form of Confucianism that the government used to justify itself.
In this environment, chongmal was an artifice that people were forced to use to maintain the inferior-superior relationships that were prescribed precisely for family members and between friends, co-workers, and the authorities on every level of government. A “truthful” response was whatever would sustain and enhance the harmonious actions and reactions of people within this minutely controlled culture. Thus “real truth” was sacrificed to the system. People were forced to “lie” as an essential part of the role playing demanded by the etiquette they were forced to follow.
When Westerners were first confronted with this form of reality, they took it to mean that Koreans had no principles and no honor and that they knowingly lied for malicious purposes rather than as a part of their normal behavior.
In the latter decades of the nineteenth century a few Westerners—mostly missionaries and their families—became longtime residents of Korea, learned the language, and became familiar enough with Korean culture to understand the difference between Western reality and Korean reality. They also learned that when Koreans were interacting with foreigners in a relatively culture-free, nonthreatening atmosphere they not only understood the concept of objective reality and truth but were perfectly capable of telling the truth and behaving in a rational manner.
Although the political, economic, and social systems of Korea have been transformed since the mid-1900s, and the people have undergone dramatic intellectual changes as well, enough of the traditional mind-set remains that it continues to play an easily discernible and significant role in society. In purely Korean settings people are still under immense pressure to tailor the truth in their responses to others and for the same reasons—to save face for themselves and others and to keep everything harmonious on the surface.
But there are now powerful forces at work within Korean society, fueled by increasing economic and political involvement with the West, by a critical mass media and the internationalization of education, that are gradually eroding the use and the need for circumstantial truth. It is unlikely that this erosion process will totally eliminate subjective truth from Korean society in the foreseeable future, but it has already gone far enough in Korea’s “international community” that it is no longer a major barrier to communication, understanding, and cooperation. As a general rule, however, it is still important for foreigners doing business in Korea to maintain a “truth alert” in their relationships with employees and others and to regularly confirm the information they receive.
Chongshik 총힉 Chohng-sheek
Doing Things by the Book
Life in ancient Korea was structured around the tenets of shamanism, with precise rituals governing all religious ceremonies, including planting, harvesting, and various other activities that were believed to be influenced directly by spirits and sundry gods. The ritualization of these functions consisted primarily of creating and following precise ceremonial actions designed to honor and placate the various spirits, from making food and drink offerings to performing dances, chanting prayers, and singing.
The introduction of Buddhism and Confucianism into Korea from China between A.D. 300 and 600 brought a variety of new rituals, both religious and social, that were to have a profound effect on the overall attitudes and behavior of Koreans down to the present time. For century after century Koreans were physically, emotionally, and intellectually programmed in all of the chongshik (chohng-sheek), “processes” or “procedures,” making up the Korean lifestyle—from worshiping, bowing, sitting, eating, performing household chores, and working, to the way they used their language.
This behavioral conditioning was so pervasive that it eventually became an integral part of Korean culture, something that was automatically taught to each child, directly as well as indirectly, and thus became a part of his or her character and personality.
A deep attachment to chongshik, which is also the Korean word for “formality,” remains a key element in Korean culture. Although most present-day Koreans, particularly those in younger generations, are significantly less formal in their behavior than what was characteristic until the last decades of the twentieth century, the legacy of millennia of conditioning in chongshik continues to distinguish Koreans from most Westerners, particularly Americans.
Some of the formalities that remain characteristic of Korean behavior include their treatment of guests in both their homes and places of work, their use of respect language, their dress, their conduct of meetings and ceremonies, and so on.
While this ceremonial behavior may be time consuming, it nevertheless adds a certain nuance to life in Korea that most foreign visitors and residents—especially those from countries where the niceties of social etiquette have become so diluted that they are hardly noticeable—find reassuring and often pleasant if not charming.
There is another facet of chongshik, however, that generally elicits a negative reaction from foreigners as well as a growing number of Koreans. This is the ongoing penchant for people in both business and the government to formalize their activities to the point that initiative, spontaneity, and innovation become difficult or impossible. Even the most mundane activities must be done “according to the book” in the ultimate bureaucratic mode, almost inevitably complicating and delaying things.
In recent years the Korean government as well as private organizations, including commercial enterprises, have inaugurated policies and programs to eliminate some of the chongshik from their operations, but it persists to varying degrees, especially in many government offices, because it continues to be part of the traditional culture. The challenge now is to find the degree of formality that continues to add decorum to personal relationships but does not detract from getting things done.
Chongui 총의 Chohng-we
Justice Korean Style
During Korea’s long feudal era, which actually did not begin to end until the mid-1900s, whole families were held responsible for the behavior of individual members, with the primary responsibility falling on the male heads of families. This Confucian-based system provided extraordinary incentive for Korean patriarchs to rule their families with an iron hand and was at the heart of the order and harmony that existed in pre-modern Korea.
In ruling their families, Korean patriarchs were prosecutor, jury, and judge. Their rules and their decisions were based primarily on Confucian ethics instead of man-made laws, and to that extent there was uniformity in the standards society required of people. But Confucianism was not so cut-and-dried that it required the same kind or degree of punishment generally demanded by man-made laws. Confucian “law” was more situational and was generally applied according to personal rather than objective circumstances.
In the Korean concept of things, chongui (chohng-we), or “justice,” within families was what served the best interests of the family, which is quite different from a universal concept of punishing an individual for misdeeds. Legal justice applied by the official judicial system of pre-modern Korea also had a personal element that made it different from Western justice.
In both family and official justice in feudal Korea the first consideration of importance was whether or not the accused admitted guilt, expressed remorse, and asked for forgiveness or maintained his or her innocence. If the accused confessed and begged to be forgiven, crying and carrying on in the process, the punishment was invariably less. (Or, in the case of people accused and convicted by authorities of capital crimes, the death sentence could be carried out in a more humane manner.)
Ordinary Koreans are extraordinarily sensitive about the concept of chongui because throughout the history of the country common people were treated by the government and the elite ruling class as second-class or third-class citizens, with few inherent human rights and no legal
