citizen to come to the Israelis with a message of peace” (Salem and Kaufman, 2006, p. 19).
In Phase III (1967–1993), intensive interactions between Israelis on one hand and Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip on the other developed, with some focused on various approaches to peacebuilding. As Israel consolidated its military presence and increased its settlements, particularly in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, tensions rose and reached a crescendo in the First Intifada (1987–1993). But there were also peacemaking moves between Israel and its Arab neighbors as in the Geneva Conference (1973), Camp David Accords (1978), Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty ←9 | 10→(1979), Madrid Conference (1991) and Oslo Accords (1993). These and other factors encouraged the growth of peacebuilding initiatives within both Palestine and Israel. They also engendered various peace approaches between Palestine and Israel (e.g., Track II diplomacy), with each having its own traits and stamp of approval. As Salem and Kaufman argue, peacebuilding was seen as “an oppositional activity and, in the best case, the formation of the peace camp.” In the Palestinian environment, it was “an activity that was approved from 1974 onward by the first leadership of the Palestinian people (i.e., the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization])” (2006, p. 25).
As for Lazarus’s historical turning points, he begins with Israel’s founding in 1948 until the late 1970s. For him, this time had “no civil society peacebuilding sector, ‘peace movement’ or ‘peace camp’ to speak of” (Lazarus, 2017, p. 31). The second turning point focuses on the emergence of the peace camp from around 1977 with the election of Menachem Begin as Prime Minister of Israel and the historic visit of Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem until the start of the First Intifada. The third turning point covers the First Intifada. It was during this time that leading Israeli officials and intellectuals became engaged in informal and unofficial backchannel or Track II diplomacy with PLO representatives or Palestinian personalities. The fourth turning point addresses the Oslo era, which “transformed a handful of activists and initiatives into an Israeli/Palestinian civil society peacebuilding field” (Lazarus, 2017, p. 35). The fifth and last turning point extends from the Second Intifada until present. During this period, many peacebuilding initiatives stopped. Others fell on hard times but are persevering as they learn how to ride the waves of conflict and absence of peace.
Following on the above formulations, I propose “the Oslo Accords-U.S. President Trump’s ‘Deal of the Century’ ” period. It extends Salem and Kaufman’s historical phases while combining Lazarus’s fourth and fifth turning points. During this period, some Israelis and most Palestinians moved from the initial hope of Oslo to the dismay with Trump’s approach to Israeli-Palestinian relations. In the first half of this period, the momentum of peace and international funding generated by Oslo were countered by internal and external realities, including (1) rightist Israeli governments after Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination by an extremist Jew in 1995 and a huge increase or expansion of Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank; (2) concerns over leadership and good governance in the Palestinian Authority; and (3) lack of resolve and vision in the international community ←10 | 11→to bridge the gap between the Israeli government and the Palestinians, thus leading to a feeble peace process and stalemate.
In the second half of this period, Israel enhanced its settlement enterprise, thus endangering the two-state solution. The Palestinians suffered from infighting and division, which were caused by conflict between the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In addition, three major confrontations flared up between Israel and Hamas in 2008–2009, 2012, and 2014. Peace negotiations or agreements—Oslo II (1995), Hebron Protocol (1997), Camp David Summit (2000), Taba Summit (2001), “Road Map” for Peace (2003), and Sharm el-Sheikh (2005), among others—helped a little but did not substantively advance peace or slow the birth of peacebuilding entities or projects. During this period, 130 peacebuilding initiatives were founded or 79.3% of the current field (Lazarus, 2017, p. 31). In my own study of peacebuilding initiatives, 67.8% of the current field started in 1993. Contrary to expectations, when the ebb and flow in the peace process ran out of waves, peacebuilding in and between Israel and Palestine intensified.
The Structure of the Book
This book contains separate analyses that focus on both individual and collective efforts to build peace, as is presented in Chapter 3 and in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, respectively. Most of the peacebuilding organizations mentioned in this book are listed chronologically in Appendix: Peacebuilding Entities and Initiatives in Israel and Palestine, 1949–2016. Moreover, this book highlights peacebuilding in Israeli-Palestinian relations by examining it at the individual, pair, and entity levels. The rationale is to explore how those involved at each level view the relationship with the other and act to bring about coexistence, a shared society, or peace in a sustained way amid major challenges and an uncertain future. It is also to discover the commonality or common ground at each level and how that can enhance the potential for peace.
In focusing on peacebuilding in Israeli-Palestinian relations, this book first argues for the need to think of Israeli-Palestinian relations instead of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Conflict is usually only part of a relationship. More and more attention in daily living and research must consider the human dimension, not only the political, military, and strategic. Humanizing the other will motivate individuals and communities for sustained commitment to peacebuilding. That is why there is considerable attention given to ←11 | 12→peacebuilding at the individual, pair, and group levels. Second, this book expresses the need to synchronize top-down peacemaking with bottom-up peacebuilding. When a peace agreement is signed, it is the people who must live the peace … together! Third, this book urges Israelis and Palestinians to take peace more seriously, as their present and future depend on it, and to do so in an intentional and strategic way. Fourth, if peace and reconciliation are to materialize and be sustained, memory must extend beyond the thoughts of suffering to enable the restructuring of identity, regaining of humanity, and embracing of constructive relationships. Fifth and last, this book calls upon people and groups of good will, as well as national governments, the United Nations and other international institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and foundations to increase their support of peacebuilding efforts.
With the above in mind, this book consists of this Introduction and seven other chapters. Given that Israeli-Palestinian relations are an extension of Jewish-Arab relations that date back for centuries, Chapter 1 elucidates the past or the historical and current contexts of peacebuilding. It provides a quick overview of Jewish-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian relations, using both a top-down “official” narrative and a bottom-up “people” narrative. This is meant to point to the gap between the two, thus alerting governmental decision-makers and security officials to consider more carefully how their actions have consequences on ordinary people and to limit violence so as to create understanding and enhance the potential for building bridges of peace. Lastly, this chapter gives a brief history of peacebuilding efforts in Israel and Palestine, clarifying how events have increased or reduced the number and value of such efforts.
Chapter 2 goes beyond competing narratives and contested histories by raising issues relevant to thinking about peacebuilding and peace in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Among these are the agreement on the language we use, the time periods we emphasize, the boundaries and maps we follow, and the ideological perspectives and narratives we espouse. In addition, the chapter checks the pulse of Arab-Jewish/Israeli-Palestinian relations by reporting the results of Israeli and Palestinian surveys in an attempt to discover how people feel about contending issues and under what conditions peacebuilders live and work.
Chapter 3 examines peacebuilding at the individual level. It presents five peacebuilders in Israel and Palestine—Gershon
