Keeping the Republic. Christine Barbour

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views and the minority, having lost the vote, so to speak, should shut up. In addition, conflicting ideas about what constitutes the public interest can lead reasonable people to disagree about whether speech ought to be protected or restricted.30

      Speech That Criticizes the Government

      Sedition, speech that criticizes the government to incite rebellion, has long been a target of restrictive legislation, and most of the founders were quite content that it should be so. Of course, all of the founders had engaged daily in the practice of criticizing their government when they were inciting their countrymen to revolution against England, so they were well aware of the potential consequences of seditious activity. Now that the shoe was on the other foot and they were the government, many were far less willing to encourage dissent. Especially during wartime, it was felt, criticism of the government undermined authority and destroyed patriotism.

      sedition speech that criticizes the government to promote rebellion

      Early in our history it was easy enough for those in government to control the information that they felt threatened their power. It didn’t take long for American “revolutionaries” to pass the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which outlawed “any false, scandalous writing against the government of the United States.” Throughout the 1800s and into the next century, all levels of government, with the support and encouragement of public opinion, squashed the views of radical political groups, labor activists, religious sects, and other minorities. By the end of World War I, thirty-two of forty-eight states had laws against sedition, which essentially prohibited the advocacy of the use of violence or force to bring about industrial or political change. In 1917 the U.S. Congress passed the Espionage Act, which made it a crime to “willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States,” and a 1918 amendment to the act spelled out what that meant. It became a crime to engage in “any disloyal . . . scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, . . . or any language intended to bring the form of government of the United States . . . into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute.”31 Such sweeping prohibitions made it possible to arrest people on the flimsiest of pretexts.

      Those arrested and imprisoned under the new sedition laws looked to the Supreme Court to protect their freedom to criticize the government, but they were doomed to disappointment. The Court did not dispute the idea that speech criticizing the government could be punished. The question it dealt with was just how bad the speech had to be before it could be prohibited. The history of freedom of speech cases is a history of the Court devising tests for itself to determine whether certain speech should be protected or could be legitimately outlawed.

      In two cases upholding the Espionage Act, Schenck v. United States (1919) and Abrams v. United States (1919), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes began to articulate what he called the clear and present danger test.32 This test, as Holmes conceived it, focused on the circumstances under which language was used. If there were no immediately threatening circumstances, the language in question would be protected, and Congress could not regulate it. But Holmes’s views did not represent the Court’s majority opinion, and the clear and present danger test was slow to catch on.

      clear and present danger test the rule used by the courts that allows language to be regulated only if it presents an immediate and urgent danger

      With the tensions that led to World War II, Congress again began to fear the power of foreign ideas, especially communism. The Smith Act of 1940 made it illegal to advocate for the violent overthrow of the government or to belong to an organization that did so. The McCarran Act of 1950 required members of the Communist Party to register with the U.S. attorney general. At the same time, Sen. Joseph McCarthy was conducting investigations of American citizens to search out communists, and the House Un-American Activities Committee was doing the same thing. The suspicion or accusation of being involved in communism was enough to stain a person’s reputation irreparably, even if there was no evidence to back up the claim. Many careers and lives were ruined in the process.

A copy of a U S Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court application.

      Security or Liberty? The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was created in the 1970s to authorize warrants from agencies like the FBI or the National Security Agency to investigate suspected foreign spies inside the United States. In 2013 it was revealed that the court had authorized the collection of metadata on millions of Americans’ phone records, raising a question of what, exactly, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.

      AP Photo

      The clear and present danger test did not protect them. The Supreme Court upheld convictions under the Smith and McCarran Acts even though by Holmes’s formulation there was no danger of imminent harm. The Court had used the clear and present danger test intermittently in the years since 1919 but usually not as Justices Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis intended, to limit speech only in the rarest and most dire circumstances. Instead, the clear and present danger test had come to be seen as a kind of balancing act in which the interests of society in prohibiting the speech were weighed against the value of free speech. The emphasis on an obvious and immediate danger was lost.

      The Court’s record as a supporter of sedition laws ended with the personnel changes that brought Earl Warren to the position of chief justice. In 1969 the Court overturned the conviction of Charles Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader who had been arrested under Ohio’s criminal syndicalism law. In this case the Court ruled that abstract teaching of violence is not the same as incitement to violence. In other words, political speech could be restricted only if it was aimed at producing or was likely to produce “imminent lawless action.” Mere advocacy of specific illegal acts was protected unless it led to immediate illegal activity. In a concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas pointed out that it was time to get rid of the clear and present danger test because it was so subject to misuse and manipulation. Speech, except when linked with action, he said, should be immune from prosecution.33 The imminent lawless action test continues to be the standard for regulating political speech today.

      imminent lawless action test the rule used by the courts that restricts speech only if it is aimed at producing or is likely to produce imminent lawless action

      Symbolic Speech

      The question of what to do when speech is linked to action remained. Many forms of expression go beyond mere speech or writing. No one disputes that government has the right to regulate actions and behavior if it believes it has sufficient cause, but what happens when that behavior is also expression? Is burning a draft card, wearing an armband to protest a war, or torching the American flag an action or an expression? The Supreme Court, generally speaking, has been more willing to allow regulation of symbolic speech than of speech alone, especially if such regulation is not a direct attempt to curtail the speech.

      One of the most divisive issues of symbolic speech that has confronted the Supreme Court, and indeed the American public, concerns that ultimate symbol of our country, the American flag. There is probably no more effective way of showing one’s dissatisfaction with the United States or its policies than by burning the Stars and Stripes. Emotions ride high on this issue. In 1969 the Court split five to four when it overturned the conviction of a person who had broken a New York law making it illegal to deface or show disrespect for the flag (he had burned it).

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