view from the 1813 earthen ramparts of Fort Wellington at Prescott. The existing central blockhouse is a postwar construction. The far bank, beyond the St. Lawrence River, is the United States.
CHAPTER 5
Threats and Counter-Threats Along the Niagara River,
July to October 1812
According to Secretary of War Eustis’s original plan to conquer the Canadas, diversionary attacks upon the Detroit and Niagara frontiers would draw British reserves away from Montreal and Quebec, thus allowing the main American thrust to enter Lower Canada through Vermont against reduced opposition. In reality, the failure of government recruiters to raise any significant military units in New England, coupled with the debacle of General Hull at Detroit, effectively derailed the 1812 American war effort. Desperate to create some kind of military success, the administration pressured General Dearborn to produce positive results on the Niagara front to counter their failures elsewhere. For Dearborn, this came as an unwelcome surprise, for he was hardly aware that the Niagara region came under his jurisdiction, while the quality of the region’s commanders had hardly risen to the challenge of the moment. In fact, although it had only been a month since war had been declared, the troops on the Niagara frontier had already been under the command of both Brigadier General William Wadsworth and Major General Amos Hall. On July 13, 1812, they gained their third new commander in the person of Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer.
A member of an influential New York State family, Van Rensselaer had been politically opposed to the prospect of war, but had been manoeuvred into accepting command of the “Army of the Centre” by his political opponent, the incumbent governor, Daniel D. Tompkins. For Tompkins, this seemingly contradictory act actually held political merit, for although a military victory would bring Van Rensselaer fame and honour, declining the post would brand him as failing to support his country in time of war. Furthermore, accepting the post would handicap Van Rensselaer’s ability to mount a political campaign against Tompkins, and any military defeat would seal Van Rensselaer’s political fate entirely.
General Stephen Van Rensselaer, artist unknown. Manipulated into a command he did not want, he later became the scapegoat for the American defeat at Queenston.
Library and Archives Canada, C-007796.
New York State Governor, Daniel D. Tompkins. Political opponent of General Stephen Van Rensselaer, he used the general’s defeat at Queenston to win re-election.
From the Conger Goodyear Manuscript Collection, Vol. 9. Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.
During the remainder of the summer, once he saw the task before him, Van Rensselaer was in a constant state of alarm that Brock would take the initiative and attack across the Niagara River, a circumstance for which he believed there was no effective defence:
Sir … At this hour I have received no reinforcements of men, no supplies of ordnance, tents nor ammunition. There are not ten rounds per man on the Niagara frontier, nor have we lead to make cartridges. We are extremely deficient of medicine and hospital stores; of lint and bandage cloth we have none, nor any surgical instruments…. The company lately under the command of Captain Jennings in Lieutenant Col. Swift’s regiment had become so clamorous for pay, and contended so strenuously that their time had expired, that I have ordered them to be dismissed.[1]
— Major General Van Rensselaer to Major General Dearborn, September 1, 1812
Under these circumstances, orders that had previously been issued to the various posts not to stir up any unnecessary trouble were reissued, a command that at least one detachment of over-enthusiastic young volunteers serving at the newly constructed Fort Tompkins, near Black Rock, found themselves unable to obey, with inevitable consequences.
I commanded the gun that threw the first ball at the enemy [on August 13, 1812] … until now we had not been permitted by our superiors to get up any quarrel with our neighbours, and were not allowed to fire a gun except with blank cartridges for the purpose of practice, and we were tired of lounging and doing nothing. So accordingly the British came near the river and commenced building a battery with some 30 or 40 men. Now the question was, should we permit them to do it? We could do nothing unless slyly done, orders being against us. However, it seemed most too much to allow our enemies to erect machines immediately under our noses to kill us with. We accordingly consulted as to whether we were able to get a ball to the gun unknown to our officers…. After waiting for a favourable opportunity, the ball went in, unknown to any except those engaged in it. Our next business was to gauge the range with the view to have the ball fall short of them, as we did not desire to kill them, but merely to drive them away. All things being ready, the match was applied, BANG! went the gun. The ball struck where we intended. The British were so completely enveloped in smoke and dust that not one of them could be seen, but as soon as they could be, we found them running in every direction…. To complete the mortification on their part, we took off our chapeaux and gave them three cheers. When our officers made inquiries who had disobeyed orders, no one knew anything about it. They did not try very hard to find out…. Now as each party was waiting for the other, the restraint was removed. The next morning, the British opened upon us with long guns. The balls that went over our battery would take out our barracks, which were in the rear. They were built of poles, and before night not one pole was left upon the other….[2]
— Lieutenant Archer Galloway, New York Militia Artillery
The upper (southern) end of the Niagara River as it flows out from Lake Erie and the various military positions established in 1812.
Fortunately for the Americans, Prevost’s directives on maintaining a defensive posture, the temporary armistice, and the limited number of troops at his disposal compelled Brock to remain on his own side of the river, thus giving Van Rensselaer time to receive substantial reinforcements.*[3] Upon arrival, however, these new units found the local command structure in a shambles, as were the arrangements for accommodations, supplies of food, ammunition, weapons, and almost every other necessity of campaign life. As a result, increased levels of insubordination and dissatisfaction led to desertions and outbreaks of mutiny within the various regiments.
Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, the self-proclaimed military “expert” who made considerable contributions to the failures experienced by the American military on the Niagara frontier in 1812.
From the Conger Goodyear Manuscript Collection, Vol. 9. Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.
Nor were things better at the top of the command structure as Quartermaster General Peter B. Porter and the local representative of the governor, Nicholas Gray, (both of whom were War Hawks and held political and personal animosity toward Van Rensselaer) repeatedly sought to undermine his authority. This schism was further widened when Brigadier General Alexander Smyth arrived at Buffalo in late September, with over 1,600 regular troops. Technically, Smyth was under the command of Van Rensselaer, and should have reported his arrival in person to his commanding officer. Instead, Smyth’s ego refused to acknowledge the authority
