airbase at Kamina. They were eventful days and for me they were about to become even more eventful. My area of responsibility within the company was the support weapons, i.e. MMGs and our tiny 60mm mortars. The company was commanded by Commandant Kevin MacMahon and my platoon was commanded by Captain Thomas Hartigan.
On the late evening of 14 September 1961 I was called to Kevin’s office where I received a brief, to the effect that the Swedes at Kaminagate [sic] were under attack by the Gendarmerie, and were in dire need of support. Since mortars were my business, Kevin instructed me to get on up there and give them a hand. Mortars come in a variety of sizes. At 60mm, my three mortars were the smallest made and not likely to impress the Swedes as serious support. We had to help them and soon I was on my way with a crew of Sergeant McCabe, Private Jack McGrath and others.
We rendezvoused with a guide at about ten in the evening and some three miles south of the base. I remember it as a beautiful moonlit night and I vividly recall all the sounds of an African evening, especially the crickets. I remember too, as we moved towards the Swedish position, the voice of a Swedish radio operator in our vehicle, calling to his base: ‘Alpha Rudolf, Alpha Rudolf, kum, kum.’ Movement forward to the Swedish position was eerie and worrying, since we were in totally strange territory. However, we were led in safety by our Swedish guide. We were extremely happy to find prepared mortar trenches located in a very suitable place just to the rear of the Swedish forward trenches.
Early in the day a company-sized detachment of Gendarmes had tried to penetrate the base along the road. The Swedes fought well and held off the attack. The Gendarmerie took casualties and backed away, leaving behind a large truck laden with ordnance. As dawn broke I was able to observe the truck some 300m from our positions. Its driver was dead in the cab and on top of the cab was another dead soldier who had been manning a machine-gun mounted atop the cab. As the light improved it was possible to see that the Gendarmerie were making serious efforts to recover their truck and its ordnance. By that time my crew was set up and ready for whatever came our way. The Swedish commander came and talked to me about neutralising the truck with mortar fire. I advised him that while he was asking the impossible, we would give it a go. The mortar is essentially a neutralising weapon. It is not a pin-point target weapon. Even the idea of targeting a truck at the distance seemed fanciful. In true artillery style we bracketed the truck – one round just beyond, then one round short and the next landed smack, bang on the truck. The Swedes were delighted and, needless to say, full of admiration for our skills (good fortune)!
On the first day of Operation Rampunch 73 mercenaries were arrested in the province – 41 by the Irish – and by 8 September, 273 non-Congolese personnel in the Katangan Gendarmerie (mercenaries and Belgian officers) had been repatriated, with some 65 awaiting a similar departure. In all, more than 75 per cent of known mercenaries in Katanga were arrested and flown out by the UN. ‘The game was up’ was how matters were generally perceived among the mercenaries, although it was estimated 104 had slipped the net. The military momentum gained as a result of Operation Rampunch was, however, neither politically nor diplomatically maintained, and so the advantage was lost. Mistakenly, the UN allowed local and Belgian officials to complete the measures the UN had initiated, but these proved unsuccessful. While the operation did see off a large part of the Belgian officer corps of the Katangan Gendarmerie, with additional UN pressure on Belgium, the deported mercenaries flown out by the UN were directly, although discretely, flown back in by Tshombe, only in additional numbers; the game was very much back on.
A by-product of the operation – of no small future significance – was the seizure of fourteen assorted Katangese aircraft (two Sikorsky helicopters, three Alouette helicopters, three Dakotas, four Doves and two Herons). Virtually the entire Katangese air complement had fallen uncontested into UN hands. However, five aircraft not at Élisabethville (two Fouga Magister Jets, two Doves and a Tri-pacer) escaped impoundment and while seriously diminished the skies were still the preserve of the mercenary pilots and, albeit much reduced, they still enjoyed air superiority; in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king.
With no UN fighter aircraft available, the Katangan Fouga Magister was master. This combat jet trainer from Aérospatiale, though somewhat obsolete, remained unrivalled in the Congo skies. Swallow-like in appearance, with a highly distinctive butterfly tail, its cruising speed was 750 kph and it had a range of almost 1,000 km. It could strike any target with its rockets and 7.62mm machine guns or bomb it at will; altogether it was a lethal force multiplier. A lone Fouga was itself a serious single prospect to have to deal with and in the hands of Magain, the stocky Flemish–Belgian mercenary pilot, UN ground forces were particularly vulnerable and susceptible to its armaments.
After Operation Rampunch a vicious campaign of anti-UN propaganda was conducted by the Katangese government and anti-UN demonstrations were orchestrated in the centre of Élisabethville. There was also increased Gendarmerie activity and a noticeable intensification in the presence of mercenaries around the city. On 9 September roadblocks sprang up throughout the capital to impede UN troop movements and the following day in Jadotville (Likasi), a quiet mining town 160 km north of Élisabethville, a mercenary-led Gendarmerie force of over 2,000 troops cut off an isolated company of 157 Irish peacekeepers in what was to become known as the Siege of Jadotville.
CHAPTER 2
Company in Defence (Jadotville)
‘Enemy attack has commenced, please send strong reinforcements immediately’ was the radio message sent from A Company, 35th Irish Battalion in Jadotville to the battalion headquarters sixty miles away in Élisabethville. Their earlier transmission: ‘Alert on here’, radioed after an initial probing incident, was responded to with: ‘Defend yourself with maximum force.’ Now, the main attack had begun in earnest. The prelude to the ground assault was an intense, unexpected bombardment of mixed mortar bombs, 75mm artillery shells and heavy machine-gun fire onto the Irish positions. Then the onslaught proper began when over 500 infantry charged in waves toward A Company. By their sheer numbers and momentum alone they looked set to overrun the Irish defences, yet the peacekeepers defended themselves with every weapon available and with every fibre of will they possessed. This was a hard place to be, but the Irish were up for the fight. It was now the turn of the Katangans and mercenaries to be surprised, so stiff was the Irish resistance that their surge forward faltered, then eased off, and then the action was over – for now. Sporadic firing continued but the Irish had held out. Dusk began to fall and with it, to their delight, the Irish could hear the thump and thud of mortars exploding and the distinctive rattle of heavy machine gun fire ten miles away at Lufira Bridge. They knew then that reinforcements were on their way and when the firing ceased all they had to do was await their arrival. They waited, and waited and waited.
Post Operation ‘Rum Punch’, and with the successful capture of Gendarmerie HQ in Élisabethville on the Sunday morning of September 1961, Commandant Pat Quinlan returned from a 35th Irish Battalion conference to where his troops, A Company, were under canvas around the perimeter of Élisabethville airport, securing it to ensure the airport remained operational in the event of an attack. He announced to his company officers, Captain Liam Donnelly, Support Platoon, Lieutenant Joe Leech, No. 1 Platoon, Lieutenant Tom Quinlan (no relation), No. 2 Platoon, Lieutenant Noel Carey, No. 3 Platoon, and Company Sergeant Willie Hegarty, that they were to pack up immediately and be ready to move by 1300 hours to a town called Jadotville, sixty miles away. A Company were to be transported by Swedish trucks, as they had no vehicles of their own, and were to be joined by two armoured cars from the cavalry group under Lieutenant Kevin Knightly. Everything was rushed in order to meet the deadline for the arrival of the Swedish transport and in their haste they were told to leave their 81mm mortars and emergency pack rations. These would be sent on later.
A week prior to their move, a Swedish force under Major Meade consisting of one Swedish APC company and B Company, 35th Irish Battalion, was sent to Jadotville on the same mission. In addition they were to patrol towards Kamina and observe and report to Brigade HQ in Élisabethville any build-up of Katangan troops. On arrival, Major Meade was ordered out
