the large Canadian formation rumbling noiselessly south. Currie did not inform his chief of logistics, General Farmar, about the move until 29 July 1918, giving the logistics staff approximately 24 hours of planning before the Corps had to start moving.5
The coming offensive down at Amiens was defined by a tight secrecy at all levels of preparation. The presence of Canadians, who had come to be used as shock troops inside the British Expeditionary Force, would easily telegraph a coming offensive to the Germans. Transportation and movement planning were mightily tested because of this requirement for absolute secrecy. In the course of compressed preparation time, the subordinate divisional logistics staffs were left with a mere five days of advance notice. By 1 August 1918, when the Canadians began to move down to the Amiens sector for the coming fight, there remained only six days to extend the logistics conduit from Boulogne. Furthermore, the Corps would need to move and prepare for battle in an unfamiliar sector under complicated conditions. It was assigned only two main supply routes — the Amiens-Roye road and the Amiens-Villers Bretonneux. These two roads could only be used at night, as recorded in the Canadian War Diaries: “The Division is now in the first stage of a concentration march preparatory to assembling in battle positions. Surprise is to be the essence of the operation and therefore, all movement is to be restricted to the cover of darkness ... transport is to be parked under trees and troops not to be allowed to move about ...”6
To complicate matters, the Canadian sector in Amiens had been a French sector, bereft of the compatible logistics pieces to sustain a British formation.7 This placement in a new, non-British sector meant that the logistics chain would have to haul from refilling points farther afield. There was no end to the administrative challenges in the preparatory actions for the Canadian Corps, but when the balloon went up at H hour on 8 August 1918, by God, the Canadians made it rain.
The accomplishments of the Canadian Corps throughout the Hundred Days campaign were plentiful. High among the list of achievements was a logistics proficiency that was the envy of the British Army in France.
When you enter Normandy Hall, the breeding ground of leadership at the Canadian Army’s superb Command and Staff College in Kingston, the first thing that strikes the eye is an ancient oak ship’s rudder mounted on the wall. A tiny brass plate next to the oak explains that it was recovered during the construction of Normandy Hall in 1953. As the story goes, the rudder belonged to a French warship that had been ransacked and burned during the ballsy raid on Fort Frontenac by Lieutenant-Colonel Bradstreet in July 1758. Bradstreet had launched the raid on the Fort Frontenac from Oswego, New York, with 2,737 men. It was a clever strategic move that knocked out the logistics base of the French, sending reverberating shock waves all the way down the Ohio Valley. The account of the raid conjures up a number of heroic images and vistas of audacity and triumph. For a combat logistician, this vignette brings other thoughts to mind.
July in Kingston is oppressively hot and muggy. This probably reduced Bradstreet’s requirement for canvas, firewood, and baggage, but water, ammunition, and rations would be needed to sustain his men. Did the raiding party merely fill their canteens in the Cataraqui River? One assumes so. How many boats of ammunition did Bradstreet bring, what sorts of specialized equipment, and how much food did his force, almost as large as our current Canadian Task Force Afghanistan, require? How long did he intend to fight, presuming everything went well? These questions fall into the realm of logistics, and though they might occur to the disciplined student of history, they are usually among the last ones to be considered by Canadian officers. The logistics specialist can grasp the operational points of the Bradstreet raid, but he or she must reduce aspects of the plan to a time-honoured calculus. The application of violence, both blood and steel, must be appreciated in an additional dimension.
Canada and Afghanistan pose the same challenges to an army: crushing geography and a climate that can kill. In the earliest military history of our great nation, logistics were synonymous with survival. We live in a land defined by large tracts of space with a climate that can often be lethal to its inhabitants. Canada is the second-largest country in the world in terms of geographical area, comprising some 9,984,670 square kilometres and stretching for nearly 9,000 kilometres along the border it shares with the United States.8 From the strategic support bases of Hochelaga and Stadacona in Quebec, through to the building of the great transcontinental railway, logistics systems have been designed to carry essential matériel across our vast and rugged country. The Red River Rebellion of 1869–70 showcased the earliest, rudimentary editions of these Canadian lines of supply. The Red River crisis was the first military test for the young Dominion of Canada and logistics in a Canadian context. The rebellion was sparked when the Dominion government purchased the belt of Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company. The less than 10,000 residents of what is now Manitoba were unhappy with the Dominion’s plans, and under the leadership of Louis Riel stood up in resistance. Riel formed a provisional government in Manitoba in an act meant to show defiance and Métis sovereignty. A federal force of 1,044 men, made up of some 400 British regulars and enlisted Canadians from Ontario, was mobilized and placed under the leadership of General Garnet Wolseley. The Dominion force followed an arduous route across Lake Superior, and a “rugged canoe route” from the lakehead to Manitoba.9 It can be said without exaggeration that getting to Manitoba was half of the battle. The Dominion forces were successful in quashing the Red River Rebellion without bloodshed. Riel fled in exile to Montana.
Louis Riel later incited the North-West Rebellion of 1885 in what is now known as Saskatchewan. This rebellion illustrates well the logistics challenges a big country like Canada poses to a fighting force. Riel set up a second provisional government at Batoche and enlisted the military leadership of Gabriel Dumont to fight the Dominion forces. The great transcontinental railway was not yet complete, but by using the existing Canadian Pacific Railway lines and American railways south of the border, an effective movement system was put in place. Of greater import was what Desmond Morton has called the “ready-made supply system” in the form of the network of Hudson’s Bay posts to glean the bulk of the required supplies.10 General Middleton had to lean on these hardy trading posts to furnish the supply needs of his force. Over the course of two western uprisings, the Canadian militia got the job done, even though it lacked dedicated military logistics.
The Boer War (1899–1902) saw a small Canadian Expeditionary Force made up of newly minted units such as the Royal Canadian Regiment and, in the second contingent, the Royal Canadian Dragoons. The Canadian detachment fought inside the larger framework of the British Army and received its logistics support from it. More than 8,000 Canadian soldiers fought in the Boer War, and yet there was no formal Canadian supply chain. The Canadian government was responsible to pay for the initial kitting of the Canadian contingent and the costs of their transport to theatre of operations. Once in South Africa, logistic support to the Canadians was the responsibility of the British Army. Two hard lessons were borne of Canadian experiences in the Boer War. The first lesson centred on the Canadian soldier’s first look at an irregular style of warfare. After the British victory at Paardeburg, in which Canadian forces figured prominently, the Boers reverted to guerrilla-style tactics to further their aims. These tactics included attacking British supply lines on the veldt, which made resupply a tactical challenge. The second lesson followed from the tendency for Canadian troops to be served after the regular British units by the British Army logistics system. Victims of another nation’s supply chain, it was not uncommon for Canadian soldiers to endure weeks on half rations or to be routinely served only after British units. This tier-two treatment left an indelible impression on the contingent and it cut a deep groove in the memory of the fledgling Canadian Army: it is always better to bring your own. When war erupted in Europe a decade later, the Canadian Expeditionary Force would at last include tactical logistics units among their number. We have been bringing our own logistics troops to Canada’s fights ever since.
TRIUMPH OF PERSONALITIES
Most of us tend to think of the First World War as a mass of senseless bloodshed — an unfortunate clash of empires in which there are few relevant military lessons. It is easy to understand
