the working of God's laws?
You are not going to tell me that I am answerable or blame-able for the nature of matter and force, nor for the operations of God's laws, are you?
You will not suggest that I am responsible for the creation: so long ago, and I so new, so weak, so small!
God, when He created matter and force and law, knew the nature of matter and force, and the power and purpose of law. He knew that they must work as He had made and meant them to work. He knew that we must be as His agents must make us.
Will He punish or reward us, then, for the acts of His agents: the agents He made and controlled? Absurd.
But, it may be urged, "man has a soul." So! He got that soul from God. God made the soul and fixed its powers for good and evil.
It is the soul, then, that is responsible, is it? But the soul did not create itself, and can only act as God has ordained that it shall and must act.
If man is not to blame for his own acts he is not to blame for the acts of his soul; and for the same reason.
"Soul," or "man," "reason," or "conscience," responsibility lies with the causer, and not with the thing caused.
And God is "The First Great Cause," and how then can God justly punish any of His creatures for being as He created them?
It is impossible. It is unthinkable. But upon this unthinkable and impossible absurdity the whole code of divine laws is built.
Therefore the Christian religion is untrue, and man is not responsible to God for his nature nor for his acts.
CHAPTER TWO – THE LAWS OF MAN
COMMON law and common usage all the world over hold men answerable for their acts, and blame or punish them when those acts transgress the laws of custom.
Human law, like the divine law, is based upon the false idea that men know what is right and what is wrong, and have power to choose the right.
Human law, like divine law, classifies men as good and bad, and punishes them for doing "wrong."
But men should not be classified as good and bad, but as fortunate and unfortunate, as weak and strong.
And the unfortunate and weak should not be blamed, but pitied; should not be punished but helped.
The just and wise course is to look upon all wrong-doers as we look upon the ignorant, the diseased, the insane, and the deformed.
Many of our wrong-doers are ignorant, or diseased, or insane, or mentally deformed. But there are some who are base or savage by nature. These should be regarded as we regard base or savage animals: as creatures of a lower order, dangerous, but not deserving blame nor hatred. And this is the sound view, as I shall show, because these unhappy creatures are nearer to our brutish ancestors than other men, the ancient strain of man's bestial origin cropping out in them through no fault of their own.
Religion says man is the product of God; science says he is the product of "heredity" and "environment." The difference does not matter much to my case. The point is that man does not create himself, and so is not to blame for his nature, and, therefore, is not to blame for his acts.
For man did not help God in the act of his creation, nor did he choose his own ancestors.
"What! do you mean to say that the ruffian, the libertine, and the knave are not to be blamed nor punished for any of the vile and cruel acts they perpetrate?" asks "the average man."
Yes. That is what I mean. And that is not a new and startling "craze," as many may suppose, but is a piece of very ancient wisdom; as old as the oldest thought of India and of Greece. In the Bhagavad-gita it is written:
He sees truly who sees all actions to be done by nature alone, and likewise the self not the doer.
And Socrates said:
It is an odd thing that if you had met a man ill-conditioned in body you would not have been angry; but to have met a man rudely disposed in mind provokes you.
Neither am I unsupported to-day in my heresies. Most theologists are opposed to me, but most men of science are with me: they look upon man as a creature of "heredity" and "environment."
What a man does depends upon what he is; and what he is depends upon his "breed" and his "experience."
We admit that no two men are quite alike. We should not expect men who are unlike in nature and in knowledge to do like acts. Where the causes are different it is folly to expect identical effects.
Every man is that which his forbears (his ancestors) and his experiences (his environment) have made him. Every man's character is formed partly by "heredity" (breed, or descent) and partly by "environment" (experience, or surroundings). That is to say, his character depends partly upon the nature of his parents, and partly upon the nature of his experience.
He comes into the world just as his ancestors have made him. He did not choose his ancestors; he had nothing to do with the moulding of their natures. Every quality, good or bad, in his own nature, has been handed down to him by his forbears, without knowledge or consent.
How can we blame the new-born or unborn baby for the nature and arrangement of the cells – which are he?
Born into the world as he was made, he is a helpless infant, dependent upon his nurses and his teachers. He did not choose his nurses, nor his teachers; he cannot control their conduct towards him, nor test the truth nor virtue of the lessons he learns from them.
He grows older the nature he inherited from his ancestors is modified, for better or for worse, by the lessons and the treatment given to him by his nurses, his companions, and his teachers.
So, when he becomes a man he is that which his forbears and his fellow creatures have made him.
That is to say, he is the product of his heredity and his environment. He could not be otherwise.
How, then, can it be just to blame him for being that which he must be?
But, it may be objected, a man has power to change, or to conquer, his environment; to train, or to subdue, his original nature.
That depends upon the strength of his original nature (which his ancestors handed down to him) and of his environment – which consists, largely, of the actions of his fellow-creatures.
A man has power to do that which his forbears have made him able to do. He has power to do no more.
He has certain powers given him by his forbears, which may have been developed or repressed by his surroundings. With those powers, as modified by the influences surrounding and outside himself, he may do all that his nature desires and is able to do. Up to the limit of his inherited powers he may do all that his environment (his experiences) have taught or incited him to do.
To speak of a man conquering his environment is the same thing as to speak of a man swimming against a stream. He can swim against the stream if he has strength and skill to overcome the stream. His strength is his heredity: his skill is the result of his environment. If his strength and skill are more than equal to the force of the stream he will conquer his environment; if the stream is too strong for him he will be conquered by his environment.
His acts, in short, depend
