hall of the building and the body, draped in the tricolour, was placed on a specially prefabricated platform in front of the statue of Daniel O’Connell, where Seán McGarry, on the point of replacing Ashe as president of the IRB, gave a brief eulogy.76
By implication, therefore, Mulcahy must have been at the head of the extended cortege as it slowly wound its way through the packed centre of the city on the Sunday. But he was definitely at the graveside when Collins delivered his ‘exceedingly brief’ speech in Irish and English, i.e. immediately after a triple volley and last post had been sounded: ‘There will be no oration. Nothing remains to be said, for the volley which has been fired is the only speech it is proper to make above the grave of a dead Fenian.’77 Clearly that was another potentially dangerous moment, should, for example, there have been an attempt made to arrest the members of the firing party. But Mulcahy was ready: ‘Richard Mulcahy … carefully demobilised the Dublin Brigade within the grounds of Glasnevin cemetery.’78
Accordingly, the responsibilities which Mulcahy undertook throughout the period of the Ashe funeral were impressively handled, especially on the Friday and on the Sunday. On Friday, like at Ashbourne during Easter 1916, he displayed an amount of nerve, especially in the City Hall, where he was in the firing line should matters have got out of hand. And on Sunday, at Glasnevin, he was so well organised that he had his men readied to slip away quickly in a controlled fashion.
Yet, Peter Hart claimed that he was deliberately kept in the dark by Collins, to the point that he was actually surprised when Collins stood up to speak.79 This is most unlikely because, upon replacing de Valera at the head of the guard of honour, he had the bones of two days to ponder both the reasons for and the consequences of that decision; in which case, as Hart also implies, Mulcahy’s preoccupation at the close of the ceremony was that an overly inflammatory speech would provoke an unwelcome response from the authorities and, thereby, make it harder for his men to get away unchallenged.
Consequently, overall, the sort of activities which Mulcahy became involved in throughout 1917 – namely his role in reorganising the IRB during the spring; becoming a member of its SC during the summer; reinvigorating the Volunteers during the same period; rising to the prestigious position of secretary of the IRB’s mouthpiece, the WTMA, in the autumn; guaranteeing that Ashe’s penultimate resting place would be in the very heartland of imperial Dublin; and securing a high level of discipline from his men during the five-hour funeral procession – all bear witness to his growing self-confidence and assertiveness; to his excellent organisational skills; but, most importantly, to the increasing centrality of active republicanism in his life. Furthermore, the brevity of Collins’ speech would not have bothered him at all. If anything, most especially when he already knew that the IRB intended in no uncertain terms to put its stamp upon Volunteering during the next few months, he would have been impressed that Collins made reference to just one ideology: Fenianism.
CHAPTER 4
Assiduous
Volunteer Command, 1917–19
The long-awaited Volunteer national convention met in the GAA’s pavilion on Jones’ Road at the tail end of a similar Sinn Féin gathering in the Mansion House on Saturday, 27 October 1917. The IRB was in almost complete control of it,1 certainly in comparison to what transpired in the Mansion House when Béaslaí, Boland, Fionán Lynch, Diarmuid Lynch, de Blaghd and Collins, who was the last to be voted in,2 accounted for a mere quarter of the executive seats. For example, all of the organising committee – except for de Valera, newly elected president of Sinn Féin,3 and Brugha – were members of the IRB, i.e. Lynch, McGarry, Collins and Mulcahy.4 Similarly, in the matter of security, entry could not be gained without a nod from Collins, Lynch or Diarmuid O’Hegarty:5 ‘nobody was present who was not entitled to be present.’6 Indeed, so secretive were they, having changed venue twice in Parnell Square, that the meeting was already three hours behind schedule when de Valera, as chairman, opened proceedings at 8 pm.7
The meeting lasted more than ten hours in all and everyone considered the attendance ‘very large’, with estimates ranging from a minimum of 300 to a maximum of 1,100. The final figure was more than likely closer to the maximum because the unit of organisation, which was allowed for representation purposes, was that of the company.8 Either way, ‘All of the prominent men in the republican physical force movement of that time were present.’9
There were two long discussions. The first resulted from a proposal that, because his countermand so negatively affected turnout for the Rebellion, MacNeill should be court-martialled.10 (Others had already been held to account by the Volunteers for non-attendance, resulting in, for example, the two Cork city brigades being cleared of all wrong doing. In a similar manner, the IRB had conducted its own inquiries. For example, its Dublin audit yielded the counterintuitive result that, if anything, the IRB had excelled itself.11) The following is the likely pattern of that debate. Brugha initially spoke strongly in favour of court martial.12 But de Valera refused to allow any censure of MacNeill, revealing that he, MacNeill, possibly as a token of goodwill, had forwarded to him the pre-1916 Volunteer funds.13 (From as early as his imprisonment in Dartmoor de Valera seemed intent on securing as united a front as possible,14 apropos of which strategy it would appear that he also shelved the usual rules of formal debate during the convention.15) Brugha then rose and praised MacNeill’s integrity, but nonetheless argued that MacNeill should never again hold any position of responsibility in the Volunteers.16 Even so, vis-à-vis the motion which was proposed, no agreement was secured. Instead, the issue was forwarded to the incoming national executive for solution.17 Then, in the second debate, which was a long one, the topic up for discussion was the inter-relationship between the Volunteers and party politics. Clearly many Volunteers had already shown a desire to help promote Sinn Féin.18 Even so, once again, the incoming executive was laboured with a solution.19
The next item on the agenda was the matter of the membership of the executive and, in comparison to the previous two items, this was dealt with quickly.20 The assembly divided into five groups, representing the four provinces and the Dublin area.21 Each group then elected its own members.22 However, the evidence is not compatible on the numbers allocated to the provinces. For example, an important authority like Florrie O’Donoghue provides no numbers at all.23 Richard Walsh (Mayo), a man who, on face value, was endowed with an alert mind and a good memory, tentatively suggested that each province was allocated three members.24 However, his opinion takes no account of local circumstances. This is why Mulcahy’s own figures are probably the most trustworthy, namely Munster (4), Ulster (4), Leinster (2) and Connacht (3).25 In any event, the three men agree that Dublin elected seven members, i.e. when de Valera, as president, is included. All told, therefore, the executive was composed of twenty members.
But, in terms of the unit where the most power would repose on a week by week basis,26 all three commentators were agreed that, with de Valera included, the resident executive contained seven members who were elected by the whole convention.27 Other than that, there were two additional groupings, called directors (specialists, e.g. DT) and co-opted members. Walsh did not refer to either of them. But O’Donoghue and Mulcahy did. And Mulcahy’s evidence, though contradictory, is probably the most reliable:
Cathal Brugha was appointed Chairman of the Resident Executive which would consist of the members of the National Executive elected for the Dublin area together with the persons from outside that area who had been appointed directors, and such co-opted persons as were considered necessary by the Resident Executive [in acknowledgement of probable absences during testing times, and, intermittently, to fill the need for particular skills and talents?].28
Given those complexities, the full complement of dramatis personae was as follows: de Valera, President; Brugha, Chairman, due to de Valera being absent so often on other business; Mulcahy, DT; Staines, Director of Supply and Treasurer; McGarry, Secretary; O’Connor, Director of Engineering (DE), and M.W. O’Reilly, all from Dublin; Collins, Director of Organisation (DO), and Lynch, Director of Communications, both elected from Cork to the Munster panel; and Eamon Duggan, Deputy Chairman;
