I confess I can hardly make out whether he and Sandfield are working together or not.”89
He would soon have the chance, however, to register his views of Sandfield’s government. On May 1, urged on by impatient followers, John A. Macdonald finally struck the blow that had been impending for weeks. He moved a direct vote of no confidence in the administration, “as at present constituted”.90 But it was a motion that condemned the ministry’s composition rather than its programme (which, in point of fact, was not very different from that of the old Coalition), and seemed to imply that a suitably reconstituted cabinet might prove quite acceptable to the Conservatives. Undoubtedly it looked like the old Macdonald game of dealing in men rather than measures. It might even point the way to an alliance between the two Macdonalds, Sandfield and John A., which Grit Liberals had often apprehended.91
Brown himself had heard a few weeks earlier that this very combination was in prospect.92 And on the other side of politics, that remarkably partisan civil servant, Egerton Ryerson, expressed to John A. Macdonald his own wish for such a happy consummation.93 The play conceivably would run as follows: many Grits, disgusted with Sandfield’s ministry, would vote against it on a test of confidence; whereupon, in no less angry disgust, Sandfield and those he could carry with him would join forces with John A. Macdonald, Cartier and Co. The old firm would not only come back in: it would come back stronger than ever, while the Reform party would be split again and left in shattered opposition. In short, there was a chance here for a new coalition coup as dazzling as that of 1854, with Sandfield Macdonald cast in the role Francis Hincks had played.
And again, as in 1854, a great deal would turn on George Brown’s course of action. Now, as then, he was outside the Reform ministry, yet potentially the chief focus of sentiment within the Upper Canada party. Would he once more, as in 1854, vote with Conservatives for the sake of demolishing an unprincipled Liberal government – and thus open the way for a new moderate-Liberal and Conservative combination? He would not, for this was a different Brown. He was just as desirous as ever of seeing party principles sustained, but now his view was broader, his recognition of political realities sharper. In fact, he meant to challenge John A. Macdonald at his own game: to see the ministry reconstituted, but as he, George Brown, wanted it. First, therefore, Sandfield must be maintained in office, and then steered to true paths of Reform.
And so, as the debate on the motion of no confidence proceeded, the member for South Oxford was distinctly restrained. He waited, took the opinions of his Reform colleagues, yet kept his own counsels. Then, as the debate moved to a close on Thursday evening, May 7, he rose to speak. It was a strong speech, but not the old impassioned sort: blunt rather than fiery, measured and deliberate.94 He criticized the course of the government in evading constitutional reform; he also criticized the Conservative non-confidence motion which had equally evaded the real question at issue, the future of the union itself. The best answer to that question, he asserted, was still the federation plan of the Toronto Convention. Again Brown read its resolutions. He assured Lower Canadians of guarantees for their security under any measure of constitutional reform; he fully acknowledged the problems of language and race in the union, no less than the need for rep by pop. And, finally, he declared that while a change of system must come, he still preferred the existing government to the last. He preferred, he said, to keep the Conservatives still in opposition to reflect on their past misdeeds, until they showed more convincing signs of a change of heart!
This was the right note at the decisive time. The angriest Grit could follow Brown in supporting the moderate Liberal ministers as the lesser evil, while echoing his frank warning that “he would kill them off when he could do better”.95 When the vote was taken shortly afterwards, it seemed that the member for South Oxford had made his case. True, the ministry was beaten, 59 to 64, because there were still a small number of defections – enough in a closely balanced House to bring it to defeat.96 Yet this was no resounding triumph for John A. Macdonald. In fact, the government carried a majority within Upper Canada; the Grits went overwhelmingly with Brown to support Sandfield’s régime. Hence, if the Liberal ministry had not been saved, the Liberal party had been. There had been no significant split in Upper Canadian Reform. Moreover, even John A.’s limited success soon proved hollow, for Sandfield asked the Governor-General for a dissolution of parliament and a new general election, and, unlike Sir Edmund Head in 1858, Lord Monck immediately granted the request. Now it was the Conservatives’ turn to rail against a governor-general, as on May 12 parliament was prorogued and the members left Quebec to prepare for new election campaigns.
The night before prorogation, Brown drafted a full, confidential report to his brother Gordon, explaining the events behind the scenes, as he traced the course he had followed on the motion of no confidence.97 “I sounded out our fellows,” he began directly, “and discovered that I could carry with me a respectable division of them for the motion. Still there would be a larger section against it, and a rupture of the party [would] ensue. A coalition of John S. and John A. would have followed immediately. Our party would have been broken up, Rep by Pop would have been indefinitely postponed, and I blamed for the whole. On the contrary, if I carried through the ministry, I felt that I would be master of the situation. And so it has proved.”
“I kept perfectly secret,” he continued, “how I intended to vote – with a view to frighten Sandfield into modifying his policy, as well as to induce the opposition to speak out on Rep by Pop.… Consequently, my speech excited consternation in the Tory ranks – they fully calculated on my support.” On the other hand, the Reformers had been delighted with his remarks – “and are ready to stand by me unitedly in our future policy”. Yet another dividend had been secured. Sandfield Macdonald had given him “express assurance that if he had an Upper Canadian majority he would entirely change his policy and reconstruct his government so as to make it as acceptable as possible to Dorion and myself”. In fact, as soon as the vote had been declared, Sandfield had sent to Brown asking his aid in a reconstruction of the ministry.
Yet George Brown still intended to work through others. “I replied that I could not go into a government under any circumstance, but that I would heartily aid as an outsider. What then would I advise? … Make Dorion leader in Lower Canada, take in Mowat and other reliables, pitch over the Intercolonial … and cut down the expenditure to the lowest shilling. Then give us an acceptable policy on Rep by Pop, and all will be right.” And this Sandfield Macdonald had fully agreed to do, so conclusive was Brown’s victory!
There had probably been another influence working on Sandfield besides, although Brown had not known of it at first. It was the Governor-General, Lord Monck, himself, who only the week before had had a significant interview at his own request with the member for South Oxford. They had been together for over two hours, discussing “all sorts of things”.98 “He was amazingly frank, straightforward and kind in all that passed,” Brown reported. “He admitted all the evils I complained of, felt strongly the necessity of remedying them – admitted I was seeking the right remedy, and put the question direct, ‘Mr. Brown, could you repeat what you did in 1858 – would Mr. Dorion go with you to the extent he then did?’ I explained to him the change in circumstances, but expressed my belief that a satisfactory government might even now be formed. It seems that I had no sooner left him than he sent for Sandfield, told him that there was great force in what I said – that sooner or later my views must be carried out, and (I gather from what Sandfield has let fall bit by bit) strongly advised him to throw himself into the hands of Dorion and myself.”99
Whether or not this last conjecture was correct, it was apparent that the burly, likeable Monck – so different from the prim, pedantic Head – had made a conquest. It was one of much importance, for Brown had gained a confidence in this governor’s understanding of Canada’s needs that would further affect his own course in politics. It seemed evident, too, that Monck had made a very different assessment of the potentialities of the short-lived Brown-Dorion government of 1858 than Head had done; and that was both vastly encouraging and pleasantly soothing to a still-felt wound. At any rate, from this moment on, Brown
