distant lenses gave us constant ‘eyes’ on their stomping grounds, like the Creggan, Shantallow, Strabane, the Waterside and the Bogside.
Sitting in front of a vast wall of TV monitors in the operations room, fed by signals from this powerful network, the operations officer(Opso) could track a vehicle or individual in real time from any point in the city to any other point, or manoeuvre his operators like chess pieces around the city, and indeed all the way down to the so-called ‘bandit country’ of South Armagh and Tyrone. As they dropped out on one camera they would be picked up by another, or by an operator; all the while oblivious to the level of surveillance they were under.
*
There were three more modules to go in our technical training at JCU-NI, followed by an exam, before a decision would be made as to who would go where.
First was a riggers course at RAF Digby in Lincolnshire. To work as a technician at JCU-NI you had to have a head for heights. Rigging army cameras or radio antennas to public masts or buildings anywhere was challenging, what with hazardous weather conditions and awkward climbs. But in Northern Ireland there was the added difficulty of having to do all the rigging at night for security and tactical reasons. Even under cover of darkness, though, the chance of being hit by a firework or petrol bomb (some might even say by a gunshot, though that would be going too far in my experience) made working at JCU-NI even less appealing. If you failed your riggers course, you were out. Heights were never a problem for me and so I passed without difficulty. So too did the other two technicians.
The Cougar radio network was used by all British army units in Northern Ireland, including JCU-NI. There were, however, significant differences in what was available to JCU-NI through the network and what a normal unit had. Whereas normal units would experience dead spots where no radio communications were available, this wasn’t the case for JCU-NI. They had a series of signal boosters, known as ‘high powers’, placed strategically in military bases and police stations to enhance their network and prevent dead spots in communications. They were completely unknown to other units. There was also the fact that all JCU-NI communications equipment was covert in both appearance and function.
Finally, there was the Cameras section, covering JCUNI’s vast network of overt CCTV cameras. Of course, JCUNI weren’t the only ones using CCTV cameras in Northern Ireland. Everyone from commercial companies protecting their premises, local council authorities trying to stamp out antisocial behaviour, private individuals, and the RUC created an ever-increasing number of CCTV cameras. This posed a problem for JCU-NI as they tried to maintain their covert presence in Northern Ireland: there would be nothing covert about being caught on someone else’s CCTV entering a premises illegally.
That’s where my previous experience with 14th Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare) gave me an advantage. JCUNI had a range of military-grade jammers capable of jamming CCTV signals over a wide frequency range. Carried either in a backpack for up-close work, or in a vehicle where a wider range of cameras needed to be knocked out, they were an excellent piece of counter-surveillance kit. Our own cameras worked at a much higher frequency range, thereby ensuring that the jammers didn’t interfere.
With the practical side of our training over, we returned to the training building at RAF Aldergrove for a series of training lectures. It would be the first time I would hear the British army’s unofficial, insider take on the situation in Northern Ireland, and I was all ears. To my surprise, it wasn’t the one-sided propagandist version I was expecting.
The initial lectures covered the civil rights movement and the persecution of the Catholic population that resulted in the first deployment of British troops in August 1969. It also covered, with commendable balance, some of the darkest days in Northern Ireland’s history, including criminal acts committed by Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries and by the British army itself. More significantly for me, though, I finally got some insight into the type of unit JCU-NI was.
Charlie, the chief instructor, was the first to speak.
‘Most of you have dealt with top-secret information before, but this goes way beyond that. Officially, this unit doesn’t exist. The various names, 14 Intelligence Company, FRU or simply “The Det”, that you may have heard given to British Intelligence units in Northern Ireland over the years, are all unofficial. The unit is officially the Joint Communications Unit – Northern Ireland or JCU-NI. It consists of nine sub-units called Special Communications Troops or SCTs.
‘I am sure that lying around somewhere in the MOD in Whitehall there is a very official description of our mission in Northern Ireland, but I can guarantee you that nowhere does it mention the true nature and objective of this unit. So, in the absence of an official version, I will give you the unofficial version.
‘JCU-NI is responsible for the covert surveillance and apprehension of terrorist suspects, both Republican and Loyalist, in support of RUC counter-terrorist operations in Northern Ireland. Note, I said in support of the RUC. We do not share sources and methods with the RUC and we are not a police force. We are here to gather intelligence and where deemed necessary we act on that intelligence, either through the RUC or directly ourselves.
‘The unit’s emblem, the hundred eyes of the Argus, is precisely what we are: the hidden eyes of British Intelligence in Northern Ireland. We are the watchers. The big difference here is that this Argus has teeth: highly trained operators, not only skilled in covert surveillance but experts in weapons and tactics. This, coupled with attachments of SAS and SBS troopers to each Det, and a dedicated SAS interceptor unit, makes us a highly potent and deadly force.’
I sat there in stunned silence. Can I really be listening to this? I asked myself. I now understood the CO’s objections to my being in the unit. It was insane that someone from my background should be privy to information like this. While I had read and heard much about British Intelligence operations in Northern Ireland over the years, this was the first time I had heard it described so matter-of-factly; and by those who had actually carried out many of those operations. I resigned myself to the fact that, as Dave had put it, I really might not be at this unit for too long. The instructor continued.
‘Contrary to what the rumour mill might say, the first Det to be established in Northern Ireland was in Derry not Belfast, and so North Det has been given the honour of being called 1 SCT. North Det provides surveillance covering everywhere from Portrush, through Coleraine, Limavady and Derry, down through Strabane and Omagh and finally to the bandit country of East Tyrone and South Armagh. For any of you heading to North Det, bear in mind that their motto is “Train hard, Fight hard, Play hard”, and they certainly live up to it.
‘2 SCT is based at Moscow camp in the Belfast Docklands and they are responsible for transporting top-secret JCUNI documents around Northern Ireland [I would later learn that this was not their actual mission]. 3 SCT is based at Palace Barracks in Holywood, Belfast, and they provide surveillance for the entire city of Belfast and surrounding areas. 4 SCT, affectionately known as ‘the Arse’, is JCU-NI HQ here at Lisburn, providing strategic intelligence and technical and administration support for the outlying operational surveillance Dets.
‘5 SCT, 6 SCT, 7 SCT, 8 SCT and 9 SCT are all located in a secure compound at RAF Aldergrove. Between them they are responsible for the southern areas of Fermanagh, Down and South Antrim. They also, through 7 SCT, produce specialist covert imagery systems; in other words, cameras disguised as rocks, trees, et cetera, whatever is needed. While North, East and South Dets all have their own SAS and SBS attachments, there is a permanent dedicated SAS interceptor unit also located at Aldergrove, and when necessary they provide the heavy tactical support to an operation.’
I’m fairly sure my mouth stayed open long after the lecture was over. But it was another lecture that hit the hardest: the story of how two Royal Signals corporals, Derek Wood and David Howes, were killed during their posting
