Then there were brief moments of hope for negotiation, for settlement or compromise, or at any rate for the peaceful parting of two American republics. But the quick-rising hopes soon faded, and seldom did Brown himself believe in them.
Secession, he saw, was a revolutionary right: it could only be maintained by arms. The North would not and could not let the Southern states withdraw from the sovereign entity of the Union; the South would have to fight to gain its independence.4 Besides, there was another reason why the Confederacy should not be permitted to go its own way: “The existence of a professedly Christian and civilized nation of men-stealers is a disgrace not only to America but to the whole world, and however strong the measures which the men of the North take for breaking it down, they will confer an inestimable benefit on the human race at large.”5
Lincoln’s inauguration on March 4, however, did not bring the violent outbreak feared. Again for a moment there was relief, talk of a revival of goodwill; and then came a seeming doldrum period, the kind a later age would miscall “phoney war”. Yet, though the guns did not sound until the Confederate assault on Fort Sumter in Charleston harbour on April 12, nothing for two months before made their explosion less inevitable. For Brown and the Globe, convinced since early January that war would come, this was an interlude that altered nothing. There was sure to be a long and brutal conflict when the adversaries were ready.6 Meanwhile, there was another question at home to be considered.
The decennial census of the United Province of Canada was under way. Soon there should be certain proof of Upper Canada’s claim to a far greater rate of growth than Lower Canada during the past decade. The census of 1851 had shown the western section of the union to have the larger population, and everything since then had indicated that its lead had steadily increased. That lead, of course, had been the basis of western demands for representation according to population, both as a practical necessity and a moral right. Nevertheless, it had been possible for Canada East to argue that the West’s apparent greater rate of growth was a passing phenomenon and no reason for a fundamental change in the constitution; that the next census would show a different situation; or at least that there should be no change in the equal division of parliamentary seats until the census of 1861 confirmed whether the western section really did contain a notably larger population. Now the time for the crucial count had at last arrived. It was only to be expected that as local returns started to come out in February the press of both sections would teem with estimates and predictions, counterestimates and refutations.
The Globe itself was emphatic on the outcome of the census: the West’s predominance was a foregone conclusion. Even early in January, when preparations for counting heads were just beginning, Brown’s paper had confidently declared: “It is evident that we are rapidly approaching a solution of the differences between Upper and Lower Canada. The census settles the question.”7 It would be impossible to deny the right of representation by population any longer – and this was “the keystone of the Reform arch, as well as the lever by which the structure is to be raised”.8
It seemed that Brown was bringing out and dusting off his old solution for the troubles of the Canadian union, now that the Toronto Convention plan of dual federation had failed in parliament. To a considerable extent he was. “Rep by pop” had a simplicity and a direct appeal that was lacking in the more complicated and less comprehended concept of federation. Besides, there was the census to give it new opportunity and well-nigh irresistible argument. Furthermore, it had been winning converts among Upper Canada Conservatives, as they came to share the western Reformers’ disgust with a union dominated by Lower Canadian interests – though they would not go so far as to turn towards George Brown as a result. It was evident that right-wing Tories, especially, were reverting to old anti-French antipathies; so much so that some Conservative papers even sought to claim that the Upper Canada members of the government were not really opposed to rep by pop, but only waiting for the right time to bring it forward.9 From all this, then, it appeared to be only sound strategy for Brown to take up the cause of representation by population once again. The potential support it could win and the expectations of the census both demanded it.
Yet this was not wholly a change in policy. Brown had never dropped rep by pop earlier, but had rather included it in the Convention scheme of federation as the underlying principle of the new governments that were to be established. He did not drop the federal idea now, but rather appended it to rep by pop as a means by which special interests – that is, French Lower Canada’s – might henceforth be safeguarded. It was a change of emphasis and priority, more than of policy, in his continuing quest for justice in the Canadian union.
At the Convention of 1859, the sixth and last of the resolutions there adopted had stated that no federal government that was not based on the principle of representation by population would be acceptable to Upper Canada Reformers.10 Now, in 1861, the Globe declared that rep by pop was “the principle governing all their arrangements and a mighty weapon to secure the object they have in view”.11 But the final objective, it said, remained the same: a federal union of the two Canadas, with the North West added – and with the prospect that the Maritime Provinces might ultimately join, if poor communications and mutual lack of interest were one day overcome.12 In short, rep by pop was still conceived as linked with and leading to a scheme of federation.
Nevertheless, if this was only a change in priority, it undoubtedly put federation well into the background, since for all immediate purposes Brown and the Globe once more concentrated on winning representation by population within the existing Canadian union. Indeed, it seemed almost like old times in the United Province, as on the one side the demand for rep by pop went up again, and on the other the old cry of “maintain the union” was heard anew. The more sweeping proposals for constitutional reform were all in abeyance now. If Grit Liberals had laid aside dual federation, and dissolution was a static force among an unreconstructed radical rearguard, so the ministerial ranks were silent on the grand design for British North American confederation. During their recent western speaking tour, moreover, Macdonald and his colleagues had said little or nothing about a general federation. Instead they had harped stirringly on the preservation of the existing union against the disruption designed by Brown. And when that same autumn the Premier of New Brunswick, Leonard Tilley, had visited Canada to discuss the question of British North American union informally with the Canadian ministers, he found them too busy even to take up the subject of his visit. He had returned to Fredericton sharply noting that the experience had “not in any way strengthened my desire for union” – and that “there appears less prospect of arriving at a satisfactory solution of this than I formerly anticipated”.13 Politics in Canada were apparently back in their old groove. It might take strong pressure – perhaps something like the impact of the American war – to bring them out of it.
The census and rep by pop; rep by pop and the census: that was the programme Brown now set for his paper, whenever there was time to turn from the American crisis. “HAS A CENSUS PAPER BEEN LEFT AT YOUR HOUSE?” the Globe demanded in large black type, reminiscent of the style in which it so often urged Reform electors to go out and die voting.14 As the Upper Canada figures came in, it published them like so many triumphant election returns, noting jubilantly that in newer western counties the rate of increase since the last census had reached as high as 450 per cent, and, as well, that Lower Canadian papers were now falling silent on their earlier confident prophecies of parity with the West.15 It really did seem evident that the final population figures would give Upper Canada a commanding lead – nearly a million and a half to a little over a million.16 Although the completed census would probably not be published before the next session of parliament was over, it was equally probable that the proceedings of the session would be greatly affected by awareness of the coming results. The House would have to give full consideration to the question of representation by population. To prepare for that debate, and for the elections that must follow the session, was now Brown’s prime concern.
Or, rather, it should have been. It was announced late in February that
