The Chōshū-led Loyalists meant to destroy the Tokugawa Bakufu as the most dangerous impediment to their objective. After the Edo authorities agreed to pay reparations to Great Britain, Kondō Isami realized that the Bakufu was not yet ready to implement Jōi. Although he intended to eventually return to the east to wage war against the foreigners there, he nevertheless determined that his corps, the avowed protector of the shōgun, must for the time being remain in the turbulent west, even in Iémochi’s absence. His corps must suppress the anti-Tokugawa radicals who would use the shōgun’s inability to expel the foreigners as an excuse to strike out against him. For Kondō Isami, protecting the Tokugawa Shōgun now took precedence over everything.
The Shinsengumi’s mortal enemies basked in imperial grace during the sweltering and frenetic summer of the third year of Bunkyū. In Kyōto, the Chōshū Loyalists enjoyed the support of the extremists surrounding the emperor, led by court noble Sanjō Sanétomi. But Chōshū’s glory in Kyōto was as short-lived as its triumph at Shimonoseki had been. In mid-August, Aizu and Satsuma formed a military alliance, tipping the balance of power at the Imperial Court back into the hands of the Tokugawa. On August 18, under the cover of night, heavily armed Satsuma and Aizu troops seized the Nine Forbidden Gates of the palace, barring entrance by the Chōshū men. Fourteen hundred armed Loyalists, including one thousand rōnin, assembled at Sakaimachi Gate, which thus far had been Chōshū ’s to guard. The tense scene was described by a chief vassal of the outside Lord of Yonézawa, in a letter to his son:
The two sides faced each other, their cannon and rifles ready to fire.... Each man wore armor, and I wish you could have seen the imposing spectacle. Chōshū Han showed no fear in the face of [the dangerous situation]. Among their samurai were youths who looked to be around fifteen or sixteen years old. They wore white crepe jackets and white headbands, carried Western rifles in their hands and thought nothing of the huge army confronting them. Rather, they advanced to the front of the line, eager for the enemy to attack.
Their brave determination notwithstanding, the Chōshū warriors were no match for their heavily armed Satsuma and Aizu foes. Betrayed by the Imperial Court, these champions of Imperial Loyalism aimed their guns at the palace. But now they were presented with an imperial order to retreat immediately or be branded an “Imperial Enemy.” They had no choice but to obey. Chōshū was banished from Kyōto, along with seven radical court nobles led by Sanjō Sanétomi. Satsuma and Aizu were aided in the fight by men of the Shinsengumi, including Hijikata Toshizō. The Demon Commander’s valor was evident in the two enemy sword marks left on the iron head guard he wore at his forehead. He sent this head guard to his brother-in-law, Satō Hikogorō, in Hino. Accompanying the package was a letter, in which Hijikata glibly remarked, “In Kyōto, I have not yet been killed.”
The so-called Coup of 8/18 exacerbated the turmoil in the city. Chōshū samurai and their rōnin allies who managed to remain in Kyōto went into hiding. They renewed their vows of Heaven’s Revenge, and there were rumors that Chōshū was planning a countercoup in Kyōto. Panic spread through the general populace and the court. In the aftermath of the coup, the Shinsengumi received official orders from the protector of Kyōto to “patrol the city day and night.”
The Shinsengumi did their job well. The extraordinary sense of self-importance and the unyielding will to power of their leaders interacted with each other, and reacted with the unique historical era they had inherited, to produce in these particularly skilled swordsmen a propensity to kill unsurpassed even in these bloodiest of times. Soon a semblance of order was restored to the city. In the following month the Imperial Court rewarded each corpsmen with one gold ryō.‡
The protector of Kyōto was similarly happy with his Newly Selected Corps, which, in fact, were becoming his most powerful security force. The corps’ unprecedented strength was bolstered by their severe code of conduct, devised by Kondō and Hijikata. That both leaders hailed from peasant households certainly steeled their resolve to conduct themselves and their corps according to the most stoic traditions of the warrior class. Strictly prohibited were “violating the Code of the Samurai,” “quitting the corps,” “raising money for selfish purposes,” “taking it upon oneself to make accusations,” and “fighting for personal reasons.” Violation of any of these prohibitions was punishable by seppuku.§ Not all violators, however, were given the honor of dying like samurai. The less worthy ones were beheaded. Attached to the prohibitions was a particularly severe regulation that perhaps more than anything else accounted for the lethality of the Shinsengumi: “In case of a fight, if you do not kill your opponent you will be ordered to commit seppuku, just as if you had been wounded from behind.”¶
This sanguine code of conduct was, in fact, strictly enforced—although it would not be established as the official code of the Shinsengumi for nearly two years.* The number of corpsmen forced to commit seppuku, or who were beheaded or otherwise murdered, has been lost to history, though several incidents have been recorded. Ta’uchi Tomo of the province of Musashi made an unexpected visit to the home of his mistress in the southern outskirts of Kyōto. The table had been set with saké and some food, which aroused his suspicion. As he questioned the woman, he was suddenly attacked from behind by her secret lover. A fellow corpsman discovered Ta’uchi bleeding from his wounds. He helped him back to headquarters, where Kondō and Hijikata ordered him to commit seppuku—a propensity to kill. Another man was similarly punished for having an affair with a married woman—a propensity to kill. A fencing instructor in the corps who espoused radical Loyalist views was condemned to seppuku for “disrupting order in the corps”—a propensity to kill. One of the earliest members deserted after seeing fellow corpsmen condemned to death and countless of the enemy butchered in the streets of Kyōto. Having been with the corps for a long time, he was privy to confidential information, the divulgence of which was not to be tolerated. He was hunted down, captured, and hacked to death by several of his former comrades—a propensity to kill. Another corpsman was beheaded for attempting to extort money from a wealthy merchant—a propensity to kill. Two others, one of whom had been expelled from the Shinsengumi for cowardice, were murdered on the streets of Kyōto for attempting to use the corps’ name for their own profit—a propensity to kill. A man in charge of accounting for the Shinsengumi was ordered by Hijikata to commit seppuku for “the crime of miscalculation”—a propensity to kill.
Although quitting the corps was certainly a capital offense, it was by no means easy to apprehend a deserter. Tracking down a deserter could be a drawn-out and complicated process, as was the case for one Shibata Hikosaburō. Shibata enlisted in 1864. About a year and a half later, in June 1866, he deserted after extorting money for personal use. When Hijikata received word of Shibata’s whereabouts in Izushi Han, northwest of Kyōto, he sent four men after him. The pursuers carried a detailed description of Shibata, including his features, age, dress, alias, and the fact that he spoke with a Musashi dialect. He was handed over to his pursuers by Izushi officials, brought back to Shinsengumi headquarters in Kyōto, and forced to commit seppuku as an example to would-be deserters—a propensity to kill.
The most infamous instance of harshness by the Shinsengumi to one of their own is the unfortunate, if historically blurred, case of Vice Commander Yamanami Keisuké. According to Nagakura Shinpachi, Yamanami, “vehement in his Imperial Loyalism, was every bit as great as Kiyokawa Hachirō, Serizawa Kamo and Kondō Isami.” Even the protector of Kyōto was counted among Yamanami’s admirers. When Yamanami’s sword was severed in a battle in which he had killed a rōnin, the Aizu daimyō rewarded him with a new sword and eight ryō .
The trouble with Yamanami seems to have originated over a disagreement in philosophy, though Shimosawa also cites a bitter rivalry with the other vice commander, Hijikata Toshizō. Yamanami was apparently vexed over the lately inflated self-importance of Kondō and Hijikata. He felt that they had forgotten the original
