18.4 (Bartoletti) presents the Spartans as being rather more reticent, sending envoys to ask the Boiotians not to invade Phokis. (The Boiotians, of course, dismiss them, and the outcome is the same.)
9. Xen. Hell. 3.5.4, 6–16, with Bearzot 2004: 21–30; Hell.Oxy. 18.4 (Bartoletti). González 2006: 39 suggests that Orchomenos revolted because it shouldered a tax burden (18.18% of “federal dues”) disproportionate to its territorial size (with Hysiai, 10.3% of “the federal territory”). The numbers are extrapolated from Hell.Oxy. 16.3–4 (Bartoletti), but the conclusion that every district paid the same amount in taxes is based on an uncertain assumption. See below, p. 298.
10. Xen. Hell. 3.5.6–16; RO 6. The Athenians also made an alliance with Lokris in the same year: Tod 102.
11. Diod. Sic. 14.82.1–4; Xen. Hell. 3.5.2, 4.2.10–14, 18.
12. Xen. Hell. 3.5.18–19; Diod. Sic. 14.81.1–3, 89; Plut. Lys. 28.1–30.1; Paus. 3.5.2–6. Cf. Westlake 1985.
13. Xen. Hell. 5.1.29.
14. Nemea: Xen. Hell. 4.2.9–23; Diod. Sic. 14.83.1–2. Koroneia: Xen. Hell. 4.3.15–20; Diod. Sic. 14.84.1–2.
15. Corinth: Xen. Hell. 4.4.1–5.2.
16. Xen. Hell. 4.8.12–15 for the entire peace conference. For the Argive seizure of Corinth in 393, the subsequent civil war, and its resolution see Xen. Hell. 4.4.1–14, 5.1.34, 36; Diod. Sic. 14.86, 92.1; Andoc. 3.26–27. Cf. Bearzot 2004: 31–36.
17. Bickerman 1958 and Ostwald 1982 established the distinction in the language of interstate relations between eleutheria and autonomia, Bickerman placing the development of the latter concept in the context of the Greek cities under Persian rule, Ostwald in the context of the shift from Delian League to Athenian empire, but both agreeing that autonomia was a relative and restricted status that protected weaker communities from arbitrary abuses by stronger ones while at the same recognizing their ultimate authority in certain spheres. Hansen 1995b argues for a stronger, unrestricted view of autonomia as self-government, which he applies to Boiotia (Hansen 1995a). Cf. the debate between Hansen 1996 and Keen 1996.
18. Andoc. 3.13, 20; cf. Philoch. FGrHist 328 F 149b. See further Cawkwell 1976: 271–72 n. 13 with references.
19. Xen. Hell. 4.6.1.
20. Naupaktos: Xen. Hell. 4.6.14. Cf. Merker 1989; Freitag 2009: 17–19. It was probably in connection with the annexation of Kalydon and Naupaktos that the Achaians besieged and captured the Aitolian community Phana, an event described only by Pausanias (10.18.1) upon seeing the statue of Athena dedicated at Delphi by the Achaians to thank the god for the favorable oracle they received during the long siege of the city (with Jacquemin 1999: 85).
21. Xen. Hell. 4.6.4–7.1; Xen. Ages. 2.20; Plut. Ages. 22.9–11; Paus. 3.10.2 (a confused account that excludes the Achaians entirely and claims that the Spartans went to the assistance of the Aitolians in their own territory); Polyaenus, Strat. 2.1.1.
22. Diod. Sic. 15.75.2. Freitag 2009: 20 argues that the Achaians invaded Akarnania with expansionist intentions; he may be right. Note that the Aitolians granted Agesilaos passage through their territory in 389 as he withdrew from Akarnania “because they hoped that he would help them to regain Naupaktos” (Xen. Hell. 4.6.14). Kelly 1978 proposed that this was the context for the conclusion of the inscribed treaty between Sparta and Aitolia (T48).
23. Ephoros FGrHist 70 F 115 (ap. Str. 8.3.33).
24. The political significance of the grant of Achaian citizenship to Kalydon has been cited by Larsen 1953: 809 and 1968: 81, 85; Koerner 1974: 485. The extent of the Achaian state in this period is indicated by Polyb. 2.41.7–8, providing a list of members before the reigns of Philip and Alexander: Olenos, Helike, Patrai, Dyme, Pharai, Tritaia, Leontion, Aigion, Aigeira, Pellene, Boura, and Karyneia.
25. Xen. Hell. 4.6.2–4.
26. Xen. Hell. 5.1.31; Diod. Sic. 14.110.2–4. See Cawkwell 1981 for speculation that the actual agreement had to contain more detailed provisions than are preserved in the royal rescript recorded by Xenophon.
27. Xen. Hell. 5.1.32–33.
28. Hansen 1995b: 28.
29. V. Martin 1944: 26 n. 7; Ryder 1965: 122–23; Cawkwell 1981: 72–74; Urban 1991: 110; Jehne 1994: 37–44. Beck 2001: 362 is right to conclude that “it is impossible to decide whether the federal principle was eo ipso in contradiction to the autonomy clause” and to insist on the importance of Spartan actions establishing a precedent that defined it in practical terms. It is certain that the issue was clarified in the next two decades. The Aristoteles decree of 377, which records the establishment of the Second Athenian League (RO 22 ll. 20–24), spells out the three facets of autonomy relevant to that context: being governed under whatever form of government a city wishes; neither receiving a garrison nor submitting to a governor; and not paying tribute (phoros). The common peace of 366/5 had as its principal condition that each signatory polis would “hold its own territory” (Xen. Hell. 7.6.10).
30. Larsen 1968: 171–72; Badian 1991: 39; Beck 2001: 363. The Olynthians, as aggressive leaders of the emergent koinon of the Chalkideis, were attacked by the Spartans in 382 in response to an appeal for help from Akanthos (Xen. Hell. 5.2.11–19), Amyntas (Diod. Sic. 15.19.1–3), or both. In Xenophon’s account, the Akanthian speaker, Kleigenes, points to the efforts of the Spartans to “prevent Boiotia from becoming one” (5.2.16) and asks that they not ignore the repetition of the same phenomenon in the north. The Akanthians wished “to keep their ancestral laws [patrioi nomoi] and to be citizens of their own state [autopolitai]” (5.2.14). Whether Sparta’s willingness to help was a direct response to the King’s Peace (which was not a common peace; it was binding only on the actual signatories) is unclear and depends upon whether the Olynthians can be proved to have been involved in the Corinthian War, as is suggested by Isae. 5.46. Cawkwell 1973: 53 seems to assume that Olynthos was a signatory, and that the Spartan response to the Akanthian appeal was legally justified by a sanctions clause in the peace, which our sources do not record.
31. Larsen 1968: 171, 175; R. J. Buck 1994: 59–61; Beck 1997: 96.
32. Mention of polemarchs in Thebes, 382–379/8: Xen. Hell. 5.2.25, 30, 32 (382 BCE); 5.4.2, 7, 8 (379 BCE); Plut. Pel. 7.4, 9.8, 11.4; Ages. 24.2. The office is amply attested epigraphically in eight Boiotian poleis from the mid-third century BCE to the imperial period.
33. Numismatic evidence has sometimes been taken to prove the complete independence of the Boiotian poleis after 386. Coins minted with polis legends and types on the reverse, with the Boiotian shield on the obverse, have been assigned to the period 386–378 (Head 1881: 43–60; against Head’s circular reasoning note Hansen 1995a: 31–32). The magistrate staters were placed next in the series (Head 1881: 61–72; Kraay 1976: 113), but it has now been shown that they go back to the very earliest years of the fourth century (Hepworth 1989, 1998). The chronology of Boiotian coinage is so insecure, and its political significance so unclear, that the coins cannot be pressed into service as evidence for this argument.
34. Th. 1.58.2 with Hornblower 1991–2008: I.102–3; Zahrnt 1971: 49–66; Demand 1990: 77–83; Psoma 2001: 189–95.
35. Military cooperation: Th. 2.29, 58; 4.7, 78–79. The Chalkidian poleis were listed independently in the Peace of Nikias (Th. 5.18.5–8) but in 415 had concluded a ten-day truce with the Athenians (Th. 6.7.4). Ambassadors: Th. 4.83.3. Proxenos: Th. 4.78.1. There has been extensive debate about the nature of the Chalkidian state in the fifth century: Larsen 1968: 59 believed that it was federal, while Hampl 1935: 182 and Zahrnt 1971: 65–66 saw evidence only for a unitary state.
