out-pouring of volley fire that mattered. In short, it was its ‘stopping power’ that was important. Fighting formation brought fire-power to bear. The singular soldier, a trained man with his muzzle-loaded, smooth-bore flintlock ‘Brown Bess’ musket, was virtually useless alone, but with others he could be highly effective. The rate of fire, range and accuracy determined the musket’s effect. These were slow, short and inaccurate, respectively. Combined, continuously discharged volumes of volley fire in groups, however, could be harnessed to deadly effect, especially if fire was held until the enemy had closed to within fifty yards or less.
To achieve the effective use of all available muskets, or the greater part thereof, a defensive formation appropriate to the circumstances combined with steadiness in the ranks was key. Individual mastery of weapon handling was crucial and it was here that the highly trained British soldier had earned a reputation for a steady, well-practised proficiency. The ‘Brown Bess’ had a barrel length of 39 inches, a total length of 55 inches (1,400mm) and weighed 9.5 pounds (4.3kg) unloaded. A long rifle enabled the muzzles of the second rank of soldiers to project beyond the heads of the men in front, thereby being sufficiently long when fitted with a bayonet to be effective against cavalry. To achieve a high rate of fire, three rounds per minute, without wavering, the soldier had to be highly trained, well drilled and disciplined. The ‘Brown Bess’ or ‘Indian Pattern’, being a muzzle-loaded weapon, required the soldier to stand up to reload and since it was a flintlock, the mechanics of firing were somewhat involved. Suffice to say that loading, aiming and firing was a complicated process, requiring twenty individual movements to fire each round. The overall objective was to achieve three rounds per minute or twenty seconds per round, thus allowing one second per movement. It took a steady nerve to keep firing in the face of an approaching enemy or a line of men changing formation less than 100 metres away, ready to open fire. Reliable infantry in separate entities of a cohesive whole were trained to fire at the same moment, or to provide a continuous running volley, the entire formation delivering their murderous execution by maintaining a steadiness in the ranks and a consistency in volume. To achieve this effect in battle, well-trained infantry needed to be well led.
Prior to the Cardwell Reforms, officers in the British army received their commissions by purchase, while advancement was secured by payment, seniority or patronage. A vacancy had to exist and he who sought it had to have money to buy it. Merit or talent had little bearing on the matter. The sons of landed gentry provided their fair share of officers to the army and navy, and these ‘gentlemen’ were literate, could ride and shoot and possessed a naturally authoritative air and an innate sense of fairness. So the system worked. The aristocracy, contrary to popular belief, was by no means all-pervasive among the officer ranks; sons of professionals, ‘gentlemen in trade’, smaller landowners and farmers along with sons of serving or retired officers all rose to officer ranks. Land, wealth and education were the all-important factors but, above all, the ability to read and write proved the great social divider.
To position the firepower of the fighting formation to best effect required movement and ‘manoeuvrings’. Troops had to be drilled into the adoption of such concentrated formations. The sight and sound of soldiers marching in unison is mesmerizing, perhaps above all because of the evident absence of anxiety, replaced ironically by an almost casual concentration that only comes from perhaps hundreds of hours of repeated drilling on barrack squares.
Forming lines from close column, retreating in line only to then advance 100 paces, going from hollow squares into line again, this time four ranks deep instead of two – these and more were all sequences intended to encompass much of what would be required on the battlefield, the fundamental order of infantry, a uniform system of manoeuvre. They had been written up in a manual in 1788 by ‘Old Pivot’, General Sir David Dundas, when stationed in Dublin. Known as Dundas’s Principles of Military Movement, this manual became mandatory when an amended version was officially issued four years later in June 1792 as Rules and Regulations for the Movement of his Majesty’s Infantry by the Adjutant General, William Fawcett. This unified system of drill formed the basis of British infantry tactics in the Napoleonic Wars (1803–14) at Waterloo and even later during the Crimean War so it is safe to say that the Curragh Camp would have seen its fair share of drills and manoeuvres along these lines. The ‘Brown Bess’ musket was replaced by the newly designed Enfield Pattern rifle-musket in 1853 and this was the firearm which saw service in the Crimea from February 1855. More than a half million of them were produced over the following fourteen years. Rifle-barrelled and muzzle-loaded, its range and accuracy was a big improvement on the ‘Brown Bess’. The same length as the weapon it replaced and with seventeen inches of a stabbing blade fixed to a musket, it could stop a horse dead in its tracks, even one advancing at pace. Singularly, even collectively, troops in line were fatally vulnerable to cavalry assault. A viable defence against a cavalry charge, however, was to form a four-deep hollow square facing outwards. The front two of this four-deep rank formation would kneel with their muskets sloped at an angle of forty-five degrees, the tip of their bayonets held at horse-chest height. Psychologically, horses would not advance on this barricade of bayonets. If those forming the four faces of the square maintained their nerve, this barrier of bayonets could indefinitely deter attacking cavalry. This defence was, of course, complemented by the two rear-standing ranks firing for effect over the heads of those kneeling. Heavy cavalry attacking at pace was a formidable and hugely frightening prospect. The natural survival instinct of those within was to break ranks and run for cover. However, by its simple yet clever design, a tightly-packed, four-sided square provided a mutually supporting formation where each man covered the back of his comrades. This interdependence allied to discipline and leadership were critical to the integrity of such a formation and survival of those within it. A battalion formation of eight companies or more formed a square. Inside the hollow square, or rectangle, were the regimental colours, the rally-point around which the square was formed. Gaps appearing in the square as a result of casualties were filled immediately to prevent the enemy cavalry probing this vulnerability. The wounded were also pulled into the inner space and, if possible, were assisted before being taken to the rear for medical aid, such as it was. Often this function in the square was performed by the battalion’s musicians.
Fire-power was, of course, also provided by artillery. The Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery trained their officers before giving them commissions, and only then on passing their exams. A rigid adherence to seniority meant promotion was slow and would have been more so had it not expanded threefold between 1791 and 1814. A close-knit group and largely centred in Woolwich, the Royal Artillery shared a strong, proud ethos and it was a family affair. Many of these men were the sons of gunner officers and there was much inter-marriage with sisters and daughters of fellow gunner officers. Their purpose, however, was far from social. To inflict death, disorientation and disorganization was the aim of artillery. Used effectively, it could support or defend against cavalry and infantry attack. Artillery pieces themselves were of two types, both fixed line-of-sight, fired directly at the enemy by cannons guns or lobbed in an arched trajectory by howitzers which had a shorter barrel. A British battery normally had five cannon guns and one howitzer. Round shot, shell and canister were employed by most of the European armies of the post-Napoleonic era. Shot, a solid iron ball – six, nine or twelve pounders – could travel 1,200 yards and bounce further on dry ground. Shell, a hollow iron sphere filled with explosive was detonated by means of a fuse cut to length, which was lit before it was fired. The fuses, however, were frequently inaccurate and prone to blowing out. Canister was a cylindrical tin case filled with small iron balls that scattered immediately on leaving the cannon’s muzzle in a short-range, shot-gun-like effect; it was hugely detrimental to closely packed infantry columns. Secret to the British artillery was a projectile called shrapnel, a mixture of canister and shell, an iron sphere filled with small balls and pre-set fuses that allowed air-bursts to target enemy in cover behind hills.
Cavalry were designated as ‘heavy’ and ‘light’, called dragoons and hussars respectively, depending on the role they were designated to undertake. Heavy cavalry was used primarily for ‘set-piece’ charges, for the injection of shock and collision in the attack to give momentum and gain the initiative when closing in on infantry. The role of light cavalry was raiding, reconnaissance and rendering advance posts to protect
