program, seen as the best means to exploit all the excitement and expectations inherent in the arrival of a new millennium.
De Clercq’s authoritarian approach is evident in his recommendations to accompany every decision taken by the Commission with a binding agreement about the message to communicate and the means for its communication (the theme and scheme of each of the Commission’s programs must obtain the prior approval of the central office of communications). He pinpointed the necessity to start a continuous process of education about Europe at secondary-school stage, including the review of school books and the introduction of a “European dimension” in the study of the past; found a “European house” comprising a library, a museum, and various operational offices to disseminate information; promote European events in the fields of leisure, sports, culture, academia, and food; organize “European weeks” on issues of common concern; award European prizes particularly in areas relating to youth; persuade targeted newscasters and reporters to become “enthusiastic supporters of the cause”; and adopt the “utmost rigour” in formulating the questionnaires when testing citizens’ “European identity” “to ensure that emotional feelings as well as cerebral attitudes are accurately probed”—all of this in order to make Europe “the envied focus of culture, civilization, intellectual life and savoir-vivre in the world” (De Clercq 1993: 27, 35, 37, 33).
The “communication gap” between the European Union and its citizens, which dates back to at least the discussions that had taken place before the referenda about the Maastricht Treaty, has deepened since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. The Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe (2005a) and the Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate (2005b) were launched by the European Commission to improve the image of EU institutions and restore public confidence in the European project, as well as to help the emergence of a “European public sphere.” The “White Paper on a European Communication Policy,” published one year later, departed from the belief that there is a sense of alienation from Brussels. The limited, one-sided communication on the part of the Commission had not kept pace with the transformations taking place in the European Union, and as a result prevented citizens both from knowing what was going on and from participating fully in the decision-making process, something “essential to a healthy democracy” (European Commission 2006: 2, 7). The expected overall result of a new communication policy was the enhancement of the public debate in Europe to accelerate the formation of a pan-European political culture with pan-European political groups and foundations. The new approach foresaw the attempt to leave behind the one-way institution-centered communication and opt for a “reinforced” citizen-centered dialogue, moving from a centralized to a more decentralized approach. The new “human-centered” attitude came to the foreground through proposals to give Europe a “human face.” The idea was to put political information in a “human interest” frame to make sure that citizens understand that it is relevant to them personally, and to give a “human face” to the information provided by EU institutions, making sure that the European Union, instead of be-ing faceless, possesses a clear public identity (European Commission 2006: 9).
Today federalists have no doubts—we need to reenact the heroic deeds of Europe’s founding fathers, pass all the necessary trials, and complete the original project of cosmogony by giving birth to the United States of Europe. “We need to breathe new life into the sails of the Greater Europe envisaged by its founding fathers. … We also need to dream about this Greater Europe,” said former European Commission president Jacques Delors (2013). José Manuel Durão Barroso, president of the European Commission between 2004 and 2014, presented his plan for palingenesis in his 2012 State of the Union Address (2012b). He put on the mask of the mythical hero and revealed the details of his (impossible) mission called the “Decisive Deal for Europe.” This decisive deal, which was supposed to transform the long-cherished dream into reality, required the creation of a democratic federation of nation-states—the completion of a deep and genuine economic and union, the development of a European public space, and the reconstruction of the European Parliament as the “house of European democracy.” Barroso used the metaphors of the European family to portray the Eurozone, suggesting that integration into the Eurozone accounts for entering the house (whose construction has not been completed) and becoming a member of the intimate European family. He resounded the idea that the accomplishment of the European dream is threatened by the rise and strengthening of nationalist and populist forces ready to destroy what has been built so far, and he set a “with-or-against” battle line for the dream of the United States of Europe with a (feeble) call to action: “We must not allow the populists and the nationalists to set a negative agenda. … I expect all those who call themselves Europeans to stand up and to take the initiative in the debate” (Barroso 2012b). It is not the USE, which is not real, but rather today’s painful reality “that is not realistic” that cannot continue. The European Commission president portrayed his era gloomily in the interest of suggesting that in order to avoid the final doom, a new beginning is necessary; a new community must emerge on the ruins of the old. He implicitly referenced Europe’s founding fathers and the responsibility of their sons and daughters to reenact the moment of creation: “Previous generations have overcome bigger challenges. Now it is for this generation to show they are up to the task” (Barroso 2012b). Barroso’s moralizing, almost religious tone is even more evident when he introduced the metaphor that “we are all in the same boat.” To stress that the sacred cause of federalism demands not just a feeling of togetherness but also unconditional devotion, he reverberated: “When you are on a boat in the middle of the storm, absolute loyalty is the minimum you demand from your fellow crew members.” He made no secret about the authoritarian nature of his salvation doctrine: in the moral community of true Europeans there is no room for nonbelievers; those who are not ready to internalize the sacred dogmas of palingenetic ultra-Europeanism are excluded from the possibility of redemption.
A month later, Viviane Reding, vice-president of the European Commission, further elaborated on Barroso’s heroic plan. Keen to sweep away all doubts, she dedicated a long speech on “Why We Need a United States of Europe Now” (2012). She prompted her audience (students, often portrayed as “young Europeans,” belonging to the “Erasmus generation”) to embark on a collective journey that would (surely) lead them to salvation, the magic land of the United States of Europe. She encouraged them to join the army of European federalists and be ready to wage a war against those who threaten the realization of (true) Europeans’ paradise dream—“populists” and “nationalists.” In an oratory style reminiscent of marketing experts, she seems to have set as her goal the enlightening of her audience about the qualities of her product. She set out to explicate the meaning and origins of the notion of the United States of Europe and to reveal why politicians betrayed the courage of the founding fathers by abandoning the concept for more than two decades, as well as to explain the reasons behind the recent return of United States of Europe to the political agenda.
What was imagined as a moment of redemption (creation of the European Union through the Maastricht Treaty) turned out to be a moment of disillusionment. While the common currency was conceived, no decisions were taken to proceed toward political and fiscal union; an independent European Central Bank was created, but it was not supported by a European economic government and a common budget. As a result of the trauma suffered, the notion of the United States of Europe ceased to be a “symbolic taboo.” Instead of recognizing the need to come to terms with the loss of the loved object, Reding believes that it is time to revive the vision of a United States of Europe and bring it back to the EU agenda. As a key prophet of “palingenetic ultra-Europeanism,” she sticks to its core doctrines: the creation of a new, federal Europe is the only way to avoid impending catastrophe, to opt for life in this critical period of flux. Like Churchill, Reding asserts that if Europe is to be saved from infinite misery, and indeed from ultimate doom, there must be an act of faith on the part of the European family and an act of oblivion against the painful (and shameful) past. The mistake made at Maastricht must be corrected. The love object cannot be renounced; there is a need to demonstrate that nothing is impossible. The EU can have a banking union, a fiscal union, an economic union, and a political union; it can even turn democratic.
In
