A Christian Directory, Part 3: Christian Ecclesiastics. Baxter Richard

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other men to sin: one is a command of God, when it is a duty which we do: the other is a greater good to be attained by the action, which cannot be attained in a less dangerous way. As in a country where there is so great a necessity of ale-houses and taverns that the good that is done by them is greater than the hurt is like to be, though some will be drunk; it is lawful to use these trades, though some be hurt by it. It is lawful to sell flesh, though some will be gluttonous; it is lawful to use moderate, decent ornaments, though some vain minds will be tempted by the sight to lust; as it is lawful to go to sea though some be drowned. To act a comedy, or play at a lawful game, with all those cautions, which may secure you that the good of it is like to be greater than the hurt, is not unlawful: but to set up a common play-house, or gaming-house, where we may foresee that the mischief will be far greater than the good, (though the acts were lawful in themselves,) this is but to play the devil's part, in laying snares for souls: men are not thus to be ticed to hell and damned in sport, though but accidentally, and though you vowed the act.

      Of scandal.

      Rule XL. Thus also must the case of scandal be resolved:84 as scandal signifieth an action that occasioneth another to sin, or a stumblingblock at which we foresee he is like to fall to the hurt of his soul, (which is the sense that Christ and his apostles usually take it in,) so it is the same case with this last handled, and needs no other resolution: but as scandal signifieth (in the late abusive sense) the mere displeasing of another, or occasioning him to censure you for a sinner, so you must not break a vow to escape the censure or displeasure of all the world. Otherwise pride would be still producing perjury, and so two of the greatest sins would be maintained.

      Rule XLI. Though in the question about the obligation of an oath that is taken ignorantly, or by deceit, there be great difficulties, yet this much seemeth clear: 1. That he that is culpably ignorant is more obliged by his vow or contract while he useth all the outward form, than he that is inculpably ignorant. 2. That though the deceit (as the force) of him that I swear to, do forfeit his right to what I promise him, yet my oath or vow obligeth me to do or to give the thing, having interested God himself in the cause. 3. That all such errors of the essentials of an oath or vow as nullify it, (of which I spake before,) or make the matter sinful, do infer a nullity in the obligation (or that it must not be kept). But no smaller error (though caused by deceit) doth disoblige.

      The commonest doubt is, Whether an error about the very person that I swear to, and this caused by his own deceit, do disoblige me? All grant that I am obliged notwithstanding any circumstantial error (as if I think a woman rich whom I marry, and she prove poor; or wise and godly, and she prove foolish or ungodly: yea, if the error be about any integral part; as if I think she had two eyes or legs, and she have but one): and all grant that an error about an essential part, that is, which is essential to the relation or thing vowed, (if inculpable at least,) disobligeth: as if I took a man in marriage thinking he had been a woman; or if I took a person for a pastor, a physician, a counsellor, a pilot, that hath no tolerable ability or skill in the essentials of any of those professions. But whether I am bound if I swear to Thomas thinking it was John, or if I marry Leah thinking she is Rachel, is the great doubt. And most casuists say I am not: and therefore I dare not be bold to contradict them.85 But I much suspect that they fetched their decision from the lawyers; who truly say, that in foro civili it inferreth no obligation: but whether it do not oblige me ethically, and in foro conscientiæ et cœli, I much doubt,86 1. Because it seemeth the very case of Joshua and the Israelites, who by the guile of the Gibeonites were deceived into an error personarum, taking them to be other persons than they were: and yet that this oath was obligatory, saith Dr. Sanderson, is apparent, (1.) In the text itself, Josh. ix. 19. (2.) In the miracle wrought for that victory which Joshua obtained in defending the Gibeonites when the sun stood still, Josh. x. 8, 13. (3.) In the severe revenge that was taken on the lives of Saul's posterity for offering to violate it, 2 Sam. xxi. 2. 2. And this seemeth to be the very case of Jacob, who took not himself disobliged from Leah notwithstanding the mistake of the person through deceit. And though the concubitus was added to the contract, that obliged most as it was the perfecting of the contract, which an oath doth as strongly. 3. And the nature of the thing doth confirm my doubt; because when I see the person before me there is the individuum determinatum, in the hæc homo, and so all that is essential to my vow is included in it: if I mistake the name, or the quality, or birth, or relations of the person, yet my covenant is with this determinate person that is present, though I be induced to it by a false supposition that she is another. But this I leave to the discussion of the judicious.

       Rule XLII. The question also is weighty and of frequent use, if a man vow a thing as a duty in obedience to God and conscience, which he would not have done if he had taken it to be no duty, and if he afterwards find that it was no duty, is he obliged to keep this vow? And the true answer is, that the discovery of his error doth only discover the nullity of his obligation to make that vow, and to do the thing antecedently to the vow; but if the thing be lawful, he is bound to it by his vow notwithstanding the mistake which induced him to make it.

      Rule XLIII. Vows about trifles (not unlawful) must be kept though they are sinfully made.87 As if you vow to take up a straw, or to forbear such a bit or sort of meat, or garment, &c. But to make such is a great profanation of God's name, and a taking it in vain as common swearers do.

      Rule XLIV. A general oath, though taken upon a particular occasion, must be generally or strictly interpreted (unless there be special reasons for a restraint, from the matter, end, or other evidence). As if you are afraid that your son should marry such a woman, and therefore swear him not to marry without your consent; he is bound thereby neither to marry that woman nor any other. Or if your servant haunt one particular ale-house, and you make him forswear all houses in general, he must avoid all other. So Dr. Sanderson instanceth in the oath of supremacy, p. 195.

      Rule XLV. He that voweth absolutely or implicitly to obey another in all things, is bound to obey him in all lawful things, where neither God, nor other superior or other person is injured; unless the nature of the relation, or the ends or reasons of the oath, or something else, infer a limitation as implied.

      Rule XLVI. Still distinguish between the falsehood in the words as disagreeing to the thing sworn, and the falsehood of them as disagreeing from the swearer's mind. The former is sometimes excusable, but the latter never.

      There are many other questions about oaths that belong more to the chapter of contracts and justice between man and man; and thither I refer them.

      CHAPTER VI.

      DIRECTIONS TO THE PEOPLE CONCERNING THEIR INTERNAL AND PRIVATE DUTY TO THEIR PASTORS, AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR MINISTERIAL OFFICE AND GIFTS

      The people's internal and private duty to their pastors (which I may treat of without an appearance of encroachment upon the work of the canons, rubrics, and diocesans) I shall open to you in these directions following.

      Direct. I. Understand first the true ground, and nature, and reasons of the ministerial office, or else you will not understand the grounds, and nature, and reasons of your duty to them. The nature and works of the ministerial office I have so plainly opened already that I shall refer you to it to avoid repetition.88 Here are two sorts of reasons to be given you: 1. The reasons of the necessity of the ministerial work. 2. Why certain persons must be separated to this work, and it must not be left to all in common.

      The necessity of the work itself appeareth in the very nature of it, and enumeration of the parts of it.89 Two sorts of ministers Christ hath made use of for his church: the first sort was for the revelation of some new law or doctrine, to be the church's rule of faith or life; and these

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<p>84</p>

Sanders. p. 82.

<p>85</p>

Ibid. p. 122.

<p>86</p>

Sanders. p. 120, 121. This seemeth the case of Isaac in blessing Jacob: the error personæ caused by Jacob's own deceit did not nullify the blessing, because it was fixed on the determinate person that it was spoken to.

<p>87</p>

Sanders. p. 84.

<p>88</p>

Disput. ii. of Church Government, chap. i. and Universal Concord.

<p>89</p>

Of the difference between fixed and unfixed ministers, see my Disput. ii. iii. of Church Government, and Jos. Acosta lib. v. c. 21, 22, de Missionibus.