• Bombing Britain
• The Good Friday agreement
The ‘Quick Victory’ of the early 1970s was not realised and a war of attrition took hold. There were several other critical periods during the conflict and many changes occurred as PIRA were faced with rapidly changing political realities. Sometimes the military establishment were at odds with its political masters, with all sides becoming more sophisticated over time.
If the British security forces were combatting terror, then their Irish counterparts south of the border were mounting a containment operation. The Provisional IRA killed 15 people in 1970, 89 in 1971 and in 1972, the worst year of the Troubles, the so-called ‘Year of Victory’, – they killed 243 people in a concerted and terrifying shooting and bombing campaign.
The televised rioting, the burnt-out Catholic homes, internment and Bloody Sunday all became rallying points around which PIRA built a support network for fundraising and arms supply – particularly in America, but elsewhere also. It was all powerful propaganda, and recruits, arms and money followed.
***
The hard fact is that in guerrilla war the enemy holds the initiative for large parts of the time and information is the key to his defeat.
(Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo,
GOC Northern Ireland, 1971–3.)
The British army implemented the political will of the Stormont and Westminster governments in arresting and detaining IRA suspects during ‘Operation Demetrius’ on 9 August 1971, a course of action advised against by Lieutenant General Tuzo. However, a British army Press Officer with 39 Infantry Brigade stated at the Operation’s beginning: ‘Today is the beginning of the end of the IRA … without the head the body will simply thrash around and eventually die ….’ However, many IRA leaders had slipped the net and internment soon became an unmitigated disaster. Violence escalated and ‘for every one we picked up, we have recruited 10 for the IRA’. A new generation of republicans had taken up the struggle.
As well as being ‘at war’ with the British, the IRA was also at war with itself; following the December 1969 split between the ‘Red’ Marxist Official IRA, under Cathal Goulding, and the ‘Green’ militaristic Provisional IRA under Seán Mac Stíofáin. The Provisional IRA was convinced that only physical force would drive the British out of Northern Ireland, a campaign that went into overdrive during 1971 and reached its peak in terms of deaths in 1972, when the Officials (or ‘stickies’ as they were known because that was how they applied the Easter Lily emblems on their lapels at Easter time, the Provisionals preferring to use a pin) called a ceasefire. But not before they had bombed the headquarters of the Parachute regiment at Aldershot, England, killing seven (including five canteen staff members) in reprisal for Bloody Sunday.
By any normal standards, 1972 was a grim year in terms of bombings, shootings and the number of fatalities. In July alone there were 200 explosions, 2,800 shootings and 95 deaths. But for the Provisional IRA, now sixteen months in existence, it gave cause for great self-belief, not least their 7 July secret high-level meeting with William Whitelaw, Secretary for Northern Ireland, in 96 Cheyne Walk, Chelsea, London. With Stormont abolished, direct rule (from London) was instigated and law and order was firmly placed under British Government and military control. A ceasefire called on 26 June, then ten days old and holding, was the backdrop to the talks. The assembled delegation consisted of Gerry Adams, Ivor Bell, Seán Mac Stíofáin, Martin McGuinness, Dáithí Ó Conaill, Seamus Twomey and an observer, the Dublin solicitor Myles Shevlin. The meeting proved inconclusive, the Provisional IRA’s demands were too much for the British, and the ceasefire was over within 72 hours. A confrontation occurred at Belfast’s Lenadoon housing estate when Catholic families were prevented from being rehoused in vacated Protestant houses. The image of a British army Saracen armoured car suddenly ramming a truck piled high with the Catholic families’ furniture was broadcasted widely and internationally.
The Provisional IRA sensed a final victory and they ‘escalated, escalated, escalated’ their campaign up yet another gear. On Friday 21 July, in what became termed ‘Bloody Friday’, they set off 22 explosions in 90 minutes, killing 9 people and injuring 130. This intended ‘spectacular’ bombing operation backfired badly on the Provisional IRA, though, as the British army were unable to deal with the many bombs in so short a time. It was the worst day in Belfast since the German blitz of 1941.
If ‘Victory 1972’ was not achieved and the movement’s appeal was hurt badly by the bombings throughout the year, the Provisional IRA were relentless in maintaining their campaign, confident now of delivering ‘Victory 1974’. The curious blend of open and guerrilla warfare continued as PIRA activists ambushes at crossroads, shot at ‘opportunity targets’, and sniped at soldiers on the streets, across walls and around corners. Local units suddenly appeared, engaged the British army, and then just as quickly melted back into the housing estates.
The Provisional IRA continued to enjoy popular community support and were proving to be a ruthlessly efficient guerrilla force and militarily, the British army were still struggling to come to terms with them. How deeply threatened then was the Irish State by these actions? Was the integrity of the Irish State more vulnerable to the danger than British sovereignty in Northern Ireland? Even with the initial confusion between ‘the doves’ and ‘the hawks’ within the Irish Republic’s ruling party Fianna Fáil resolved, what kind of a security response could be mounted sufficient to match the violent vigour of the Provisional IRA? Curiously, the context south of the border was different, and while the Irish State had every reason to fear what the Irish Minister for Justice, Des O’Malley, described as ‘the scourge of society’ (PIRA), there existed a residual memory within the republican movement of what had happened during the 1940s, when de Valera’s Fianna Fáil Government reacted strongly to the IRA threat. Six were executed and three left to die on hunger strike. Subsequently, in 1954, two years before ‘Operation Harvest’ or the IRA ‘Border Campaign’ (1956–62), the IRA introduced General Standing Order Number Eight as part of its operating policy:
Volunteers are strictly forbidden to take any militant action against 26 County Forces under any circumstances whatsoever. The importance of this Order in present circumstances, especially in Border areas, cannot be over emphasised …. Volunteers arrested during training or in possession of arms will point out that the arms were for use against the British Forces of Occupation only.
In theory, PIRA were careful not to bring themselves into open conflict with the southern authorities, not out of concern for members of the southern security forces, rather to prevent any ‘anti-IRA’ sentiment from surging across the Republic and a reintroduction of the harsh measures used to deal with them. As it was, the Irish Government was already strengthening its arsenal of measures to deal with the IRA: using new legislation; the building up of the Defence Forces and the Gardaí; and the reintroduction of the Special Criminal Court (SCC) amongst them. However, the Provisional IRA was also building up its arsenal of measures, weapons most prominent amongst them.
On the outbreak of the Troubles, their previously dumped collection of guns and ammunition was unearthed from hides, taken from outbuildings or under grain in farmyard sheds and unwrapped from plastic bags, barrels and boxes. They were basic weapons but in good condition and capable of delivering the lethal effect they were designed and manufactured for: Lee-Enfield .303 (Mark 4) and US Garand .30 calibre semi-automatic rifles, Springfield carbines, Thompson and Sten sub-machine guns, shotguns, .22 rifles, .45 Webley revolvers and explosives stolen from quarries. The simplest bomb was sticks of gelignite taped together with a detonator and a length of fuse, but there was also a lot of information on explosives available in libraries, and IRA training manuals were updated and made available. Subsequently, homemade explosives were produced from readily available materials, much of it fertiliser-based. From very early on, the first consignment
