and a just Cause, separated from which it is Folly, and in opposition to it, Oppression. But, upon the Epicurean Scheme, every thing ought to be sacrific’d to the preservation of Life, and the enjoyment of sensual Pleasure, which it would, therefore, be folly to hazard, and madness to sacrifice, in defence of either Friends, or Country; for Religion is with them out of the Question.
It may justly be question’d, Whether the Heathen Philosophers, in the whole, were of Service to the Cause of Virtue.
§XIII. The Philosophers, amongst the Greeks, succeeded the Poets in the profession of teaching Virtue; and they certainly made improvements in moral Discipline, they reduc’d it into the form of an Art, enrich’d it with variety of Arguments, fortified its Precepts with great Reasons, propos’d many wise Considerations for subduing exorbitant Affections and Passions; they set forth the praises of Virtue, its excellency and importance, with great Vigour and Eloquence; and, in several instances, excellently declaim’d against Vice with great Wit and Judgment; they disparag’d the Vanities of the World, and the Follies of human Life. There is amongst them an unpopular kind of Virtue, which, altho’ greatly distant from the holy Life, yet, in several respects, does resemble it. Their Discipline and Institution had a considerable effect upon some of themselves; some of the Philosophers were great Examples of the Virtue which they taught, and they made some few Converts from Debauchery to Philosophy; and some few Commonwealths have had their Laws from Philosophers. The Philosophers, therefore, may seem to have done a great deal of Service to the Interest of Virtue; but, if their Disservices be set against their Services; if their Ignorance, Vice, and Extravagance, be compar’d with their Virtue; it may justly be doubted, upon a full Comparison, whether they have done any real Service at all to the Cause of Virtue and Goodness. The mighty Prejudices, which they have done to the Interests of it, clearly enough appear in the accounts already given; for the further setting of which in a clear Light, we will here take a brief Survey, both of their moral Learning and of their Life.
As appears, from a Consideration of the Divine Virtue of the Philosophick Pagans;
1. The sublimer sort of them distributed the Virtues into three Kinds, the Ethical, Political, and Divine. The Ethical and Political Virtue may be called the common Morality, which constitutes a good Man; but the Divine Virtue is suppos’d to be his Assimilation to God, and his Deification. This Divine Virtueis Philosophic-Pagan, the Popular-Pagans having no concern in it, and was the invention of Philosophy, but was not for the Interest of Virtue, but was rather to its Prejudice and Disservice; for it is not truly Divine Moral Virtue, constituting a divinely-good Man, but an Imposture, unpopular Humour, Fancy; and a wicked sort of Bravery is made the End, the Chief Good, the Divine Virtue, and the Happiness, of Man, his Assimilation to God, and his Deification. Apollonius ask’d the Brachmans, “What they were”? Jarchas, the Prince of them, answer’d, “They thought themselves Gods.” Apathy they thought a great and a Divine Thing, “To live in the Body, as the Soul of the World in the World, which cannot be struck, or impress’d upon, from without. He is devoid of Grief; is not a compound of Soul and Body; accounteth not the Death of Mortals, or the Ruin of his Country, any great Matter; he is above the Fear of any thing; trusteth to himself, that he shall have nothing of Evil, so he shall be fearless of any thing,” saith Plotinus.30 Thus they oppose the sufficiency of Virtue against all Externals. But to be thus unapprehensive of Danger, is Folly and Fool-hardiness; it is as unnatural, as it is irreligious, and ruinous to all true Virtue and Goodness. They thus impiously deified themselves, and their Virtue, by their self-Sufficiency, self-Security, and Confidence. “They that are furnish’d with the Virtues, living in greatness and celsitude of Mind, are always in Happiness. Philosophy setteth them intirely in the Fortress of Virtue, above Grief and Fear.”31
And from the excessive Pride of the Stoicks.
2. There is much of Pride and Arrogance, complicated with other Vices, in the Philosophick Pagans rampant Affectation of Divinity. They were as highly conceited of their own Merits, as Diogenes was, who fancied, that he merited his Alms. In Aristotle’s Composition of Magnanimity32 there is a large Dose of Pride, and Celsus’s Generosity33 is of the same Character. Much of the Stoical Philosophy is a rant and huff of Pride; the greatness and height of Mind, to which they pretend, is bloated and unsound; and the Constancy of their Wise-Man is a System of such Maxims, as are the very Quintessence of Pride. “The Wise-Man is not obnoxious to any Injury. The Wise-Man can suffer no Evil. An Injury detracteth and diminisheth, whereas nothing can be taken from the Wise-Man,” who hath all in himself. “Wickedness is not so strong as Virtue, therefore the Wise-Man is not hurt by Malice. None can benefit the Wise-Man,” who wanteth nothing, “therefore none can hurt him. An Injury is from Hope, or Fear; the Wise-Man is touch’d with neither. None receiveth an Injury unmov’d, the Wise-Man is not mov’d. A Contumely is a Contempt, and thence hath its Name; which the Wise-Man doth not look upon as belonging to him, who knows his own Greatness. He thinketh also, that all others are so much inferiour, that they have not boldness to despise Things so high above them. If he once debaseth himself, so as to be mov’d with Injury, or Contumely, he can never be secure; whereas Security is the proper Good of the Wise-Man.”34 If Pride and Stomachfulness had not been one of the Stoicks Cardinal Virtues, they could not have applauded Cato’s barbarous Self-Murder, “who scorn’d to be a Petitioner to any, either for his Death, or his Life, and was a contemner of all Powers.”35 They call themselves great Men, and accordingly found their Happiness, not upon the Favours of God and true Piety, but upon their Greatness of Spirit, the Greatness and Stoutness of an high invincible Mind;36 whence their Virtue becomes a sort of Self-magnifying and Self-deifying, which is but an illegitimate kind of Bravery of Spirit, incongruous to their Condition as Creatures, much more incongruous to frail miserable Men, and most of all incongruous to wicked miserable Sinners. Nor is there any Thing more distastful to a truly pious Mind, than the haughty Pharisaical Humour of these Philosophick-Pagan Magnificoes swaggering with their Virtue, their Magnitude, their Celsitude, their Altitude, their Fortitude, their Beatitude. Pride suggested that Stoical Maxim of Heraclitus. “The Wise need not any Friends.” Whence all the wonderful Provision, which Divine Grace has made for a World of wicked Sinners, was lost upon these Philosophers; for they that need no Friend, need no Saviour, or Salvation. They were able to live of themselves, and had an imaginary Happiness of their own making, wherein they took Satisfaction and Content; they look’d upon their Philosophy as the Perfection of Wisdom and Virtue, in it-self and to them; and thought, both themselves and their Institution, far Superiour to Popular Mankind; and, therefore, it was but agreeable to their Philosophick Grandeur and Magnificence, to contemn Christianity, which is a popular Institution, design’d for, and adapted to, the Salvation of miserable Sinners; whereas they were rais’d to a Superiority above Sin and Misery, and suppos’d themselves nothing less than Divine Men, and Kings, Jupiter’s Sons and Peers, and petty Deities. “It must be something Super-Human, Celestial, and Magnificent, that constituteth the Wise-Man. If thou ask, What that is? As God and his Beatitude is Constituted, so is the Wise-Man.”37 Chrysippus affirmed, “That the Happiness of Jove is in no respect more Eligible, nor more Fair, nor more Venerable, than that of the Wise-Man.” Virtues are thought to be true and genuine, when they are lov’d and desir’d for their own sake; but it appears, from the Stoicks Elation of Mind, that when Virtues are desir’d for their own sake, in a way of Separation from God, and without any Relation to him, they are proud and tumid, and are rather Vice than Virtue. Plato is much more modest in his Accounts of Virtue, than the strutting Stoicks; yet some of the Stoick’s principal Maxims, which nothing but Pride inspir’d, particularly that eminent One, “The Wise-Man is self-sufficient,” are derived from Socrates and Plato. Pride made Plato an envious Man, Socrates
