о прочной органической связи территории, государства и народа, языка, литературы и нации, в соответствии с которыми национальный язык и национальная канонизированная литература становились частью государственной идеологии).
41 As Tlostanova puts it: “[…] the hybrid, interethnic and intercultural identification was not recognised or was reduced to a single dominant element, thus greatly simplifying the psychological model and the epistemological configuration of the hybrid subject. The writer was thus forced, unintentionally, to reach out to a well-defined ethnocultural and linguistic model, and rarely had the possibility of finding his own realization as a hybrid subjectivity, in the full sense of the word (2004: 194; […] гибридная межэтническая и межкультурная идентификация отрицалась или сводилась к одному доминирующему элементу, заметно упрощавшему психологический рисунок и эпистемологическую конфигурацию гибридного субъекта. Писатель тем самым невольно был вынужден тяготеть к определенной этнокультурной модели и языковой, редко имея возможность реализовать себя в полном смысле слова как гибридного индивида).
42 “[…] с одной стороны, официальная российская эпистемология не включает в поле своего внимания и осмысления категорию гибридности в силу отрицательного отношения к медиальности и культурному смешению […] с другой стороны, сама история Российской и Советской империй с их огромным количеством примеров смешанных браков, этносов, религий и языков, представляет большое количество реальных субъектностей, отвечающих гибридной модели.”
43 As the Ukrainian historian Georgii Kas’ianov (2009: 11) notes: “The year 1991 became the turning point […] Nationalized history began to fulfill important instrumental functions: legitimize the newly established state and its attendant elite; establish territorial and chronological conceptions of the Ukrainian nation; and confirm the appropriateness of that nation’s existence as a legal successor in the consciousness of its citizens and neighbours alike.”
44 As Andreas Kappeler put it in 2009: “Ukrainian history was mostly a narrative of suffering and martyrdom under the rule of foreign elites and states. Poles, Russians and Jews living in Ukraine were perceived as agents of foreign rule and oppressors of the Ukrainian people. There was no positive place for them in the Ukrainian national narrative and in the collective memory of Ukrainians, nor is there one today” (2009: 57).
45 Here my research will be mainly focused around the complexity of Ukrainian–Russian relations. An analysis of the colonial history of Polish domination in Western Ukraine and its impact on Ukrainian culture and society, which has been the focus of several studies published in the last decade (e.g. see Korek 2007; Ładykowski 2015), lies outside the scope of this work.
46 “Знаю только то, что никак бы не дал преимущества ни малороссиянину перед русским, ни русскому пред малороссиянином. Обе природы слишком щедро одарены Богом, и как нарочно каждая из них порознь заключает в себе то, чего нет в другой, — явный знак, что они должны пополнить одна другую.”
47 The controversial reception of Gogol’ and Shevchenko has been under the focus of several studies for decades (e.g. Luckyj 1971; Grabowicz 1982). In this section I touched on some of the crucial points of the issue; however, an in-depth analysis of the debate lies outside the scope of this book.
48 According to the British scholar, after the unexpected explosion of the USSR in Ukraine, symptomatically “there was no real revolution” (Wilson 2015: 102). Wilson identifies the alliance between the Communist elite and the “minority nationalist movement” as the key to understanding the reasons behind the political opportunity to support Ukrainian independence in 1991. In his view, this explains “why the country tried to have two catch-up revolutions in 2004 [i.e. the Orange Revolution] and 2014 [i.e. the Euromaidan Revolution].”
49 See: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/ (08/2019). The second All-Ukrainian population census was postponed several times throughout the second decade of the 2000s. At the time of the writing of this book (July 2019), the new census has been scheduled to be held in late 2020.
50 As Ihor Stebelesky (2009: 77) highlights in his study entitled Ethnic Self-Identification in Ukraine, 1989–2001: Why More Ukrainians and Fewer Russians?: “While their numbers [i.e. the numbers of Ukrainians] increased from 37.4 to 37.5 million, or by 122.6 thousand, the number of those who declared their nationality Russian decreased from 11.4 to 8.3 million, or by about 3 million people. As a result, the share of the declared Ukrainians and Russians shifted dramatically, from 72.7 and 22.1 percent in 1989, to 78.1 and 17.3 percent, respectively, in 2001.”
51 In his comprehensive reconstruction of Russians’ and Russophones’ identity formation in Ukraine, Kulyk (2019a) retraced the origins and nuances of the sociological debate around the issue in the last decades. For the sake of clarity, it is worth noting that here we report only some of the crucial dynamics of the point in question.
52 As the KIIS sociologist Valerii Khmel’ko explained in an interview for Radio Liberty: “[…] after the standard question about nationality—what nationality do you consider yourself—we
