of Christian churches in the country, was already active in the struggle against corruption. It had convened confessionals for compromised politicians and officials and others with information about corruption to ‘unburden themselves’. The SACC hosted a national public event to announce its commitment to opposing state capture a week before we released our report. Many originally believed that Betrayal of the Promise was a church document.
We had consulted with the SACC, but our report was compiled completely independently of the ‘unburdening panel’. The problem the SACC had was that all those who ‘unburdened’ did so on condition that their testimony remained confidential. This made it impossible for the SACC to use the information to compile its own report. However, when the SACC read our report it said our analysis accorded exactly with the first-hand testimony it had received from church members across the country, including very high-level officials and politicians.
The church mobilised religious opposition to the Zuma administration. The SACC position was taken up by a group of ‘veterans and stalwarts’ of the ANC, who addressed an open letter to the secretary general of the organisation, explaining:
Our hearts are broken as we watch some in the leadership of our movement … abrogate to themselves the power of the State to serve their own self-interests rather than the interests of the people of South Africa.9
In July 2017 the largest gathering of civil society organisations came together under the umbrella of the Future South Africa coalition to fight state capture and to rebuild state integrity.
Business associations were also mobilised. The firing of Nhlanhla Nene galvanised the ‘Young Turks’ in Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA), who had ousted the old guard collected around the likes of Anglo American’s Bobby Godsell. They activated public action by chief executive officers, issued press statements that were openly critical of government and raised funds to support various anti-state capture campaigns, including a public relations campaign to counter the infamous Bell Pottinger campaign funded by the Guptas. Other business coalitions were also activated and a new bilateral dynamic opened up between business and the trade union movement. The BLSA attended an indaba on state capture hosted by the SACP.
Two features of this coalition are notable. The first is that, though it comprises many of the people and the kinds of organisations that advanced the anti-apartheid struggle in the 1980s and 1990s, and in this sense marks a revival of an older civil society, it is not exclusively made up of such groupings. Organised business formations have shared a platform with radical trade unionists and avowedly liberal associations.
The second notable feature is that civil society activists in South Africa have, for the first time, taken up issues of state building and, even more surprisingly, of public administration. For the first time there is appreciation of the fact that the immediate victims of tyranny in South Africa have been honest civil servants committed to a public service ethos. The move towards tyranny has, first and foremost, been a political war waged within and for state administrations. This fact goes some way towards explaining why journalists and activists have not been subject to the kind of repression seen elsewhere.
Civil society tactics
All these initiatives taken together saw the re-emergence in 2017 of powerful coalitions of civil society groupings, often bringing together new and unexpected partners. Working separately, and occasionally together, they have used four effective tactics.
Litigation
The growing lawlessness of the government has made litigation an often powerful tool. The High Courts have overwhelmingly safeguarded their independence, and civil society groupings have used them to successfully challenge illegal government decisions and appointments – ranging from challenging the president’s appointments of heads of key state institutions (such as the state prosecuting authority and the police) to reinstating criminal charges against Zuma himself, to upholding the independence of state organs, to insisting on the force of law of constitutional principles and to further developing the jurisprudence on public law.
Social mobilisation
Some civil society groupings have successfully drawn people onto the streets in fairly large numbers. Especially important is the fact that they have constituted new and diverse publics willing to speak out against state abuse of power and national resources.
Political mobilisation
Especially impressive has been the ability of activists to build energetic and diverse political coalitions, drawing senior figures in the ANC itself into alliances with a broad range of other organisations.
Unsettling hegemony
The shift to tyranny in South Africa has been accompanied by political arguments about the nature of South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy, and about the Constitution. Essentially, the Zuma government was able to justify growing criminality as a necessary instrument for radical change, and to depict opponents as acolytes of ‘white monopoly capitalism’. Reports like Betrayal of the Promise played a key role in unsettling these claims and providing a new language of resistance.
Another country?
From 16 to 20 December 2017 members of the ANC gathered in Johannesburg for the movement’s 54th National Conference, at which a new president of the organisation would be elected. Cyril Ramaphosa, the then deputy president of South Africa, defeated Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a candidate strongly affiliated to the networks of tyranny.
The result, however, did not represent a straightforward victory for Ramaphosa and his faction. Former key allies of Jacob Zuma now occupy three of the top six positions in the organisation. In the broader National Executive Committee (NEC), consisting of 80 people, Ramaphosa’s supporters comprise 41 members. What distinguishes Ramaphosa from Dlamini-Zuma, apart from questions of policy, is that he is more of a constitutionalist – after all, he was one of the key architects of the Constitution. We will have to see whether he is able to stamp his authority on the party. What is certain, though, is that he and the ANC now operate in a different country, one that is less naïve about risks to democracy and development.
There is fire in the belly of a rejuvenated civil society. The courts have stood by the Constitution, and parts of the media have played heroic roles. In various state administrations and across government numerous officials and public servants have quietly resisted tyranny. Parliament has discovered its authority. In all of this civil society organisations have played a leading role. The publication of the Betrayal of the Promise report was a key moment in this process, and reveals the constructively critical role that academics can – and must – play to build frameworks of meaning that help societal actors to make better sense of what is going on.
That said, the challenges that lie ahead cannot be underestimated. Just because the kingpin, Jacob Zuma, has been removed from his position of power at the apex of the structure that holds the constitutional and shadow states together does not mean that the criminal networks have disappeared.
Undoubtedly the power elite centred on the Gupta–Zuma nexus has been critically weakened as a result of Zuma’s departure. However, these networks are effective because they are remarkably resilient. They can adapt and morph to meet new circumstances. Much will depend on the effectiveness of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, which will have the right to refer matters to the prosecuting authorities.10
However, this assumes that prosecuting authorities are able to act. Actions taken by both the NPA and its Asset Forfeiture Unit against Gupta-linked companies
