rifle butts were employed on stragglers. McGrath later claimed that he escaped with a number of others and he was at liberty for three days, but a face wound led to his being identified and he was recaptured.11 Through France, Belgium and Luxembourg the POWs trundled, until after two weeks, hungry, dirty and exhausted, they reached the German frontier town of Trier. There they were paraded through the streets as war trophies to be mocked and spat at, before being dispatched to various prisoner-of-war camps. About two hundred didn’t make it; those who couldn’t keep up or tried to escape were shot, including one of those who attempted to escape along with McGrath. This was an ominous start to what was to be five long years of captivity for thousands of British POWs. It was an experience unlikely to endear even nationalist Irishmen to their captors.
McGrath was first placed in an officers’ camp in Laufen, a town on the Bavarian side of the Austrian border near Salzburg. Conditions were difficult at first, but later improved. Officers were treated much more favourably than regular POWs. Under the Geneva Convention they could not be forced to work and were relatively free to mingle and organise their own activities. McGrath seems to have had a relatively benign existence for most of the eight months he spent there. He had access to a library, attended lectures and, with Red Cross parcels supplementing camp fare, he was reasonably well nourished.12 He couldn’t have viewed the prospect of a move to a special Irish camp with much enthusiasm. During interrogation he refused, on a number of occasions, to be persuaded to go there. Whatever the content of the information provided by the Germans, it would have been clear to him what they had in mind. When his superior officer in Laufen, Brigadier Nicholson, suggested that he volunteer to go there in order to find out what was going on, he was obliged to give the matter serious consideration. It is possible that a coded message was sent to Nicholson suggesting Irish-born officers consider volunteering for this mission, for there is evidence that other British officers with Irish backgrounds were asked by MI9 to pretend to the Germans that they were anti-British and to double-cross them.13 In any event, he sought the guidance of the most senior officer in captivity, the somewhat optimistically named General Victor Fortune, who had surrendered the remnants of his 51st Highland Division to Rommel after Dunkirk. Fortune is believed to have encouraged McGrath to take up the offer. The Irishman was also required to train some trusted men in the use of codes developed by the War Office that had been designed for intelligence purposes in letters posted home.14
McGrath agreed to take on the task and decided to self-promote himself from major to lieutenant colonel in the process.15 He told himself that this would increase his credibility within the ranks in Friesack, although it’s doubtful that this would greatly impress anyone, especially as he was still going to arrive in a major’s uniform. It should, however, have led to his pay being increased as, under the Geneva Convention, the imprisoning power was obliged to pay officers according to rank. In any event, he may have felt he deserved a promotion for his gallantry in France, and for the dangerous task he was about to undertake.
The Germans, following their victory in France, had begun a process of identifying and segregating some POWs along ethnic and national minority lines. Breton, Flemish and Irish were among those chosen for special attention. The Irish section of the Friesack Camp was initially intended to facilitate the recruitment of Irish POWs into an Irish Brigade as per Roger Casement’s efforts in the First World War. Sean Russell, the IRA Chief of Staff, proposed the idea to the Germans, but he died aboard a German U-boat before the scheme could be put into effect. The intention had been to land him in Ireland to coordinate German–IRA actions directed against Britain. The Germans had contingency plans to land an expeditionary force in Ireland, either in the event of a British re-entry into the Irish Free State, or as a prelude to a German invasion of Britain. In either case, they hoped an Irish Brigade, formed from Irish POWs, would fight alongside the Germans against the auld enemy. Following the failure of the Battle of Britain, the invasion plans were shelved and the task of the Irish camp in Friesack was downgraded to one of selecting and training a number of men deemed suitable for sabotage and espionage work.
The project came under the remit of Dr Edmund Veesenmayer, later to be directly complicit in Holocaust crimes, but at that time responsible for Irish matters, in particular liaison with the IRA. Hoven had been assigned by him to manage the Irish camp and he held the view that most Irishmen serving in the British forces had only joined because of economic necessity.16 His contacts with the IRA during his time in Ireland may well have coloured his view about the extent and depth of Irish Anglophobia. It is estimated that there were more than 100,000 Irish in British uniforms throughout the war and motives for enlisting varied greatly. For many, especially those who joined before the war, an inability to find gainful employment at home would have been a factor, but there was no necessary correlation between this and anti-British sentiment. The attitude of Irish recruits towards Britain was likely varied and nuanced, and, like many involuntary emigrants, resentment was as likely to be directed homeward.
The selection of ordinary POWs for Friesack had begun in late 1940. Some merchant seamen and civilians were also included in the selection process. Prisoners were promised improved conditions and offered the prospect of release from captivity should they cooperate. The process involved POWs being questioned about their reaction to a theoretical British invasion of the Irish Free State and how they felt about a united Ireland. The purpose was to gauge Irish nationalist and anti-British sentiment. Frank Ryan, a legendary Irish Republican, participated, albeit briefly and reluctantly, in the selection process at the request of the Abwehr. A charismatic figure, he had left the mainstream IRA for the left-leaning Republican Congress and later fought with the International Brigade in Spain. He had become friendly with both Clissmann and Hoven during their time in Ireland and they were instrumental in having him removed from a Spanish prison, where he faced execution. Clissmann, with whom he shared accommodation for a time,17 asked him to help verify claims of past IRA involvement by certain prisoners. Ryan, who was not introduced under his own name, withdrew from the process when one of the Irish servicemen recognised him.18 Presumably, he feared reports portraying him as collaborating with the Nazis. Francis Stuart, the Irish writer who had taken up an academic post in Berlin University just before the war – an arrangement facilitated by Clissmann – also participated in the vetting process.19 Unlike Ryan, Stuart had no qualms about being associated with Nazi propaganda, at least not at that time, for he later went on to make weekly broadcasts on a German propaganda radio station directed at Ireland.20
For some reason the selection process was slipshod and even chaotic. The Germans found the initial responses disappointing, so an adjudged absence of hostility to the possibility of German support for Ireland in the event of British occupation was deemed sufficient reason for selection. One decidedly hostile group was dispatched to Friesack in error following a mix-up of lists, and because the camp was a secret project they were kept there.21 At its peak, about 180 Irish prisoners were housed in Friesack. When one considers that there were likely to be close to 1,000 Irish-born servicemen in POW camps in 1940, this represented only a small percentage of the total. Of those sent to Friesack, only about a dozen volunteered for sabotage or radio training and, it seems for most of these, it was just a ruse to get home and, or, to enjoy the privileges on offer. Volunteers for training were provided with rented accommodation in Berlin, paid an allowance and permitted relative freedom of movement, an alluring prospect at a time when there were few air raids or food shortages in the German capital.
After McGrath settled in the camp he consulted with the senior NCOs present. One of them was a fellow ‘sapper’, Sergeant-Major Whelan from Cork, who was actively warning prisoners against having any dealings with the Germans.22 But McGrath decided on a different approach. He had learned that a number of prisoners had already volunteered to undergo training in radio communications and sabotage. This presented him with a dilemma; if he attempted to stop them, it would have exposed him and undermined his plans. His approach was to sanction their ‘collaboration’ provided they agreed that on landing in Ireland or Britain they would immediately report to the authorities and make no contact with the IRA. In clandestine briefings, he promised those he felt he could trust that ‘he would stand by all’ if ‘they were not influenced by the Germans to undertake anything behind my back’.23 Although most assured him of their support, McGrath wasn’t confident that all would comply with
