The State and the Social. Ørnulf Gulbrandsen
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The dilemma suggested here echoes the contradiction Gluckman identified long ago in his seminal analysis of ‘the village headman’ in a colonial context. He argued that ‘the delicacy of the headman's position arises from conflicting principles’ (Gluckman 1949: 93). In order to come to terms with this kind of conflict, we have to go significantly beyond the scope of all the scholarly works that restrict the issue of ‘resurgence’ by focusing narrowly on the relationships between the state governments and indigenous authority figures. As I hope the present work will demonstrate, we need to carefully examine the whole system of social relations in which such ‘traditional leaders’ are embedded, especially the symbolism of power grounded in indigenous cosmology and constitutive to hierarchies of authority relations.
A number of scholars have recognized the great significance of indigenous hierarchies of authority to formation of a modern state in Botswana. Contrasting Botswana and Congo, which both are blessed with abundant, highly valuable mineral wealth but are radically different in respect of the sustainability of state leadership and societal controls, Englebert (2002: 107) argues that ‘the quality of leadership and the construction of state capacity in Botswana are directly related to the embeddedness of its postcolonial state into pre-colonial patterns of political authority.’ Furthermore, in search for the political foundation of development in Botswana, Beaulier and Subrick (2006: 105) claim that in this country ‘political authority stems from traditional sources.’ Maundeni (2002: 126) holds that the postcolonial state in Botswana ‘inherited an indigenous state culture which it used to construct an indigenous development state.’ Moreover, under the subtitle ‘Chieftaincy and democracy as dynamic realities in Botswana’ Nyamnjoh (2003: 235) asserts that ‘the assumption that . [chieftaincy] is incompatible with modernity and democracy has no empirical foundation.'
In a wide ranging, critical review of scholarly usage of the Weberian notions of ‘patrimonialism’ and ‘neo-patrimonialism’ in African contexts, Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009: 149) argue, with particular reference to Botswana, that ‘there is nothing inherent in patrimonialism to prevent creation of a democracy by leaders determined to do so.’ They hold that ‘[f]or Weber, patrimonialism was not a synonym for corruption, “bad government,” violence, tribalism, or a weak state. Instead it was a specific form of authority and source of legitimacy’ (ibid.: 126). Thus conceived, they argue, ‘[a] more complete application suggests that Botswana – one of Africa's success stories – may also be one of its most clearly “patrimonial” or “neopatrimonial” states.’ (ibid.: 150) They claim that this country's ‘elites have not abandoned patrimonialism or overcome it; rather they have built a democratic state on a foundation of traditional and highly personalized reciprocities and loyalties’ (ibid.: 145, emphasis added).
Notwithstanding these authors’ recognition of the significance of indigenous authority-relations for the formation of a modern state in postcolonial Africa, Botswana is not an example of how patrimonialism might constructively underpin the formation of a modern, democratic state. The authors’ conception of what they call ‘patrimonial legitimacy’12 as a matter of highly personalized reciprocities and loyalties leads them to suggest that ‘patron-client’ relationships have been crucial for the successful grounding of the modern state in indigenous political relations. In my analysis, by contrast, the post-colonial leadership in Botswana has succeeded because indigenous authorities have not been linked up with the modern state in relationships of ‘highly personalized reciprocities and loyalties'. Rather, they were, as we shall see, from the outset incorporated in the bureaucratic structures of the modern state as civil servants by means of rational-legal provisions. This means that they were effectively barred by state legislation from engaging in party politics. There have, to be sure, been some instances of informal and tacit impacts by indigenous authorities upon the modern political field. But on the whole they have been kept efficiently at bay. Furthermore, it would be far off the mark to classify the modern political practice as clientelistic. Although the ruling party has increasingly been under attack for support by means of allocating favours and other practices of bribery and corruption, political life in this country contrasts sharply with that of countries like Italy where my recent research made it evident to me how the country's pervasive networks of patron-client relations work in ways highly detrimental to democratic political processes (Gulbrandsen, in prep.).
Importantly, by incorporating indigenous authorities at different levels in the structures of the post-colonial state of Botswana, the political leadership has, quite successfully, encompassed indigenous hierarchies of authority into the process of modern state formation. These are institutionalized hierarchies that do not necessarily open up for the kind of political entrepreneurship associated with a patron's operation of personalized clientelistic networks. Although they certainly have that kind of potentiality also in Botswana, the strength of the state has depended much upon its leaderships’ capacity to prevent this potentiality to manifest in post-colonial politics, especially during the formative and consolidating decades that are, I reiterate, of major concern in this volume.
Even more significantly, I shall explain, these hierarchies and indigenous governmental structures are inseparable from people's everyday lived-in-world, and are institutions right in the middle of it. We are hence faced with the complex task of coming to terms with the intricate ways in which this form of indigenous symbolism, practices and institutions of authority have interfaced with European ideas and practices in the formation of a distinctively Botswana modern state. For this purpose I question the analytical value of the notion of ‘patrimonialism,’ especially when conceived as a matter of ‘personal connections between leader and subject, or patrons and clients’ (Pitcher et al. 2009: 129). That is, a conception of reciprocal relations between ruler and subjects that focuses the transactional pragmatism-aspects of exercise of power (cf. Weber 1978: 1010ff.). Certainly, such an approach might be highly beneficial to analyze particular features of pre-modern political systems especially those of an acephalous kind as eminently demonstrated by Barth (1959). Also in the present study I have found some use of an actor/interaction perspective and, of course, the Weberian conception of sources of authority (1978: 215). Nevertheless, I find use of the Weberian notion ‘patrimonialism’ problematic because it easily leads scholars’ (including Pitcher et al.) attention primarily to personalized relations of power, e.g. in the form of individualized patron-client bonds. While this is a perspective that might be helpful to examine certain features of African, post-colonial politics (as demonstrated by Bayart [1993] and others), it is far too narrow to come to terms with how indigenous authority hierarchies, like the ones with which I am presently concerned, are constructed and operating. Moreover, the highly inclusive hierarchies found in indigenous societies of Botswana are, as already suggested, constructed in ways that make it hard to distinguish between ‘the governmental’ and ‘the social.’ This kind of socio-political system where conventional Western distinctions between ‘the political’ and ‘the social’ are inadequate, does not seem to fit into Weber's comparative range of pre-modern polities, conceived as governmental institutions and relationships (e.g., see Weber 1978: 1006–1110).
Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed, finally, that although the modern state in Botswana is to a great extent legitimized on the basis of ‘rational grounds,’ there have, as we shall see, also been considerable efforts to activate what Weber (1978: 215) has conceived as ‘traditional grounds’ of legitimacy. At the same time, we need to go beyond Weber in order to come to terms with how pre-modern symbolism, practices and institutions of authority are reproduced/transformed under post-colonial circumstances. In this endeavour I now turn to presenting approaches I have found helpful for pursuing