Faithless Execution. Andrew C McCarthy
Чтение книги онлайн.
Читать онлайн книгу Faithless Execution - Andrew C McCarthy страница 1
FAITHLESS EXECUTION
© 2014 by Andrew C. McCarthy
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of Encounter Books, 900 Broadway, Suite 601, New York, New York, 10003.
First American edition published in 2014 by Encounter Books, an activity of Encounter for Culture and Education, Inc., a nonprofit, tax exempt corporation.
Encounter Books website address: www.encounterbooks.com
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48 1992 (R 1997) (Permanence of Paper).
FIRST AMERICAN EDITION
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA is available for this title.
ISBN 978-159403-777-1 (ebook)
CONTENTS
Lawlessness in the use of raw power, or “direct action,” is central to the training and practices of community organizers
The dictatorial potential inherent in the power to enforce or not enforce the law makes impeachment a crucial check on presidential power
Unmoored from the president’s constitutional duty to execute the laws faithfully, law is a weapon in an ideological crusade; the president becomes a ruler, not a public servant
President Obama’s policies are deeply unpopular and his imperialism is alarming
A summary of the president’s extensive violations of law and derelictions of duty
There is a worthy case for impeaching the president due not to political or philosophical disagreements but to his violations of law, which threaten our constitutional framework
As a practical matter, impeachment is the only plausible congressional remedy to stop systematic presidential lawlessness
The courts are impotent to stop systematic presidential lawlessness
Impeachment is a political remedy, not a legal one; it is a question of the public’s will to remove the president, not a matter of whether impeachable offenses can be proved
The Framers sought to ensure that the presidency’s enormous powers would be checked and that presidents would be held accountable for abusing them
The Framers saw impeachment as an indispensable protection against executive lawlessness
The constitutional standard of “high crimes and misdemeanors”—in addition to treason and bribery—was adapted from British law to address profound executive maladministration
High crimes and misdemeanors are not necessarily statutory crimes; they are offenses political in nature that involve “the misconduct of public men” and subversion of the Constitution
The president is fully responsible for the misdeeds of his subordinates (or “coadjutors”)
Impeachment is one of three ways the Constitution reins in executive lawlessness; the others—elections and the power of the purse—no longer perform this function as originally envisioned
The modern left’s drive to centralize power confirms the Framers’ fear that factions would endanger the Constitution’s framework of divided, competing powers
The aggressive passivity of Republicans also frustrates the Framers’ constitutional design
The failed Clinton impeachment did not involve willful, systematic subversion of our constitutional framework and is thus not a precedent against impeaching President Obama
True lesson of Clinton impeachment: A principled political case for impeachment should be made, but the House of Representatives should not file articles of impeachment unless there is a reasonable chance of conviction in the Senate
Impeachment is innately political, not a legal process; it has more to do with the public’s investment in preserving our system of government than with proving impeachable offenses
The House’s power to impeach does not create a duty to file articles of impeachment if there is no realistic prospect that the Senate will vote to remove the president
Drawing an analogy to the work of a police officer or a grand jury does not support the argument for an immediate impeachment by the House, in part because police do not make an arrest and grand juries do not indict every time a crime is committed
The requirement of a two-thirds Senate supermajority ensures that a president will not be removed in the absence of broad, bipartisan public support for the action
The Senate acquittal of a president who has been impeached before there is public support for his removal would encourage more presidential lawlessness, just as the contempt citation of Attorney General Holder, showing a lack of resolve to remove him, encouraged more executive malfeasance
CHAPTER FIVE
Politics, Not Law
Impeachment