arbitration treaty between the three kingdoms – they have carried on many bloody internecine wars, which have only benefited their powerful neighbours, but have been in the highest degree injurious to themselves; and the possibility of war between the three northern kingdoms is not excluded so long as they are not simultaneously neutralized, or in some other way engaged to carry out a common foreign policy. It is no longer ago than 1873 that the so-called "pilots' war" in Oeresund caused much bad blood among relatives on both sides of the sound. That that was settled authoritatively by the mutual declaration of the 14th of August is due to circumstances on whose continuance for the future it is not possible to reckon. Had a strained relation at the same time obtained between one or more of the great powers within or without the Baltic ports, and had these endeavoured to sow discord between the coast powers, that they might fish in the troubled waters, and feather their own nests by getting these small states as their allies; and if one power had got Denmark, but its enemy got Sweden-Norway as an ally – a new northern fratricidal war would have broken out. Even if such a future possibility cannot be entirely eradicated by a mutual arbitration treaty amongst the northern nations, a new guarantee for peace would be secured." (Bluntschli's expression.) "For the small northern kingdoms would by such a treaty acquire an excellent moral support when it came to withstanding the attempt of the great powers to entice or threaten them into taking part in wars as their allies. Such a participation is always a dangerous game, because, as history shows, the small States lose rather than gain. The small States are used as counters for the great ones to play with."
At this point we may remark, that as far back as 1848, the same year that the Peace Congress was held in Brussels, Feb. 2nd, a treaty (the Guadaloupe-Hidalgo Treaty) was concluded between the United States of America and Mexico, containing a clause that a committee of arbitration shall settle, not only such differences as may arise directly concerning that treaty, but also shall, as the highest authority, adjudicate as far as possible all disputes which may arise between the high contracting States.3
Switzerland concluded, July 20th, 1864, a similar treaty with the Hawaian Islands, and on October 30th with San Salvador.4
Siam, whose monarch has given many proofs of sympathy for Oskar II., concluded a similar treaty, May 18th, 1868, with the United Kingdoms, and also with Belgium, Aug. 29th of the same year.5 The Central and South American Republics, Honduras, and the United States of Colombia did the same when on April 10th, 1882, they signed an arbitration treaty between themselves.6
Since that time this vigorous idea has grown into the Central and South American Arbitration League, and is now making good way towards being applied to the whole of America.
The question now is, whether the value of peace treaties, in general or in particular, which are established between mutually distant small States can be estimated as highly as the good intention of their creation, which is habitually acknowledged to be good? Are they something to be depended upon? Will they be carried into effect?
That depends in the first place upon what is meant by peace treaties.
If reference is made to certain international settlements which the conquered, with hatred in their hearts, bleeding, upon their knees were forced to accept, we may at once grant that they imply no security for peace, but, on the contrary, are a fresh source of warlike complications.
Thus, for example, the conclusion of peace which France was forced to sign at Versailles, Feb. 26th, 1871, and by which Alsace-Lorraine was torn from France, became a volcano which now for nineteen years has held the nations in suspense and unrest, and still threatens to ruin Europe.
Neither would it be advisable to set much store on such obligations as the Western Powers undertook in the agreement which goes by the name of the November Treaty, to help us to defend the northern part of our peninsula against Russia; because a guaranteed neutrality implies in reality more danger than safety, if the guarantee is not mutual; that is, in this instance, if our eastern neighbour is not included in the guarantee; which is so far from being the case that the treaty, on the contrary, is a source of menace and distrust to him.7
With respect to certain treaties of alliance, whose object is to collect the greatest possible number of bayonets as a mutual security against other powers, who, on their side, seek to protect themselves by uniting their forces, nobody can see in them anything else than a guarantee for an armed peace, which, by the necessity of its nature, leads to war.
If, on the contrary, by peace treaties are meant such international contracts as are not written in blood; such as relate to trade and commerce, industry, art, science and so on, it would be in vain to seek for a single instance of the breach of contract, either on the side of the weaker or the stronger.
Neither can any example in our time be pointed to of open violation of the rights of a small country in its quality of an independent State, as long as these rights have stood under the mutual guarantee of the great powers.
As evidence to the contrary, the London treaty of May 8th, 1853, has been adduced, which was intended to secure Denmark's neutrality; the Treaty of Paris, April 14th, 1856, respecting the Black Sea; and the fifth article of the Peace of Prague in 1866. But here the fault lies in a misunderstanding.
What the Treaty of London established was not the indivisibility of Denmark, but of the Dano-German monarchy. The German territory was to be fast linked to the Danish. This was admitted, as a principle, by the treaty to be fitting and right, but the treaty contained no trace of stipulations as to guarantee.
With respect to Russia's breach of treaty of the stipulations as to her banishment from the Black Sea as a military power,8 it must be remembered that the representatives of the powers, and of Russia also, on January 17th, 1871, signed a protocol, whereby it was settled as an essential axiom in international law, that no power can absolve itself from the obligations which are entered into by treaty without the consent of the contracting parties. Therefore Russia openly acknowledged that her declaration of not choosing to abide by the injunctions stipulated for in the Treaty of Paris respecting the Black Sea, was precipitate, and that, consequently, the treaty was permanently in force until it was formally abrogated. This took place in the new treaty of March 3rd, of the same year. Besides, here comes in what was said above about the value of such treaties as are concluded after brute force has determined the issue. And this not only was the case in the Black Sea stipulations, but also with respect to the unfulfilled promises of article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, whereby the Danish people was to be given the opportunity for a plebiscite in determining upon their reunion with Denmark. As to the peace treaties between the lesser States, which certainly have important trade relations one with another, but which, on account of their mutually distant position, cannot reasonably be expected to go to war with each other, it is true that one cannot in general attribute any special importance to them. Nothing is gained by over-estimating their value. But they deserve to be brought forward as enrichments of international law and guide-posts for other States. And that the small States need not wait until the great ones are ready to unite appears just as much in accordance with the nature of the case as with the interests of their own well-being.
Calvo, undeniably the first authority in these matters, emphasizes as a significant fact, that no single example can be pointed to in which States, after their mutual disputes have been referred to the consideration or judgment of arbitrators, have sought to withdraw from the operation of the decision. And according to Henry Richard and other authorities, by allowing international questions to be settled by arbitration, at least in sixty-seven instances, disputes of a menacing character have been averted.
I shall not here give a detailed account of all these instances, but only with the greatest conciseness refer to some of them.
See Martens' "Nouveau recueil général," xiv. p. 32 (art xxi.), and Calvo, "Droit International," II., § 1499.
According to a Manuscript by President Louis Ruchonnet, addressed to F. Bajer.
See "Svensk förfaltningssamling," 1869, No. 74, page 26, and "Lois Beiges," 1869, No. 36, § 24. In the Swedish-Siamese treaty, art. 25, it is stated: "Should any disagreement arise between the contracting parties which cannot be arranged by friendly diplomatic negotiation or correspondence, the question shall be referred for solution to a friendly neutral power, mutually chosen, whose decision the contracting powers shall accept as final." Similar agreements are to be concluded between Italy and Switzerland, Spain and Uruguay, Spain and Hawaii, and between France and Ecuador.
The Treaty is given word for word in the
In this treaty, which was concluded at Stockholm, Nov. 21st, 1855, the King of Norway and Sweden bound himself not to resign to Russia, or to barter with her, or otherwise allow her to possess, any portion of the territory of the united kingdoms, nor to grant to Russia right of pasture or fishery, or any similar rights, either on the coast of Norway or Sweden. Any Russian proposal which might be made under this head must be made directly to France or England, who then by sea and land must support us by their military power. A glorious contrast to the declaration of neutrality, Dec. 15th, 1853!
Conquered Russia had to bind herself, at the conclusion of peace, not to keep war ships in the Black Sea, not to have any haven for war ships on her coasts. Stipulations which were perceived by all thinking men at the time to be untenable in the long run.
