had really been decided by the strategic success of the allies in cutting off Attila from Orleans. The battle was fought when he was in full retreat, and its value lay in damaging his prestige as an invincible conqueror, in weakening his forces, and in hindering him from extending the range of his ravages. But can the invasion and the campaign regarded as a whole be said to assume the proportions of an ecumenical crisis? The danger did not mean so much as has been commonly assumed. If Attila had been victorious, if he had defeated the Romans and the Goths at Orleans, if he had held Gaul at his mercy and had translated — and we have no evidence that this was his design — the seat of his government and the abode of his people from the Theiss to the Seine or the Loire, there is no reason to suppose that the course of history would have been seriously altered. For the rule of the Huns in Gaul could only have been a matter of a year or two; it could not have survived here, any more than it survived in Hungary, the death of the great king, on whose brains and personal character it depended. Without depreciating the achievement of Aetius and Theoderic we must recognise that at worst the danger they averted was of a totally different order from the issues which were at stake on the fields of Plataea and the Metaurus. If Attila had succeeded in his campaign, he would probably have been able to compel the surrender of Honoria, and if a son had been born of their marriage and proclaimed Augustus in Gaul, the Hun might have been able to exercise considerable influence on the fortunes of that country; but that influence would probably
