the initial conflict. For a shrewd businessman like Rosensteil, anything that sullied the national reputation of his products had to be eliminated.14
Rosensteil broke ranks with other owners and called on attorney Sidney Korchak to broker a deal with Chavez. A mercurial man with assumed connections to the Chicago mob and a reputation for “fixing” labor problems in the liquor and film industry, Korchak summoned Chavez, Levitt, Teamster representatives, and AFL-CIO representative, Bill Kircher, to his Beverly Hills mansion on April 3, 1966. The meeting preceded the merger of the NFWA and AWOC in August; however, Kircher’s presence provided representation for AWOC. According to Marshall Ganz, everyone at the meeting had an agenda, but Korchak recognized that “it was the NFWA that controlled the boycott.” As a consequence, Korchak recognized the NFWA as the union to represent Schenley workers and agreed to an immediate 35 cents per hour increase in wages to $1.75, the creation of a union-run hiring hall, and the option for workers to join the NFWA credit union upon their affiliation. He also promised full contract negotiations to replace the temporary agreement in exchange for an end to the boycott against Schenley.15
News of the breakthrough reached the marchers in Lodi, California, on April 6, just four days prior to Easter Sunday and the culmination of the perigrinación in Sacramento. The next day DiGiorgio, the other corporate giant in the fields, announced its willingness to recognize a union, but without fully endorsing the NFWA. Rather, it expressed its support for a secret ballot election, with the NFWA, AWOC, and a company union, Tulare-Kern Independent Farm Workers, as options. When the press exposed the company’s ties to TKIFW, DiGiorgio shifted tactics and appealed to the Teamsters to organize farm workers. Initially, DiGiorgio attempted to run an election at its Borrego Springs Ranch in San Diego County without agreeing to terms with either the NFWA or AWOC. When the NFWA appealed to workers to boycott the election and AWOC agreed, nearly half the 732 workers refused to participate, invalidating the results.16
To DiGiorgio’s surprise, its attempt to divide the NFWA and AWOC had the reverse effect, driving the two unions closer and making it possible for Kircher to engineer their merger into the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee.17 Fred Ross, who came to Delano to help with the DiGiorgio campaign, recalled, “Cesar learned as he went along; he knew he had to have money, and he had to have more strength.” According to Ross, “He had to do it,” but the decision to merge with AWOC did not sit well with many of the organizers who had hoped to maintain their independence. Chavez sympathized with these concerns, explaining, “I was worried that it would curb our style.” Among his chief concerns, AWOC’s tacit recognition of the government’s restriction against “secondary boycotts” compelled him to push for terms that would allow for a continuation of its use. “I told them I didn’t mind joining,” Chavez told the reporter Ron Taylor, “as long as we got a good deal, but we had to have the right to boycott.”18 Ultimately, the two sides got what they were looking for: AWOC wanted a union supported by the Mexican workers who constituted the majority of the NFWA’s rank and file, and the NFWA wanted the approval from the AFL-CIO that had been backing AWOC.
The formation of the UFW did not please everyone, and some from each organization defected to the Teamsters or left labor organizing completely. For most, however, Chavez adroitly navigated around conflict by honoring many of the Filipino organizers who initiated the 1965 AWOC grape strike. Larry Itliong became second in command of UFW, and Andy Imutan and Phillip Vera Cruz were named vice presidents. Veterans of the NFWA Dolores Huerta, Gilbert Padilla, and Tony Orendain also became vice presidents, while LeRoy Chatfield continued as an important manager of the new union’s affairs from its base in Delano. Meanwhile, Chris Hartmire and Jim Drake continued to steer urban support and dollars toward the movement through Migrant Ministry.19
DiGiorgio attempted to protect the reputation of its national products, S & W Fine Foods and Treesweet fruit juices, just as Schenley had, by separating itself from the San Joaquin Valley growers’ clique and pursuing peace with the union. Another company, Perelli-Minetti, a producer of quality wines and vermouth, pursued a similar solution when the newly formed UFW initiated a nationwide boycott of its products. Like DiGiorgio, Perelli-Minetti initially sought to have the Teamsters represent its workers rather than resist any union. The effectiveness of the boycott, however, compelled Perelli-Minetti to back away from the Teamsters and accept the UFW as the bargaining agent for its employees. On July 21, 1967, the Teamsters reached an agreement to turn over all its contracts for field workers to the UFW in exchange for Chavez’s recognition of the Teamsters’ right to represent all employees working in canneries, packinghouses, and freezers. The next day, many of California’s large wineries, including Gallo Wines and Paul Masson, followed Perelli-Minetti by agreeing to hold elections for their workers.20 The wineries saw the virtue of this strategy because, like Schenley and DiGiorgio, they had made their money based on the quality associated with their brand names.
The solution of union recognition stood in stark contrast to the thinking of local table grape growers, who fought to maintain exclusive control over the hiring and labor processes. When Schenley caved to the pressure of the march and the boycott, for example, the California Council of Growers, a nonprofit public relations firm representing the majority of owners, issued the following statement: “While the NFWA and its religious cohorts were righteously preaching democratic processes and marching on Sacramento, the leaders were closeted elsewhere, working out a deal that denies workers any voice in the proceedings.… Schenley Industries, whose farm operations are incidental to their basic whiskey-making business, is not representative of California agriculture, where growers steadfastly refuse to sell out their employees and force them into a union which does not represent them.”21
Unwittingly, the movement exposed the class cleavages among farm owners, prompting the local table grape growers to articulate differences between them and their corporate peers. The diversity of brands used by Schenley, DiGiorgio, and Perelli-Minetti made them more susceptible to the boycott and more inclined to settle the conflict quickly. In addition, the union learned that by toppling a leader in a particular industry, other companies quickly followed. This was the lesson of the Perelli-Minetti boycott, in which Gallo and Masson sued for peace immediately after Perelli-Minetti capitulated.
Table grape growers undermined the assumption that such a strategy worked in all circumstances. Rather than dividing and conquering all grape producers, the boycott had the unintended consequence of moving a diverse group of ethnic and family-based table grape growers toward greater cooperation. Forged in the crucible of class conflict, the South Central Farmers Committee (SCFC) became the leading self-help organization for growers.
The SCFC grew out of early affinities among Slavic pioneers, such as Jack Pandol and Martin Zaninovich, but it also included a handful of non-Slavic growers from the Delano area. By the 1960s, European ethnic growers had fully embraced Armenians as equals, but Japanese American small farmers remained conspicuously absent from the membership. According to the SCFC’s first president, Martin Zaninovich, the organization incorporated on August 26, 1960, in anticipation of union organizing. When the union did come, the SCFC became more organized and leased an office in downtown Delano in early 1966. According to Zaninovich, “The primary function of the committee at that time was to serve as the public relations arm of the agriculture in the area.”22 Members also met routinely to plot strategy and strengthen their common bonds, if necessary through threats. In one case, a beleaguered grower confessed to having grown weary of constantly searching for workers and battling the union. “The next time you come, bring your pink slip,” a peer responded, suggesting that he would buy him out rather than see his farm end production because of the unions. “Unionizing of farms was simply not accepted,” Zaninovich remembered.23
Early on, the SCFC responded to the strike by denying its existence. The arrival of the boycott, however, generated bad publicity at the point of sale, hurting the grape growers’ reputation with customers and forcing them to abandon their bunker mentality. In January 1966, the SCFC formed a speakers’ bureau to circulate growers who were willing to make their case to urban consumers. It also reversed
