View of the Constitution of the United States. St. George Tucker
Чтение книги онлайн.
Читать онлайн книгу View of the Constitution of the United States - St. George Tucker страница 12
Inseparably connected with this distinction between limited and unlimited governments, is the responsibility of the public functionaries, and the want of such responsibility. Every delegated authority implies a trust; responsibility follows as the shadow does its substance. But where there is no responsibility, authority is no longer a trust, but an act of usurpation. And every act of usurpation is either an act of treason, or an act of warfare.
Legitimate government, then, can be established only by the voluntary consent of the society, who by mutual compact with each other grant certain specified powers, to such agents as they may from time to time choose to administer the government thus established, and their agents are responsible to the society for the manner in which they may discharge the trust delegated to them. The instrument by which the government is thus established, and the powers, or more properly the duties, of the public functionaries and agents, are defined and limited, is the visible constitution of the state. For it has been well observed by the author of the Rights of Man, “that a constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. It has not an ideal, but a real existence; and whenever it cannot be produced in a visible form there is none. A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government, and a government, is only the creature of a constitution. It is not the act of the government but of the people constituting the government. It is the body of elements to which you can refer, and quote article by article; and which contains the principles on which the government shall be established, the manner in which it shall be organized; the powers it shall have; the mode of elections; the duration of the legislative body, &c.” Hence every attempt in any government to change the constitution (otherwise than in that mode which the constitution may prescribe) is in fact a subversion of the foundations of its own authority.
The acquiescence of the people of a state under any usurped authority for any length of time, can never deprive them of the right of resuming the sovereign power into their own hands, whenever they think fit, or are able to do so, since that right is perfectly unalienable. Nor can it be supposed with any shadow of reason, that in a government established by the authority of the people, it could ever be their intention to deprive themselves of the means of correcting any defects which experience may point out or of applying a remedy to abuses which unfaithful agents may practice to their injury. The sovereign power therefore always resides ultimately, and in contemplation, in the people, whatever be the form of the government: yet the practical exercise of the sovereignty is almost universally usurped by those who administer the government, whatever may have been its original foundation.
It is the proper object of a written constitution not only to restrain the several branches of the government, viz. the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments, within their proper limits, respectively, but to prohibit the branches, united, from any attempt to invade that portion of the sovereign power which the people have not delegated to their public functionaries and agents, but have reserved, unalienably, to themselves.
A written constitution has moreover the peculiar advantage of serving as a beacon to apprise the people when their rights and liberties are invaded, or in danger.
It has been before remarked, that the constitutions of the several United States of America, rest upon the ground of general consent, and compact, between the individuals of each state respectively. To this it may be added, that in every state in the union (Connecticut and Rhode Island excepted) their constitutions have been formally expressed in a visible form, or writing, and have been established by the suffrages of the people, in that form, since the revolution.
The federal government of the United States rests likewise upon a similar foundation; the free consent and suffrages of the people of the several states, separately, and independently taken, and expressed.
It is therefore a fundamental principle in all the American States, which cannot be impugned, or shaken; that their governments have been instituted by the common consent, and for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, in whom all power is vested, and from whom it is derived: that their magistrates, are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them; and that when any government shall be found inadequate, or contrary, to the purposes of its institution, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.
SECTION IV.
Political writers in general seem to be agreed that the several forms of government, which now exist, may be reduced to three; viz. first the democratic; or that in which the body of the nation keeps in its own hands the right of commanding: secondly, the aristocratic; or that in which that right is referred to, or usurped by, a certain number of citizens, independent of the concurrence or consent of the remainder; and thirdly, that in which the administration of the affairs of the state is vested in a single person, which is denominated a monarchy. … These three kinds may be variously combined, and united, and when so combined and united they obtain the general appellation of mixed governments; and sometimes of limited governments. Thus the Roman commonwealth, after the establishment of the tribunes of the people, contained a mixture of democracy, with aristocracy: the former being vested in the assemblies of the people; the latter in the senate: thus, also, the government of Great Britain, in which there is supposed to be a portion of all three of these forms, is not infrequently styled a limited monarchy.
SECTION V.
When the body of the people in a state keeps in its own hands the supreme power, or right of ordering all things relative to the public concerns of the state, this, as was before observed, is a democracy. And, in such a state, says Montesquieu, the people ought to do for themselves, whatever they conveniently can; and what they can not well do, themselves, they should commit to the management of ministers chosen by themselves.
A democracy, therefore, may be either a pure and simple government, in which every member of the state assists in the administration of the public affairs, in person; or, it may be representative, in which the people perform that by their agents, or representatives, to the performance of which in person, either insurmountable obstacles, or very great inconveniences, are continually opposed.
1. A simple democracy must necessarily be confined to a very small extent of territory: for if it be the duty of every citizen to attend the public deliberations and councils; to make laws; to administer justice; to consult and provide for the protection and security of the state against foreign enemies; or to compose domestic factions and strife; this will be impracticable if the territory of the state be extensive; and, moreover, the important business of agriculture, every species of industry, and the necessary attention to the domestic concerns of each individual must be neglected; and where this continues to be the case for any considerable length of time, the state must inevitably perish.
Where the limits of a state are so confined as that the people can assemble as often as may be requisite, for the administration of the public concerns from every part of the state, such state must have too small a population to protect itself against the hostile designs and attacks of powerful, or ambitious neighbors; or, too small a territory to support the number of its inhabitants; either of which circumstances must continually endanger its safety and independence.
A pure democracy seems, therefore, to be compatible only with the first rudiments of society, and civil government; or with the circumstances and situation of a people detached from the rest of the world; as the inhabitants of St. Marino, in Italy, are said to be, by the inaccessible cliffs of the mountain, whose, summit they inhabit. And it may be doubted (for reasons that will hereafter be mentioned),