of both Dáil Éireann and the republican leadership, declaring themselves independent.
Both Mellows and Michael Collins continued to import arms from Germany during the slide into Civil War, and Charlie McGuinness, an experienced seaman and member of the Volunteers from Derry City, had undertaken to bring a shipment of weapons into Ireland under direct orders from Collins while the Truce negotiations were ongoing. With £30,000 provided for the purpose, McGuinness purchased the Anita and a cargo of weapons and ammunition in Hamburg. McGuinness and his crew were almost immediately captured by German customs, however, after they left a dockside public house much the worse for drink. Arrested and fined, yet, characteristically undaunted, McGuinness had the ill-fated vessel returned to him by the German authorities, minus the arms, with the best wishes of the prosecuting judge. Impervious to danger, he purchased a second vessel, the Frieda, along with 1,500 rifles, 2,000 lugers and nearly two million rounds of ammunition. After an eventful passage, the Frieda made land off Hook Head in November 1921 and McGuinness and his German crew transferred their cargo at Cheekpoint, close to Waterford Harbour. With his German crew, McGuinness was placed in Mellows’ care. ‘Liam had given me up for dead and his joy at seeing me was unbounded’, McGuinness recalled.68 In return for his efforts, McGuinness was allowed by Mellows to do as he wished with the Frieda and he happily sold her for £1,000, leaving Mellows with a crew of bewildered, drink-addled German sailors to be housed, fed and returned to the fatherland. The German crew were disbursed to safehouses across the city but ‘under confinement were becoming intractable’.69
McGuinness subsequently delivered a second cargo of arms into Ireland, landing a consignment of weapons purchased in Bremen at Helvick Harbour aboard the Hanna in the first week of April 1922. After McGuinness declared his support for the Four Courts Executive, Mellows provided him with £10,000 for a third shipment of German arms; however, the capture of the Four Courts in July saw the deal fall through, in lieu of a further £40,000 needed to complete the transaction. ‘The deal was off’, McGuinness recalled, ‘I quit the Irish movement then and there. Incompetent meddling had destroyed my gun running organisation.’70
Peace Moves, Setbacks and Army Conventions
The split over the Anglo-Irish Treaty affected the army, Dáil Éireann, the IRB, Sinn Féin and Cumann na mBan, and official and unofficial efforts at maintaining unity were attempted by a range of groups and individuals, including the Church and the Labour Movement. Uniquely among republican organisations, Cumann na mBan came out almost completely against political compromise and at its Ard Fheis, held in the first week of February, members voted 419 to 63 in favour of rejecting the Treaty. A small group of pro-Treaty members subsequently left to form Cumann na Saoirse under Jenny Wyse Power. Cumann na mBan went on to play a crucial role on the republican side during the Civil War with hundreds of members jailed.
The Sinn Féin Ard Fheis held on 22 February successfully delayed a split in the party with almost universal support for a motion to adjourn proceedings for a period of three months ‘to avoid a division of the Sinn Féin organisation and to avert the danger to the country of an immediate election, and give an opportunity to the signatories of the London Agreement to draft a constitution’.71 The motion was passed amid a spirit of hope and comradeship; however, the postponement worked to the advantage of the pro-Treaty leadership by delaying an open debate with the membership. In a similar vein, Dáil Éireann agreed, on 2 March, that no election should be held until the new Free State constitution was presented to the people and the Dáil was adjourned until the end of April, allowing the Free State leadership further time to consolidate power.
While the IRB was important in maintaining bonds of allegiance among republicans to Michael Collins and the National Army, outside Dublin, Collins’ control of the IRB did not give him the personal sway he anticipated. The South Munster Division of the IRB rejected the supreme council’s directive to support the Treaty in January 1922, with the entire Cork membership unwilling to obey the directive.72 In the west and north of the country, the IRB was weaker and had minimal influence over Volunteer officers.
The much anticipated army convention was formally announced by Richard Mulcahy at the end of February for 26 March, but as the strength of republican sentiment became apparent, it was banned by the Free State on 15 March and an order issued that any officer attending would be dismissed from the National Army. The republican ‘Military Council’ pressed ahead with preparations for the convention; however, the threat of dismissal from the Free State Forces scuppered hopes of unification, and, as Florence O’Donoghue reflected, ‘a disaster, worse than any defeat in the field, had struck the army’.73
The growing anxiety among the government that elements within the republican leadership were considering a military coup d’état was re-enforced by an interview to the press given by Rory O’Connor on 22 March, four days before the army convention.74 Fielding questions alone, O’Connor purported to speak for the anti-Treaty leadership and presented the most extreme republican position. Claiming the Irish Republican Army represented 80 per cent of Volunteer officers, O’Connor argued that the army would return to its original constitution at the upcoming convention as Dáil Éireann no longer had any moral authority. O’Connor claimed that by accepting the Treaty, the government had ‘abolished itself’ and ‘has done something it has no moral right to do’. Stating that the actions republicans were contemplating ‘are no greater than the men took in 1916’, O’Connor claimed ‘the army has overthrown the government in the same way in many countries’. When asked ‘if the parliament and the people go wrong, will they have to take the consequences?’, O’Connor replied, ‘Yes, that is so.’ When pressed further by reporters, ‘if the army executive refuses its consent to the government set up by the people, will we have a military dictatorship?’ O’Connor replied, ‘Yes, you can take it any way you like.’
Coming four days before the army convention that effectively established two rival armies, O’Connor’s reckless interview made it problematic for republicans to seek any political accommodation with the Free State and presented the republican leadership as being committed to the overthrow of a democratically elected government. O’Connor’s comments did not represent the views of the republican leadership, however, which contained a diverse range of opinion. For most republican officers, particularly in the crucial First Munster and Fourth Northern Divisions, unity within the army remained the priority, and O’Connor falsely presented the most extreme republican position as the agreed policy of the entire republican leadership. A point of no return had been established that was problematic for republicans to retreat from, and which ultimately benefitted the Free State, which now had carte blanche to take extreme measures against republicans.
Mellows presided over the army convention that was attended by 211 officers from 49 brigades and officially established the Irish Republican Army on 26 March. The IRA was controlled by an executive of sixteen members elected by ballot, from which an army council of five was elected. On 9 April, a second IRA convention elected an army council containing both militant and more conciliatory republicans: Liam Lynch (Cork, 1st Munster Division), Chief of Staff; Joseph McKelvey (Belfast, 3rd Northern Division), Deputy Chief of Staff; Florence O’Donoghue (Cork, 1st Munster Division), Adjutant General; Liam Mellows (Dublin/IRA GHQ), Quartermaster; Rory O’Connor (Dublin/IRA GHQ), Director of Engineering; and Ernie O’Malley (Tipperary, 2nd Munster Division), Director of Organisation. In terms of the balance of opinion within the army council, Lynch and O’Donoghue remained hopeful of achieving unity with the Free State Army, while O’Connor, supported by Mellows and O’Malley, represented uncompromising republicanism.
The establishment of the new governing body marked a definitive break and a further step towards conflict but did little to unify republicans; as Florence O’Donoghue conceded, ‘the Executive never fused into an effective unit. It never had a common mind or a common policy. There was not time. Many matters, not strictly the concern of the Army, obtruded in discussions, social theories were aired and debated, projects were considered in an atmosphere of unreality, stresses developed which weakened the fabric of authority.’75 Ernie O’Malley recalled executive meetings where ‘there
