among a ruler’s subjects. Efforts to use such forces to advantage have often materialized in royal support for the institutions that serve the followers of charismatic religious leaders. From Morocco to Indonesia, enormous sums of money have gone into the endowment, building or renovation, and general financial support of holy places associated with holy persons. Some tomb-shrines have become the centers of entire towns. Those of Mulay Idris I (d. c. 793) on Mount Serhun near Fez, Morocco, and of Mulay Idris II (d. 828) in Fez are two such focal points. For centuries Moroccan governments have paid official attention to the maintenance of these holy sites, for devotion to these two Friends of God and descendants of Muhammad runs too deep among the people to ignore.
Given recent upheavals across the Arab Middle East and North Africa, especially the resurgence of al-Qaeda and related groups, what are the chances that those striving to resurrect the caliphate will threaten global stability and overrun the “Islamic World”?
Here, as always, historical perspective is essential. First, of the scores of proclaimed caliphates that various groups have announced over the past five hundred years, virtually none have attained greater than regional success and/or remained significantly influential for more than a generation or two. Second, in more recent memory and back as far as 1980, a group such as the Taliban proudly conferred on their leader, Mulla Omar, the name “Commander of the Faithful,” a primary historical title of the caliph. No matter how loudly they shout their assumed prerogatives, the Taliban will likely remain a threat to regional stability in South Asia and not far beyond. Third, even though groups such as the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Syria” (ISIL/S) boldly advertise their establishment of a “caliphate” for which they claim sovereignty from the Mediterranean to Iran (with designs well beyond that, presumably), their recent alarming successes depend heavily on political and social factors that can still be reversed.
While “ISIL” might (like earlier temporarily successful attempts to reestablish a caliphate) manage to consolidate some territory and advertise its success in attempts to recruit young fighters, there are hundreds of millions of Muslims from Morocco to Malaysia who want nothing to do with such a development and who are horrified at ISIL’s ideology and savagery. Finally, many major Muslim religious and legal scholars from the most respected and prestigious Islamic institutions have issued unmistakable denunciations of these extremists, their pretensions, and their methods as contrary to Islamic law’s restrictions on the conduct of war and in no way representing Islam’s deepest values. ISIL, they insist, has no right to use the term “Islamic” in its title.
Are there other examples of rulers promoting religious values by promoting popular devotion and “shrines”?
Further to the east is an instructive example of a different sort of shrine associated with the legitimation of an Islamic ruling dynasty, the Timurid (referring to “descendants Timur Lang, aka Tamerlane). In Iran and central Asia, rulers funded architectural projects as part of their programs of charitable works that would demonstrate their own genuine Islamic values. But this was not purely for show and often represents deep religious commitment on the part of these princely patrons. Ruling class figures were often genuinely attached to the teachings and legacy of venerable spiritual teachers. Timur Lang, for example, was so taken with the spirit of the already long-deceased Shaykh Ahmad Yasawi (d. 1166) that he undertook a major architectural project to honor the shaykh. In 1397 he built a glorious new tomb at the site of the original grave. Timur became personally involved in the project, even to stipulating the central dome’s height of 126 feet. Highly visible near an oasis along a pilgrimage and caravan road, this splendid work was a statement of Timur’s devotion as well as a monument to the shaykh.
Is such “devotion” not really a cover for political motives—more akin to currying favor among the wider population of believers?
Political motives do not necessarily rule out genuine devotion, though they may indeed cast a shadow of doubt on the sincerity of a ruler’s claim of religious motivation. Many Ottoman Sultans well into modern times engaged in the renovation of shrines and tombs, with credible evidence of authentic piety. In fact, even during times when rulers have felt the need to officially suppress overt veneration of Friends of God and force devotees to go underground, those very authorities themselves may have continued to be devotees. For example, Jalal ad-Din Rumi’s (d. 1273) tomb in Konya was originally built under a Saljuqid ruler, a predecessor dynasty to the Ottomans. But under Sulayman’s rule, the tomb, already a popular place of pilgrimage for generations, was renovated and the facilities expanded. Now Rumi’s final resting place provides a stunningly ironic example of the enormous power of such holy places.
Has this dynamic ever worked in reverse, with rulers trying to undermine popular devotion to a major religious figure?
When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (d. 1938) officially proclaimed the secular Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923, he suppressed the Sufi orders because they represented too great a potential force for disruption in his experiment in governing a Muslim nation. Members of the Mevlevi tariqa were officially disbanded and no longer allowed to gather publicly. But the Turkish Ministry of Culture continues to subsidize Rumi’s tomb as a “museum,” and pilgrims continue to visit it as a shrine. A striking tribute to the enduring spirit of Rumi (and indirectly of scores of other holy persons) appears on a 5,000 Turkish lire currency note in use until inflation rendered it virtually worthless: one side depicts a sternly serious Ataturk in profile; the other, a benignly smiling Rumi next to the fluted green dome beneath which three dervishes whirl. On balance, political rulers throughout history and in many cultural and religious contexts have run a broad gamut of modes of expressing, cultivating, and, of course, manipulating religious beliefs for their own purposes.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (d. 1938) founded the secular Turkish Republic after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi ruled Iran from 1941 until the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The Pahlavi shahs were considered by many Muslims to have been heavily influenced by the West and Russia.
Has Iran always been ruled by radical Shi’ite “clerics” like Khomeini and his successor, Khamenei?
Iran has been “officially” a Shi’i nation since around 1501—a relatively small portion of the Persian people’s very long history, dating back as far as 2800 B.C.E. In the early sixteenth century, a Turkic dynasty with Sufi background, called the Safavids, came to power and declared Twelver Shi’ism the “state creed.” For some 480 years, the religious establishment of scholars and specialists in Sharia functioned as a kind of loyal opposition in relation to the royal authorities. The Safavids were sandwiched between the two other “gunpowder empires”—the Ottomans and the Mughals, both Sunni dynasties. They engaged militarily with the Ottomans over several centuries, and some argue that by distracting the Ottomans in contests over territory the Safavids may well have prevented the Turks from conquering more of Europe. The Safavid dynasty weakened toward the end of the seventeenth century and suffered from an Afghan inter-regnum after a Pashtun invasion in 1722. After several decades of political instability, Iran was again stabilized by another Turkic dynasty, the Qajar, in 1794. From their new capital in Tehran, the Qajars ruled until overthrown by the Pahlavi family, an indigenous and short-lived Iranian dynasty.
How did Iran undergo such radical change after the mid-twentieth century?
Under the two Pahlavi shahs, Iran’s foreign relations were marked by increasing influence by outsiders, especially Russia, Britain, and the United States. One notorious example of foreign interference was the CIA overthrow of Musaddiq’s interruption in Pahlavi rule in 1953—an event that still colors Iran views of “the West.” In 1963, an ayatollah named Ruhollah Khomeini spearheaded a popular
