government, in which the “balance inclined monstrously toward the labor unions,” with the statements of the new government, which were described as “serene and reasonable.”67
In May 1952, the British ambassador wrote: “I am more and more convinced that the basic reason for the Armed Forces having staged the revolution was their utter disgust at the growing and unrestrained power of Labor.”68 Later that year he added: “The business community, industry and commerce have all welcomed the new regime.… If the coup d’état had to come, no better leader could in their view have been found and no more opportune moment chosen.”69
The U.S. ambassador equally noted that businessmen were among the new regime’s most enthusiastic supporters.70 The role of the state as ultimate guarantor of the interests of the ruling class was to be clearly demonstrated in the period under Batista’s rule.
A Business-Friendly Coup
Attempting to influence the international market price of sugar was an important policy objective for the Cuban government, and the sheer size of the country’s production seemed to offer the possibility of success in manipulating the market to maintain price levels. The government’s attempts to achieve this, first by a unilateral cut in exports and then through participation in the International Sugar Agreement, ended in failure as the price of sugar continued to fall. This fall made the question of labor productivity more urgent. The level of profitability was a serious problem for nearly all sectors of the Cuban economy by the middle of the twentieth century, even without the fall in the world price of sugar. The Truslow Report identified the principal challenge facing the Cuban economy as low labor productivity, and the task of resolving this problem would be made much more difficult if the still-dominant sugar industry ceased to be profitable. To achieve this general increase in productivity, wages would have to fall and manning levels would have to be cut, and that in turn would require state action. The report foresaw that a dictatorship might result from this conflict of class interest.71 Given the fear of most workers that the productivity measures proposed would be detrimental to their income and employment prospects, many employers thought that an authoritarian regime would be necessary to enforce the Truslow Report’s proposals that, at least in the short-term, could only result in a considerable increase in the already chronic level of unemployment.
One of the reasons for the success of the coup of March 10, 1952, was support from the business community for a regime that could reduce the ability of Cuban workers to defend their wages and working conditions. Such a regime could push the balance of national income in favor of the employers. The new government sought to reduce opposition from organized labor by incorporating and corrupting the trade union bureaucracy, which would operate with the support of the Ministry of Labor and the police if necessary. Should that be unsuccessful, the regime had the army at its disposal to enforce its priorities. The year 1955 would bring this conflict to the fore.
3. THE EMPLOYERS’ OFFENSIVE
The year 1955 was a crucial turning point in the developing history of the Cuban Revolution. Up to this point, the Batista government had not tried very hard to enforce its productivity agenda, and the mujalista bureaucracy had generally maintained its control of the union structures, with few examples of serious industrial action. This all changed during 1955, with important disputes in several key industries. These would have long-term effects on the relationship between organized labor and the regime, as well as profoundly changing the balance of forces within the working-class movement.
At the end of 1954, the Batista government had two pressing industrial problems on its agenda. The falling price of sugar meant that the industry’s employers were demanding wage and job cuts. They were particularly insistent as their demands for such cuts the previous year had been largely ignored pending the elections.1 Additionally, financial problems in the U.S.-owned Ferrocarriles Consolidados (FFCC Consolidados), the railway company that operated the network in the eastern end of the island, meant that its owners also wished to cut their wage costs and staff numbers.2 The government’s confrontations with the workers in these two powerful industrial sectors, as well as with some other important groups of workers, made 1955 an important turning point in the history of labor mobilization in Cuba. The outcomes of these disputes were different in each industry, and the political trajectory of the leading protagonists was correspondingly different. The degree to which each group of workers were successful or not in their aims helped determine whether the politics of the PSP or the MR-26-7 would come to dominate the anti-Batista opposition in different industries and regions.
If the role of workers in the Cuban insurrection has been overlooked, the role of women workers has disappeared completely from view. When we speak of workers confronting the government and their employers, it is important to recognize that women frequently played an important role. The importance of working-class women in day-to-day labor struggles, and in the final triumph of the revolution, will be referred to frequently in this and succeeding chapters. An examination of contemporary sources, particularly photographs, demonstrates the significance of women both as workers themselves and as family members of workers in struggle: women railway office workers, bank workers, and shop assistants, as well as the solidarity provided by the wives and families of sugar and port workers. Two examples of this that are better documented, the office workers of Camagüey and the sugar workers of Delicias y Chaparra, serve as an illustration of women’s wider involvement.
The account of the events of 1955 can be given sector by sector with only minimal disruption of the chronological sequence, because the government was careful to avoid a generalized confrontation and therefore engineered disputes in one industry at a time, beginning with the Cuban transport industry, continuing with the bank workers’ dispute, then a number of single-enterprise strikes in industries such as brewing and textiles before getting to the sugar workers’ strike. This sugar workers’ strike not only involved half a million workers in the island’s major industry, it also involved student activists, thus forming a link that would have a significant impact on the developing revolutionary situation. From this account, it emerges that the failure of these strikes at the hands of a repressive state and a corrupt trade union bureaucracy led a significant group of militant class-conscious workers to seek a different approach to the defense of their economic interests. To present a rounded picture, it is also necessary to address the apparent success of the port and tobacco workers in resisting the employers’ offensive when, all around, their compatriots were suffering defeat after defeat. Reflecting on why the employers’ productivity offensive was successful in some industries and not in others is key to understanding the later political development of different industrial sectors within the labor movement.
Batista planned his attack on working conditions carefully. He had reached an accommodation with the CTC but could not move too quickly because, if he undermined Mujal’s base, that accommodation would be useless. Moreover, Mujal was accustomed to influencing government policy to a greater extent than would have suited Batista, and the new dictator took a little time to subordinate Mujal to his project. We shall see how Mujal’s relationship with the government changed over time and how he became increasingly identified with the regime. Having established a good relationship with the CTC leadership, Batista adopted an approach that would be reprised thirty years later by the Thatcher government in Britain using an approach that became known as the Ridley Plan: an attempt to restore profitability by defeating workers sector by sector, making sure that the field of battle is always chosen by the government and that any chance of generalized and united industrial action is avoided.3 Once the government had decided that the time was right to confront a particular group of workers, it acted with considerable brutality to overcome resistance. Nevertheless, the government did not always win, and particularities of each sector will be examined below along with the political conclusions each group of workers drew from their victory or defeat.
Public Transport
The first significant
