the psychological effects which inevitably follow upon prolonged isolation’ and had been adversely influenced by ‘pacifist Lord Longford’.110 In retrospect, the Derryman believed that the negative response from Irish comrades was a by-product of the enhanced importance and perception of ‘solidarity’ among the political prisoners in England.111 When moved to Maghaberry, County Antrim, in September 1985, he perceived a greater degree of tolerance for his perspective, albeit within a prison regime designed to undermine paramilitary authority. However, it is extremely unlikely that he would have been allowed to remain on a republican landing of Portlaoise or an IRA-controlled prison environment in Crumlin Road and Long Kesh in 1978. Prisoners in England generally had far more freedom of association and routine than under the formal O/C arrangements maintained in Ireland. Among those he may have presumed to be hostile were men who believed that he had refused to enter into dialogue.112
The ‘Blanket Protest’
The shifting context of the Irish situation changed the relative significance of the prison struggle in England. The mounting severity of the Blanket Protest in the H-Blocks in the early months of 1978 competed for the limited resources available to pro-republican advocates in Ireland and Britain. A case in point was the London meeting convened in Conway Hall on 3 March 1978 which highlighted the demand for ‘Prisoner of War Status’. The focus was very much on Belfast as opposed to Parkhurst, and the gathering was similar to those held by the new Relatives Action Committee in Limerick and elsewhere. The Irish bias was logical given that ‘special category’ had been expressly removed to undermine republican cohesion in the Six Counties. This had resulted in a gruelling, widespread protest. Prisoner groups organized by Sinn Féin Headquarters in Dublin, not least the RAC of Belfast, sought publicity in England for the parallel protests in the North of Ireland.113 Belfast RAC drew strength from precursor and kindred groupings, and Andersonstown founding member Leo Wilson had belonged at various times to the Citizen Defence Committees, the Association for Legal Justice and later the National H-Block/ Armagh Committee.114 Linked events included the picketing of newspaper offices on Fleet Street, London, by twelve blanket-clad women on 1 March and a public meeting in the House of Commons. Many London-based personalities of the prisoner campaign participated in the Conway Hall evening, including Sr. Sarah Clarke, Jim Reilly, Jackie Kaye and progressive Labour politician Ken Livingstone.115 The International Marxist Group and Socialist Workers Party were prominent in the London gathering yet were criticized by Kaye and Reilly for their ‘failure … to support Republican prisoners in England’.116 Generally, the strategy of the PAC Central Committee was to ‘maintain friendly relations with all anti-imperialist groups and to co-operate with them wherever possible in the mutual struggle against repression’.117 The lack of rigid alliances provided room for criticism of policies and tactics within the groupings.
Tensions between the PAC and elements of Sinn Féin in London, partly due to uncoordinated fundraising arrangements, had calmed since a flare up in the early months of 1977. ‘Official’ Sinn Féin, which had recently added the suffix ‘The Workers’ Party’ to its title as part of an ambitious process of reinvention, commented on the matter in their Eolas newsletter. The Official Republican Movement had a vestigial interest in the fortunes of the PAC given that the group had emerged from its Clann na hÉireann affiliate in England. ‘Official’ Sinn Féin claimed that An Cumann Cabhrach in London had complained that An Phoblacht editor Gerry O’Hare and ‘Provisional’ Sinn Féin in general was overly supportive of Kaye and the PAC.118 O’Hare, a man with a Peoples Democracy background, was described as an ‘ultra-left’ activist in the same edition of Eolas, which promoted the impression that the Provisionals were politically incoherent and riven with dissension.119 While there were indeed divergences on strategic direction between the PAC and Sinn Féin in England, the key bone of contention in London in 1977–78 centred on money-raising for prisoners in a small pool of city locations. An Cumann Cabhrach relied upon such venues to fulfil its obligations of providing welfare support to the families of imprisoned republicans. The Official Republican Movement, which retained an armed existence for fundraising and feuding into the 1980s despite its nominal 1972 ‘ceasefire’, underplayed its commitment to imprisoned adherents compared to Sinn Féin and the IRSP.120
Sinn Féin in England was increasingly preoccupied with the political status campaign in Ireland. A planning meeting in London on 19 February 1978 preceded the 26 March Easter Sunday parade from Marble Arch to Kilburn Square. Advance publicity stated: ‘This year … the commemoration will have added significance. There is a growing campaign in Ireland demanding Prisoner of War status for all Republican prisoners and an end to the torture of prisoners in Long Kesh, Crumlin Road and Armagh prisons’.121 Sinn Féin (Britain) recognized that it would have to take the lead and that its role in the UK was to harness, as far as possible, ‘the revolutionary left and Irish prisoners groups’.122 Given the fractured nature of UK jurisdictions and its weak constitutional framework, Sinn Féin was essentially lobbying for reforms which, if granted by Westminster, would not automatically apply to imprisoned IRA personnel in England and Scotland.
There were limits to what could be achieved by an overstretched Sinn Féin, and the party’s efforts to build support in Britain were subject to well-orchestrated state obstruction. On 5 April republican strategist Jim Gibney was held in Manchester for the full seven days permitted by the PTA on travelling to address a National Union of Students conference. He was duly issued with an Exclusion Order which effectively nullified his contribution to any England-centred campaign.123 When the United Troops Out Movement conference met in Leeds on 22 April, Kaye’s speech on Irish prisoners in England competed for attention with an ultimately successful attempt to move a resolution pledging support for ‘the Republican Movement in the Irish Freedom Struggle’.124 UTOM comprised a breakaway from the original TOM with whom it differed in July 1977 on the primacy of ‘armed struggle’ vis à vis mobilizing the British public on the Irish question. British radicals in the late 1970s were stressed by the dilemma of urging an immediate, unilateral military withdrawal rather than pressing first for a Bill of Rights and other forms of legislation designed to promote parity between the two political traditions in the Six Counties.125 TOM had raised consciousness in Britain regarding the human price being paid by the military in the early-to-mid 1970s. Founder member Aly Renwick believed this informed the ‘Ulsterization’ strategy: ‘There was a period when they were at their wits end about what they were going to do about the North. They were quite close to going for withdrawal’.126
The 1978 Easter Sunday rally in Kilburn had created a platform for the PAC and Sinn Féin to canvas allied left wing groups. This was followed up by a 5 May PAC meeting in the NUFTO Hall, London, to address a two point agenda: ‘Prisoner of War status for all Irish political prisoners within the terms of the Geneva Convention and amnesty within the context of British withdrawal from Ireland’. Kaye chaired on behalf of the PAC and Jim Reilly of Sinn Féin (Britain) gave the main oration. The date selected for the event, the birthday of Karl Marx, was intended to honour his role, along with Friedrich Engels, in campaigning on behalf of Fenian
