epistemological (and perhaps even ontological) implications. But the implications of Bohr’s work, however important, are restricted to the empirical sciences. In order to address the concerns we have raised regarding the validity of both a mundane and a sacred view of nature, we must pass beyond the limitations imposed by such restrictions. How is Bohr’s complementarity related to these issues?
Complementarity, Science, and Religion
Complementarity as developed by Bohr and complementarity as a generic logical relations tool have both been employed in the science/religion dialogue, but often in ways that don’t properly distinguish between them and sometimes the uses are claimed to be of questionable validity. Criticisms have been offered by Sharpe7 and by Duce8 on the grounds that complementarity is an overly limited conception that hinders the attempt to truly engage the two discourses. Other criticism has come from Barbour9, Alexander10, and Bedau11 on the grounds that two complementary descriptions must be of the same logical type, a condition violated in the case of science and theology (or religion more generally). Watts, on the other hand, has presented an extended analysis of the issues that includes consideration of previous criticisms, arguing in the end that science and theology are indeed complementary forms of discourse12. Reich2 also concludes that complementarity (at least in his more broadly rendered RCR formulation) is a highly valuable approach to relating science and theology. Some recent exciting work has explored another variation on these ideas of this sort, known as Generalized Quantum Theory (GQT)13. This work draws on the formal structure of quantum mechanics, especially non-commutation, entanglement, and nonlocality. Complementarity plays a central role in this approach to the analysis of issues, and a number of phenomena have been fruitfully explored using GQT. Finally, it’s also worth noting that complementarity has been used strictly within theological discourse (by Loder & Neidhardt14 and by Honner15, for example) to address issues such as the simultaneous humanity and divinity of Christ.
In many of these cases, both the supporters and the critics of using complementarity to discuss the science/religion relationship face a key issue in whether to use complementarity as developed by Bohr and applied in physics or to use complementarity as a generic logical tool independent of any such use in physics. Much of the inspiration for the application of complementarity in the science/religion area certainly stemmed from the prominence and celebrity it attained in a fundamental part of physical science. Yet all of these commentators, both proponents and critics, point out the major difference between complementarities within physics and the proposed complementarities between scientific and religious discourse. The arguments are over the validity of the application of complementarity in the latter case, and there is sometimes ambiguity over whether a given application is construed as the use of Bohr’s version of complementarity or the use of the more general conceptualization going by the same name.
Bohr explicitly intended the complementarity framework he developed to be applied in objective empirical sciences (he had hoped that it would be valuable in many such sciences, especially biology and psychology). Hence, his reasoning must be modified accordingly if we wish to adapt it to problems outside the sciences, as in the science/religion relationship. Some commentators have expressed the view that complementarity as it is used in physics is so different from what is needed in science/religion discourse that it is essentially useless. A concept forged in the struggle to interpret a physical theory can’t be applicable in the broader arena that includes religious faith and claims well outside science. I have already alluded to the limitations built into complementarity as used in quantum physics, but I disagree with the contention that it is irrelevant. There is important content in the careful and sophisticated formulation of complementarity developed by Bohr, content that is not inherent in the more generic version of complementarity as a logical tool. I believe that this content is in fact useful and important for analyzing issues at the boundary between science and religion, and more particularly for the sacred/mundane antinomy that I am exploring in the present work. In order to use the aforementioned content, however, we must follow Bohr’s reasoning and suitably generalize this reasoning. Bohr’s brilliant contribution to epistemology needs to be generalized and modified at appropriate points to give us a form of complementarity that retains all of his insights but that is not restricted to the empirical sciences and objective knowledge.
Generalized Complementarity
At the heart of Bohr’s reasoning is his contention that all of our knowledge about a physical object comes through some interaction with that object. In the case of quantum physics, the interaction takes the form of some experimental apparatus, and this can be precisely specified and described. If we wish to broaden this epistemological lesson to the world at large, what should play the role of the experimental apparatus? In addressing this question, the first thing we notice is that this more general case quite obviously demands the presence of a conscious observer, a knowing subject interacting with the object in the world. (The potential need for conscious knowing observers in quantum theory has been a controversial point of contention; we will assume here, in agreement with Bohr, that conscious observers are unnecessary in quantum theory.) The implications of needing knowing subjects for the acquisition of knowledge have long been a traditional problem in philosophy, a prominent example being the critical philosophy of Kant and his successors. What is new here is to think of this as an extension of the insights gained by examining the problem of knowledge in light of the issues we find in quantum theory, because that is the process by which complementarity takes on a central importance and a new methodological clarity.
Bohr’s contentions concerning the inseparability of the observer from the object of knowledge carried a drastic implication: knowledge of the object is no longer independent of the conditions of observation. This aspect of the subject/object relationship is a crucial ingredient in the development of complementarity. Because knowledge of the world depends on the conditions of observation, we need to carefully specify these conditions in order to have any meaningful knowledge at all. In the case of atomic physics, the specifications merely concern experimental arrangements, and the only knowledge we might want is objective knowledge. For the more general subject/object context presently under discussion, knowledge concerning nature will not necessarily be objective. The crucial importance of carefully specifying the conditions of observation, however, is once again mandated by the inclusion of an observer, just as in Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. But our generalization requires that we go well beyond the mere description of an experimental arrangement. For the case of a knowing subject, the kinds of questions being asked; the state of consciousness of the observer; the modes of communication possible and those employed; the role of multiple observers and/or technology used in observation; the effects of culture and history, of time, place, and intention; all these things must be taken into account in order to understand the meaning of any knowledge we may have of nature. Answering these kinds of questions constitutes the methodology that I’m advocating in this work. Performed successfully, a proper specification of the conditions under which knowledge of nature is acquired results in the complementarity framework being free of logical contradictions. The conditions under which nature is found to be sacred are not those under which it is mundane. Both sets of conditions are valid, both are needed for a complete view; and both refer to the same world. This world, I contend, is both sacred and mundane.
The foregoing points are the central message of this work. These points are presented in Chapter 8 in a more detailed form, along with several specific examples of the mundane/sacred dichotomy (Mount Fuji, the body of a loved one, and a crystal) to illustrate the thinking and methodology. More examples and applications, including extended discussions in some cases, are found in Chapters 10-12. Chapter 8 also includes a discussion of how complementarity relates to monolithic logical integration at one extreme and to dualistic or dialectic approaches at the other extreme. I argue that complementarity is not a form of dualism but rather a special kind of integrated worldview that respects the conditions under which we acquire knowledge. There are still, however, some remaining metaphysical issues that need to be discussed. Does our knowledge of the world affect the world itself? Are these complementary views saying something about reality or merely something about our internal mental constructions? Does objectivity have a privileged status, and if so doesn’t this imply an asymmetry
