strength and armament of the army, the relocation of troops, and the development of railway.18
Logistic problems multiplied with the growing strength of the Prussian Army. The increasing expenses for the army, approved by the German Parliament (Reichstag), resulted also in the growing number of soldiers and officers in active duty: from less than 100 thousand to more than 400 thousand in 1880. The duration of time spent in the military training area increased to eighteen weeks per assignment.19 The army constantly grew to number almost 700 thousand people the brink of the First World War, after the decisions of the German Parliament.20
However, universal military duty before 1914 never applied to all men. In 1909, only a little more than half of men in military age formed the ranks of regiments, that is, 230 thousand recruits out of 422 thousand available men. The reasons for this state of affairs were not financial but political and ideological. Part of the officer corps was not eager to call up whole year groups as they feared the agitation of German social democrats, whose influence steadily grew among the increasing number of the working class. Even right before the First World War, in the 1913 conscription, the military called up only 60 percent of the available pool. As a result, when 1914 required the mobilization of a multi-million-strong army, 5.4 million of conscripts out of the total of 10.4 million had no ←15 | 16→previous military training. Thus, they required preparation before going to the frontlines.
After the introduction of the new military bill of 1912, the number of reserve officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers on the eve of the Great War amounted to 768 thousand (761 thousand in Germany and 7 thousand in colonies).21 At the outbreak of the Great War, the German Army was smaller than the French. The former had 120 thousand officers and 3.7 million non-commissioned officers and soldiers in active duty out of 67.8 million inhabitants, so 6 percent, while the latter’s indicator reached 9.1 percent22; of course not in absolute values, but proportionally, that is, taking into account the number of inhabitants. 2147 thousand conscripts were sent to the European fronts, 10 thousand to the colonies – 7–8 thousand were recruited directly in the colonies – while the rest were on duty in the German Reich.23
In the nineteenth century, the German Army became the model of modern organization and logistics thanks to the creation of conditions for the rapid movement of mass military and the most efficient mobilization capability in Europe. The two wars with eminent European powers – Austria and France – tested the efficiency of this war machine. The Battles of Königgrätz and Sedan proved the superiority of Prussian training. It resulted from the perfect preparation of recruits in the regiments, to which they practically belonged nearly through their whole adulthood. The impersonal military gave way to a civic army that based on loyalty to regiment of registry passed from one-year group to the next. The acceptance of military norms and values along with the pride of belonging to a specific Prussian regiment became the experience of several generations of not only officers, as before, but also regular soldiers.24
Poles from the eastern Prussian territories belonged to the Prussian contingent and the following corps: II in Szczecin, V in Poznań, VI in Wrocław, XVII in Gdańsk, and XX in Olsztyn. Many Poles became members of the elite 2nd Guards Infantry Division and the 1st Guards Infantry Division that jointly constituted the Guards Corps. Poles from Westphalia belonged to the following army corps: XI in Kassel and XIV in Karlsruhe.
I will discuss in more detail the VI Army Corps in Wrocław, which comprised the territories of Upper Silesia, mostly inhabited by the Polish-speaking ←16 | 17→community. My discussion will focus not only on the time of mobilization but also the tradition of creating the large units after von Moltke’s reforms, not to mention the way of mobilizing the reserve divisions. The other corps developed similarly at the turn of the twentieth century. The Annex on pages 305 contain information about the deployment and commanders of all German corps, in which Poles constituted the majority during the First World War.
The Wrocław VI Army Corps (VI. Armee-Korps) in 1871 comprised 25 infantry battalions, 8 cavalry squadrons, and 84 cannons. Wilhelm von Tümpling, General of the Cavalry, commanded the VI Army Corps, which then gathered the Lower Silesian 11th Infantry Division and the Upper Silesian 12th Infantry Division. The Corps also included units in military reserve: two units of the Silesian Field Artillery No. 6 (Fuß-Abt. Schlesischen Feld-Artillerie Reg. Nr. 6), Silesian Sapper Battalion No. 6 (Schlesisches Pionier-Bataillon Nr. 6), and Silesian Train Battalion No. 6 (Schlesisches Train-Bataillon Nr. 6).25 During the Great War, the Silesian VI Army Corps was commanded by General of the Infantry Kurt von Pritzelwitz in 1914, General of the Infantry Ernst August Max von Backmeister in 1914–1915, General of the Cavarly Georg von der Marwitz in 1915–1916, General of the Infantry Julius Riemann in 1916–1917, and General of the Artillery Konstanz von Heineccius. In 1871–1914, the corps underwent considerable changes. It still comprised two infantry divisions: the 12th Infantry Division of Upper Silesia with its staff in Nysa, and the 11th Division of Lower Silesia with its staff in Wrocław. The second division gathered: the 21st Infantry Brigade in Świdnica (the 1st Silesian Grenadiers Regiment No. 10 in Świdnica, the 38th Silesian Fusiliers Regiment of Kłodzko), the 22nd Infantry Brigade in Poznań (the 2nd Silesian Grenadiers Regiment No. 11 in Wrocław, the 4th Lower Silesian Infantry Regiment in Wrocław), the 11th Cavalry Brigade in Poznań (the 1st Silesian Life Cuirassiers Regiment No. 6 in Wrocław, the 2nd Silesian Dragoon Regiment No. 8 in Kluczbork, Bierutowo, and Namysłów), the 11th Field Artillery Brigade of Poznań (the 1st Silesian Field Artillery Regiment No. 6 in Wrocław, the 2nd Silesian Field Artillery No. 42 in Świdnica). The following regiments remained in the reserve corps: the 2nd Silesian Fusiliers Battalion No. 6 in Oleśnica, the Machine Gun Division No. 1 in Wrocław, the 56th Silesian Light Artillery Regiment in Nysa and Głogów, the 6th Silesian Sappers Battalion in Nysa, and the 6th Silesian Wagon Fort Division in Wrocław.
←17 | 18→
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Poles from Upper Silesia mainly joined the ranks of the 12th Infantry Division in Nysa. It usually functioned as a compact unit. Before 1914, all its regiments conducted joint maneuvers in Upper Silesia: in Łambinowice and on the Prussian-Austrian border. Initially, the draft applied to recruits from all over Silesia, but after the implementation of a detailed mobilization plan, it applied to the ones “only from Upper Silesia.”26 During the war, the division was commanded by major general Johannes von Eben in 1914, lieutenant general Martin Chales de Beaulieu in 1913–1915, lieutenant general Karl Fouquet in 1915–1916, lieutenant general Arnold Lequis in 1916–1918, and major general Georg Pohlmann in 1918.27
Before the outbreak of the First World War, the Upper Silesian division comprised three infantry brigades (the 33rd Infantry Brigade with staff in Gliwice, the 24th Infantry Brigade with staff in Nysa, and the 78th Infantry Brigade with staff in Nysa,) two cavalry brigades (the 12th Cavalry Brigade with staff in Nysa and the 44th Cavalry Brigade with staff in Gliwice,) as well as the 12th Field Artillery Brigade with staff in Nysa. An independent battalion of sappers also quartered in Nysa, where the division’s command resided. Below, I list a detailed structure of the division.
The 23rd Infantry Brigade of Gliwice included the 1st Upper Silesian Infantry Regiment No. 22 (1. Oberschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment “Keith” Nr. 22). It was the oldest Upper Silesian infantry regiment that carefully cultivated its tradition dating back
