for an infinite number of possible variations. This becomes a problem when “single” begins to depict something absolute and definite instead of something ambiguous and vague. Consider the analogy to painting. In Realist artwork, there is an attempt to represent on a canvas the spectral image of, for instance, a landscape. These pieces may be evaluated in terms of their similarity to the original. Cézanne, an Impressionist, has remarked that these masters have “replaced reality by imagination and by the abstraction which accompanies it” (in Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 12). The Impressionists paint a landscape “no longer covered by reflections and lost in its relationships to the atmosphere and to other objects” (p. 12). Indeed, in painting one does not represent a landscape that one has seen, but shares a unique experience. Returning to the topic of Facebook profiles—these do not capture the individual in her singularity as if she were a finite object. Consider Merleau-Ponty’s description of the Impressionist artist’s task, modified for the present discussion: If the Facebook user is to express herself,
… the arrangement of [her words] must carry with it this indivisible whole, or else [her profile] will only hint at things and will not give them in the imperious unity, the presence, the insurpassable plenitude which is for us the definition of the real. That is why each [detail] must satisfy an infinite number of conditions. (p. 15)
To complete the analogy, sharing oneself through the categorical limitations of Facebook would be akin to asking Cézanne to paint a portrait using only two pigments and without blending them. To be sure, he would probably produce something most impressive, but the point is that he has been supremely limited in his expression.
The second instance of de-individuation of which I have accused Facebook concerns its role in mediating relationships. Namely, one does not interact with one’s “Facebook friends” as a unique individual, but must interact by way of the abstractions of personality like a puppeteer with marionettes. As has already been shown, this dramatically reduces and nearly wipes out any personal individuality by restricting self-presentation to generalized personality traits. Suddenly the template by which your personality gets abstracted into bits of information becomes exceedingly consequential. Consider the question of gender. The question does not read: “With which abstraction do you most identify—‘Male’ or ‘Female’?” though this may be implied. Instead you get to decide which of the two you are. Consider the problematic limitations these two categories present, which effectively exclude transgender, pre- and post-operation transexual, and queer genders, among others, from representation. Nobody gets to interact in the social space mediated by Facebook as a transgender. Consider also the nebulousness of the genders provided. Are you male or female? One finds no additional space for qualifications, or variable options, depending on context. One only finds “Male or Female.” It doesn’t matter that with some men or women one may seem more masculine, or with other men or women one seems more feminine; one must choose what one is independent of context. Once chosen, every subsequent interaction can only be done with the standardized gender with which one has identified. Not only does this promote a dramatic over-simplification of gender, it also restricts one’s experience of gender to the designated dichotomy. By extending this example to all of the other personality identifiers on the Facebook profile, one begins to see just how restricted one is when interacting with their friends through the mediation of Facebook.
Imagine that, instead of designing Facebook profiles, we had designed marionettes. Like the Facebook profile, these puppets could be personalized in certain predetermined and generic ways. Identification with one’s puppet would initially be laughable. Yet we proceed to lower our puppets down onto the stage to interact with other puppets. One can only interact with other puppeteers—concrete persons—through one’s own puppet and through theirs. This is further limited by a restriction of only the eight to ten movements the puppet can perform. The dance is initially awkward and frustrating, and one might wish to peel back the black curtain and have a direct conversation with another puppeteer who, incidentally, may or may not resemble their puppet. Anyway, this continues until great mastery is had over the life of one’s puppet. One might even become impressively talented at making friends and gaining popularity—might become the life of the stage—despite having been limited to eight to ten movements. Popular or not, this increased sophistication of puppet-use is how the stage-world slowly beings creeping into the life-world. This begins when the puppeteer, having grown accustomed to, and increasingly adept at performing these eight to ten movements, starts to privilege these puppet movements in her actual life. Her concrete interactions with concrete people begin to resemble the puppet-interactions on stage.
To be sure, the beginning may seem harmless but the consequences are grave. Lanier explains that since social networks began mediating relationships, “A new generation has come of age with a reduced expectation of what a person can be, and of who each person might become” (p. 6). One’s abstracted personality profile on Facebook begins to inform one’s actual personality through repetitive use. That is, one becomes so accustomed to one’s abstract personality as depicted by Facebook that it becomes increasingly indistinguishable from one’s concrete personality. To demonstrate this phenomenon, Lanier compares this abstraction of the person suffered at the hand of Facebook to the abstraction of music suffered at the hand of MIDI (which is the program responsible for the digitization of music). Lanier explains:
Before MIDI, a musical note was a bottomless idea that transcended absolute definition. It was a way for a musician to think, or a way to teach and document music. It was a mental tool distinguishable from the music itself. Different people could make transcriptions of the same musical recording, for instance, and come up with slightly different scores. (p. 10)
As an abstraction of music, MIDI has been an indispensable tool for the organization, codification, and dispensation of music. But it can never reproduce the musical note as the “bottomless idea that transcended absolute definition.” Given his impressive and eclectic musical talent, Lanier should not be here accused of hyperbole. The digital note represented on MIDI is no more the original sound than a musical score is the actual song. In each, the former is an abstraction and the latter is a concretion. However, with enough exposure to the abstraction, one begins to increasingly forget about the concrete experience of which the abstraction was originally a mere representation. Lanier continues,
After MIDI, a musical note was no longer just an idea, but a rigid, mandatory structure you couldn’t avoid in the aspects of life that had gone digital. The process of lock-in [which can here be substituted with abstractification] is like a wave gradually washing over the rulebook of life, culling the ambiguities of flexible thoughts as more and more thought structures [abstractions] are solidified into effectively permanent reality. (p. 10)
After time, one might no longer remember that there was anything more to say about one’s occupation than that it was at the University. This same person’s eyes glaze over in life when, having politely inquired about somebody else’s occupation, they are met with a description of experience rather than a two-bit response. Lanier wonders “whether people are becoming like MIDI notes—overly defined, and restricted in practice to what can be represented in a computer. This has enormous implications: we can conceivably abandon musical notes, but we can’t abandon ourselves” (p. 10).
Two types of technology, utilized specifically by Facebook but seen in other forms of social media, will here be described with emphasis on their role in abstractifying its users. The first details the “status update” which provides users with the opportunity to share with the greater Facebook-mediated social community what one is up to or how one is feeling. The second details the integrated use of digital cameras, with which users may share photographical representations of events or experiences with the Facebook-mediated social community. Moreover, it will be shown how, with each of these tools, the Facebook-mediated social community may interact with the concrete reality of the user.
The abstracted world of Facebook begins to inform the concrete world of experience through the technology employed. Consider the status update. With the status update, I am ostensibly able to keep continuous contact with my friends and loved ones. But since my
