Understanding Canadian Law Three-Book Bundle. Daniel J. Baum

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with assaulting her six-year-old son, Jason. Ms. Wye had taken Jason and her three-year-old daughter, Lucy, to the neighbourhood supermarket. Time and again that day, Ms. Wye had quietly and firmly told Jason not to tease his sister. And, time and again, Jason, who understood what he had been told, had proceeded to tease Lucy by pulling her hair and laughing at the result, namely, Lucy in tears with his mother visibly upset.

      At the supermarket, Jason’s teasing became more forceful. He not only pulled his sister’s hair, but he yanked some of it out by the roots. Lucy screamed. Jason laughed, and he continued laughing — even when his mother screamed at him. Purposefully, Jason started teasing Lucy. He yanked as hard as he could at some of her long hair.

      At that point, his visibly angry mother energetically shook Jason. She said to him, “How would you like it if someone pulled your hair?” She then reached down, took a small clump of Jason’s hair, and pulled it out by the roots. Some blood flowed from the wound. Jason immediately stopped his teasing. Shocked, he looked at his mother and started to cry.

      The store manager called the police. Ms. Wye was arrested and charged with assaulting Jason in violation of the Criminal Code. A Children’s Aid worker took charge of the children.

      The Issue

      Was the force Ms. Wye used against Jason intended to “correct” his behaviour and, as such, was it a defence against the assault charged?

      Points to Consider

       Section 43 of the Criminal Code prohibits intentional use of force against another without that person’s consent.

       The force that Ms. Wye used against Jason was not minor. It was not what the law would term de minimis.

       Section 43 does indeed provide a defence against assault of a child by a parent or schoolteacher if it is intended for correction and/or educational purpose.

       A section 43 defence by a parent must demonstrate that the assault was reasonable under the circumstances.

       The child assaulted (Jason) must be capable of benefiting from the discipline, that is, the assault.

      Discussion

      Ms. Wye’s defence would likely be rejected for two reasons: (1) the force she used was not imposed to educate or correct Jason’s behaviour, (2) under the circumstances, the Court would conclude that it was not “reasonable.”

      To Correct and Educate

      On the facts, Ms. Wye physically disciplined her child while she was angry. The chief justice, speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada in the Foundation case, stated that it is not possible for a person in a state of anger to administer physical discipline which, if it is used at all, must be for educative or corrective purposes. She wrote:

      The person applying the force must have intended it to be for educative or corrective purposes.… Accordingly, section 43 cannot exculpate [allow] outbursts of violence against a child motivated by anger or animated by frustration. It admits into its sphere of immunity only sober, reasoned uses of force that address the actual behaviour of the child and are designed to restrain, control or express some symbolic disapproval of his or her behaviour. The purpose of the force must always be the education or discipline of the child….

      Reasonable Under the Circumstances

      An important element for a section 43 defence, the Court ruled, is that the physical discipline must be reasonable under the circumstances. The Foundation questioned whether this test has any objectivity, and whether what is “reasonable” is open to the trial judge’s interpretation. So it was that the Foundation cited The Queen v. K.(M.) (1992), 74 Canadian Criminal Cases, 3d series 108. There, Justice O’Sullivan of the Manitoba Court of Appeal wrote, “The discipline administered to the boy in question in these proceedings [a kick in the rear] was mild indeed compared to the discipline I received in my home.”

      Reasonableness, said Chief Justice McLachlin in the Foundation case, is a broad standard. But it does have meaning. Trial judges are not free to do whatever they want. There are limits placed on its application. The chief justice wrote:

      The reality is that the term reasonable gives varying degrees of guidance, depending upon the statutory and factual context. [In itself, the term] does not insulate a law against a charge of vagueness. Nor, however, does it automatically mean that a law is void for vagueness. In each case, the question is whether the term, considered in light of principles of statutory interpretation and decided cases, delineates an area of risk and avoids the danger of arbitrary ad hoc [individual] law enforcement.

      Is section 43’s reliance on reasonableness, considered in this way, unconstitutionally vague? Does it indicate what conduct risks criminal sanction and provide a principled basis for enforcement? While the words on their face are broad, a number of implicit limitations add precision.

      The first limitation arises from the behaviour for which section 43 provides an exemption, simple non-consensual application of force. Section 43 does not exempt from criminal sanction conduct that causes harm or raises a reasonable prospect of harm. It can be invoked only in cases of non-consensual application of force that results neither in harm nor in the prospect of bodily harm. This limits its operation to the mildest forms of assault. People must know that if their conduct raises an apprehension of bodily harm they cannot rely on section 43. Similarly, police officers and judges must know that the defence cannot be raised in such circumstances.

      Applied to Ms. Wye, her section 43 defence would likely fail. She struck in anger, and this probably foreclosed an intent to be corrective. Yet more to the point, she caused bodily harm to Jason. She yanked out his hair and caused him to bleed.

      A Case of Serious Misbehaviour

      Penny Franklin, age twelve, understood the difference between right and wrong. However, she was the leader of a gang of seven girls who called themselves the Holy Terrors. The object of the gang was to intimidate neighbourhood girls who were the same age or younger.

      Penny’s parents believed in the philosophy of “spare the rod and spoil the child.” Learning of their daughter’s involvement with the gang, they cautioned her in the strongest possible terms to stop, and they spoke with school authorities — all to no avail.

      One day, Mr. and Mrs. Franklin became aware of a particularly vicious attack by the Holy Terrors on eleven-year-old Zoë. No one struck Zoë, but for more than an hour she was swarmed by the Holy Terrors and intimidated. To Penny’s parents, particularly in view of the warning they had given their daughter, this was extremely serious misbehaviour. They felt strongly that it was their duty as parents to take corrective action. Mrs. Franklin took responsibility for meting out discipline. She strapped her daughter, giving her ten strong lashes on her bottom. The punishment left bruises on the girl.

      Penny’s serious misbehaviour, however, is not a factor in determining whether her mother’s use of the strap was justified. Corporal punishment, said Chief Justice McLachlin for the Court majority in the Foundation case, should be used only to correct, never to punish. She wrote, “It is improper to … focus on the gravity of a child’s wrongdoing, which invites a punitive rather than corrective focus.… The focus under section 43 is on the correction of the child, not on the gravity of the precipitating event. Obviously, force employed in the absence of any behaviour requiring correction by definition cannot be corrective.” Further, discipline cannot be inflicted if it is likely to cause harm to the child.

      CHALLENGE QUESTION

      Setting Standards

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