doctrine, “the common belief that every single fact in the universe is precisely determined by law.” Peirce, as a man of science, was looking for a cosmology that explained the world in its fullness and, like Epicurus before him, and Aristotle too, he was convinced that some things could not be explained without appeal to real chance. Peirce was also motivated by his belief that strict determinism left no room for freedom of the will, something he believed there was good reason to admit.
According to Fisch, Peirce had first stated his case against the “doctrine of necessity” in 1887 in “Science and Immortality” (W6, sel. 14), where he took a strong stand against Spencer’s “mechanical notion of the universe.” In “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined,” Peirce constructed a more substantial argumentation by systematically considering and rejecting the main arguments for determinism and then building a positive case for the claim that an element of absolute chance prevails in the world. Within the massive philosophical literature that discusses determinism, Peirce’s article deserves to attain classical status in view of the singular insightfulness of his counter-arguments at a time when the vogue of determinism was at its historical apex. Peirce named his anti-necessitarian doctrine “tychism” (from τυχη, the Greek word for chance) and claimed that “tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and mind are regarded as products of growth.” Basic to Peirce’s case against determinism were several key ideas, among them, that the prevalence of growth in the universe is inconsistent with the conservation of energy; that the great variety within the universe is inexplicable unless due to chance; that law, also prevalent in the universe, must be explained by something other than law, which can only be chance; and that the reality of feeling is “a patent fact enough, but a very inconvenient one to the mechanical philosopher.” The connection between chance, spontaneity, variety, life, growth, and increased complexity is at the center of Peirce’s tychism, the consequences of which, he claims, can be “traced out with mathematical precision into considerable detail” and can be tested as scientific predictions. The line of his argumentation adduces severe criticisms of the belief in the power of scientific postulates, in the exactitude of measurements, and in the inconceivability of certain explanations, while it clarifies the rationale of induction, the purport of probabilities, and the limits of regularity. It is noteworthy that Peirce recommended tychism because it did not barricade “the road of inquiry” as determinism did by insisting on “the regularity of the universe.” This marks a step in Peirce’s progress toward fallibilism.45
Peirce’s article would appear five months later in April 1892, accompanied with a note in which Carus remarked on the philosophical depth of Peirce’s analysis and announced his intention to issue a reply.46 Carus indeed published an “editorial treatment” in July 1892,47 and a second response in the October number,48 attacking tychism at great length in defense of determinism; Peirce would then compose a long “Reply to the Necessitarians” in the winter that appeared in the July 1893 issue of the Monist, followed immediately by Carus’s extensive rejoinder, “The Founder of Tychism, His Methods, Philosophy, and Criticisms.”49 The latter, if anything, demonstrated the inability of a deterministic point of view to grasp the gist of Peirce’s sophisticated logic of inquiry and synechistic metaphysics. The entire exchange between Peirce and Carus is well worth studying, for it conveniently consolidates a large number of forceful philosophical arguments on a classical issue between two spirited and fully engaged opponents.50
Near the end of October 1891, Peirce traveled to New York City for the early November meetings of the New York Mathematical Society and the National Academy of Sciences. Why he went early to New York is unclear, but it was probably to drum up more income-producing projects. He went to visit his friend and Harvard classmate James Harrison Fay, a lawyer who had recently become Vice President of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company. Peirce noticed in Fay’s office a pamphlet written by another Harvard classmate of theirs, an occasional participant in the old Metaphysical Club and the chief American founder and leader of the radical movement for Free Religion and secularism, Francis Ellingwood Abbot. Titled Professor Royce’s Libel: A Public Appeal for Redress to the Corporation and Overseers of Harvard University,51 the pamphlet was an appeal to Harvard to redress “the wrong” perpetrated against Abbot by Josiah Royce, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, who Abbot alleged, had, in his “‘professional’ position as one of [Harvard’s] agents and appointees,” publicly attacked his reputation “with no imaginable motive other than mere professional jealousy or rivalry” and who had “gone to the unheard-of length of ‘professionally warning the public’ against a peaceable and inoffensive private scholar.” Abbot had been aggrieved by Royce’s stinging review of his book, The Way Out of Agnosticism, which had appeared in the inaugural issue of the International Journal of Ethics (of which Royce was a founding editor).52 Ironically, Abbot had based his book on a course of lectures he had given at Harvard when, with Royce’s approval, he had filled in while Royce was on leave to recover from a period of serious depression.53 According to Bruce Kuklick, Abbot had high hopes for his book, thinking it might finally win him an academic post and the respect he thought he had earned, so when Royce’s devastating review appeared accusing him of “an unconscious and blundering borrowing from Hegel” and warning readers of his “philosophical pretensions,” Abbot knew that he had suffered a severe blow.54 Royce had concluded his review with muted praise for Abbot’s “devotion to high ideals” and his “heroic sacrifices in the service of duty,” but he justified his harsh assessment of Abbot’s book by holding that “in judging of the actual work of philosophical writers, we must lay friendly esteem aside … we must show no mercy,—as we ask none.” Abbot, wounded and angered by Royce’s unkind treatment, prepared a strong reply and submitted it in January to the International Journal of Ethics, but after disagreements over demands for revisions and the timing of a rebuttal by Royce, Abbot withdrew it and produced the 48-page pamphlet.
Peirce had not read Abbot’s Way Out of Agnosticism, but he knew him from earlier times, had liked his 1885 book on Scientific Theism,55 had recently selected a lengthy quotation from that work for the Century Dictionary entry on “realism,” and thus he was sympathetic. He wrote to Abbot from Fay’s office saying that, even though he doubted that the pamphlet was “a wise publication,” he was confident that Abbot had not plagiarized Hegel and, moreover, that he had himself long regarded Royce as “one of the large tribe of philosophical blunderers,” so he was prepared to lend a hand (c. 30 Oct. 1891). Peirce wrote a letter to the Nation editor in support of Abbot and it was published about two weeks later (sel. 40). In his letter, Peirce reviewed Abbot’s charges against Royce—that Royce had maliciously libeled Abbot and had used unfair means to stifle Abbot’s reply—and concluded that while Royce’s “warning” was clearly an “unwarranted aspersion,” it could not strictly be regarded as libelous though it seemed clear enough that Royce had contrived to have Abbot’s reply first postponed and then excluded from publication. Peirce noted that Royce seemed almost openly intent on “ruining Dr. Abbot’s reputation,” and that is a conclusion often drawn by scholars who examine this dispute.56 Abbot quickly wrote to thank Peirce for his support, noting that of course Royce had “every advantage of position” on his side: “All the more do I feel the nobility of spirit which moves you to strike a brave blow for me…. If it is a high minded thing to champion a just cause against great odds, you have earned, as you certainly receive, my very grateful thanks” (15 Nov. 1891).
Peirce’s letter, appearing in such a prominent periodical, brought to the public eye a dispute that had up to that point been isolated to a rather small circle of insiders. James quickly wrote to set Peirce straight, admitting that Royce had taken a harsh and pretentious tone and that Abbot was justified in feeling “sore,” but fully taking Royce’s side in the dispute (12 Nov. 1891). “Abbot,” he wrote, “seems to me simply insane, in all that touches on his philosophic or personal pretensions.” James said he wished Peirce had just “let the thing die away in silence.” Peirce replied that Abbot surely didn’t deserve Royce’s “sweepingly contemptuous criticism” and that if, indeed, he was “almost insane,” then “all
